790.5/2–1853: Telegram
The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Department of State
1601. Thai Government and press have been following closely development foreign policy with considerable anticipation US will take more positive action in defense Southeast Asia against Communist menace. Reference Embtels 325, August 22, 1952; 569, October 2, 1952; 1324, January 15, 1953.1
While Thais thoroughly realize effective defense against Communism in Asia must depend largely upon support Western Powers particularly US there is as noted in Embtels 325 and 569 an undercurrent concern major Western Powers determined exercise kind of White man’s monopoly over defense Southeast Asia. Since Thailand has participated in UN Korean action and generally aligned itself with free world in UN activities Thais inclined be puzzled if not resentful over what appears to them continued Western Power exclusiveness regarding Southeast Asian defenses. US–French discussions in Washington last year regarding Indochina, ANZUS Conference in Honolulu and reported “Top Secret” meeting in September [Page 275] among US, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand while indicating positive US interest in defense area also served emphasize exclusively Western Power character such defense plans.
I fear recent press reports will lead Thailand believe we committed such policy. For example AP Washington press despatch February 11 claiming US intends carry on further exchanges military information regarding Southeast Asia defense with Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand and has agreed to French proposal for establishment liaison group will likely arouse same reaction as reports previous Indochina discussions and ANZUS Conference not withstanding Thailand desire see US take firmer stand in Southeast Asia.
Fully appreciate difficulties from security standpoint taking Thais or other Southeast Asians into our confidence especially on matters of military nature but feel it essential take into account Thais sensitivity. I am convinced our economic and military aid to Thailand must be supplemented by greater effort our part identify Thailand politically with general pattern our defense plans. Communist propaganda of course ceaselessly plays on theme US economic and military aid Thailand merely device by which US hopes use country for our own strategic purposes.
I have previously recommended (Embtel 325) we make greater efforts keep Thais fully advised as security requirements permit US aims and objectives in any important meetings or discussions concerning Southeast Asian defense. I am sure Thai Government must at times resent fact that its information on such vital matters must come from subsequent press accounts.
In recent conversation with British Ambassador2 (Embtel 1324) we discussed possibility stimulating greater Thailand-Malaya cooperation by arranging joint British-Thai naval and air maneuvers. I also feel such joint activities should be encouraged whenever and wherever feasible as another measure convince Thais we are willing take them into our confidence on matters affecting defense this area.
Thailand’s constructive participation activities of UN has proved of value to US by intensifying our Asiatic policies with Asians themselves. This participation has also gone far to discourage neutralist sentiment in Thailand and convince Thailand of efficacy of positive association with free world. At same time Thai association with US in UN has provided clear proof we are willing to work with and take them into our confidence as equals. From our experience with Thais in UN therefore would appear most desirable we [Page 276] endeavor extend this cooperation association to problem regional security in Southeast Asia.