Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/5–1153

Report of the Conference of Representatives From the Principal Military Authorities Representing Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the Southeast Asia Area, Held at Pearl Harbor, April 6–10, 1953¹

secret

Pearl Harbor, T. H., [undated].

I. Pursuant to agreement reached by the principal military authorities concerned in the Southeast Asia area, staff representatives met at Pearl Harbor, T. H., 6–10 April 1953, for discussions on agenda items listed herewith:

A. Adequacy of present arrangements for exchange of current intelligence.

B. Adequacy of established and planned communication systems and procedures.

C. (Deleted prior to conference.)

D. Machinery for further coordination of national plans which may be approved in the future.

E. Recommendations to be forwarded to respective Chiefs of Staff or their equivalent.

F. Planning study to determine possible courses of action or capabilities to counter further Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

G. Study of the most appropriate means to carry out the continuity of the contacts and the permanence of the studies.

II. For the purpose of these discussions, the area of Southeast Asia was defined as: Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Crown Colonies of Singapore (including Christmas and Cocos Islands), British North Borneo and Sarawak, the Sultanate of Brunei, Indochina (now the Independent States of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia), the Philippines, Portuguese Timor, the Republic of Indonesia, Dutch New Guinea, Hong Kong, Macao and Formosa.

III. In consideration of these discussions, the following recommendations are made:

A. In order that effective coordination of appropriate portions of approved national plans be achieved to increase the effectiveness of the overall strategic defense of Southeast Asia, it is recommended that:

1. Each of the Five Powers concerned should designate a commander within the area of Southeast Asia (or national Chief of Staff as appropriate) as its Military Representative for the area. These five Military Representatives should be responsible for the mutual coordination of plans, to include the full exchange of pertinent current intelligence, agreed communication procedures and the exchange of other planning information essential to most effective cooperation.

2. The respective Military Representatives should designate one or more staff representatives based at the headquarters of the Military Representative concerned as the permanent points of contact for the exchange of preliminary information and arrangements for meetings as required.

3. The machinery for coordination should permit participation between those of the Five Powers currently involved. These arrangements should permit the designated representative of any participating country to communicate with any one or more of the representatives of other countries, in making arrangements for the exchange of information and for meetings at such times and places as those concerned in the specific matters to be discussed mutually agree upon. Under this concept it would not be necessary or desirable to invoke a meeting of all representatives each time a representative has matters to be considered. In each case, only those directly concerned need meet. In any case the Military Representative of each of the Five Powers would be advised as to the purpose of the meeting and would be free to attend, or be represented, if desired. The chairman of the conference would subsequently advise the non-participating representatives as to the matters discussed and conclusions reached.

4. The machinery should not provide for the establishment of a formal body or committee, and in consequence there should be no requirement for a permanent chairman nor for regular meetings. However, the Military Representatives designated under paragraph III.A.1. above will be free to meet at any time upon their own initiative or to arrange for a meeting of their representatives.

5. Recommendations or conclusions should be forwarded as appropriate by the Military Representatives to their respective Chiefs of Staff or equivalent, for approval.

6. The rules of procedure contained in enclosure (1) should govern for meetings of the Military Representatives and their staff representatives.

B. It is recommended to the respective national chiefs of staff or their equivalent that:

1. The Five Power Military Representatives undertake planning studies to determine possible courses of action to counter further Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, utilizing the machinery recommended under paragraph III.A. above.

2. The subjects listed below be approved as a basis for planning studies, in priority groups as shown, to determine courses of action for further recommendation to the respective national chiefs of staff or their equivalent.

Priority A

• Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Indochina.
• Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Hong Kong.
• Provide ground forces along with appropriate naval and air support to reinforce friendly forces in Indochina.
• Maintain the security of Hong Kong by the introduction of appropriate reinforcements.
• Conduct air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland.
• Conduct a blockade of the China coast.
• Conduct psychological warfare.
• Conduct guerrilla warfare.

Priority B

• Utilization of Chinese Nationalists forces.
• Seize a beachhead on the Chinese mainland.
• Seize and hold a beachhead on Hainan Island.

Priority C

• Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Malaya.
• Provide ground forces along with appropriate naval and air support to reinforce friendly forces in Malaya.
• Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Thailand.
• Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Burma.
• Provide ground forces along with appropriate naval and air support to reinforce friendly forces in Thailand.
• Provide ground forces along with appropriate naval and air support to reinforce friendly forces in Burma.

C. The present arrangements for the exchange of current intelligence should be continued and are adequate provided the following four requirements are approved and implemented:

1. Authority to exchange, and enter into, agreed intelligence estimates on Communist China and the threatened areas of Southeast Asia which are prerequisite toward the evolving of adequate planning studies by the Five Power Military Representatives.

2. Improve the information on all countries not now fully covered, particularly Communist China.

3. Increase the exchange of intelligence in the intervals between the conferences.

4. Evaluate more closely intelligence reports from the field, using standard, agreed evaluation symbols.

D. 1. The present communication systems can meet the anticipated requirements of the Five Power machinery in addition to current commitments. Planned systems appear adequate for operational requirements with the possible exception of the Singapore–Saigon circuit; however, these systems should be the subject of continuing review.

2. Existing broadcast facilities are adequate. Adequacy of mobilization broadcasts is dependent upon final procedures established to implement full naval control of shipping.

3. NATO procedures and publications, which are now effective and/or planned in NATO, are adequate.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The UK and France review the adequacy of the Singapore-Saigon circuit.

b. Broadcast areas and requirements be included in studies to establish naval control of shipping procedures.

c. NATO procedures and publications be made effective and available for all the Five Power Nations.²

• V. E. Hancock
  [Air Vice Marshal]
  Senior Representative, Australia
• R. Lennuyeux
  [Colonel]
  Senior Representative, France
• H. E. Gilbert
  [Colonel]
  Senior Representative, New Zealand
• E. K. G. Sixsmith
  [Major General]
  Senior Representative, United Kingdom
• T. J. Hedding
  [Rear Admiral]
  Senior Representative, United States

1. The source text is attached to a covering letter of May 11 signed on behalf of Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) by his Deputy Assistant Secretary, Najib E. Halaby.
2. Ten annexes to this report are not printed. They include summaries of planning studies on many of the topics listed in the priorities section of paragraph III.B.2 above, and a general estimate of the forces each of the five powers might have available in the event of hostilities in Southeast Asia.