Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.00/2–1753

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 17, 1953.

Subject:

• Five Power Liaison Machinery in Accordance with Recommendation of the Report of the Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia held in Washington October 6–17, 1952

The Five Power Conference of Military Representatives held in Washington in October 1952 was for the purpose of concerting military measures to be taken by the five powers in Southeast Asia in the event of overt Chinese aggression in the area, more particularly a Chinese Communist invasion of Tonkin. The over-all conclusions of the conferees were as follows:

• “40. Air, ground and naval action limited only to the areas of aggression and contiguous areas of China offers little prospect of causing Communist China to cease its aggression.
• “41. The imposition of a total sea blockade, in conjunction with the actions limited to the areas of aggression and contiguous areas of Communist China, might have a significant cumulative effect. This course of action offers little assurance of forcing the Chinese Communists to cease aggression.
• “42. A combination of all coercive measures including the defence of the areas of aggression, interdiction of the lines of communication, a full sea blockade and air attacks on all suitable targets of military significance in China, insofar as they are within the Allied capabilities, plus such reinforcements in time and scale as may be practicable in the immediate area, offers the best prospect of causing Communist China to cease an aggression.”²

The agreement contained in paragraph 42 represented definite progress in that all the powers concerned agreed on the measures which would offer the best prospect of causing the Communist Chinese to cease aggression. There was not, however, any agreement as to the military requirements for putting into effect these coercive measures. There were wide divergencies between ourselves and the British on the subject of a sea blockade and on the planes required for successful air action.

The military conferees under the heading of “Conditions to an Effective Military Action” also reached agreement on the following:

• “43. Any action taken against Communist China should be swift and effective and so conducted as to show the Chinese Communists the determination of the Allies to cause them to cease aggression.

• “44. If action is to be prompt, the several participating nations obviously must have plans ready which have been fully coordinated in respect to action to counter the enemy at the actual scene of aggression and in areas immediately contiguous thereto. This coordination, which includes the full exchange of pertinent current intelligence, agreed communication procedures and other information essential to most effective cooperation, may require the setting up of a staff agency so that contacts are maintained and necessary studies continued. The respective Commanders in Chief in the areas concerned should be charged with the earliest implementation of such action as may be appropriate in this regard. The United States delegation is of the opinion that, insofar as United States participation is concerned, the United States Commander in Chief in the area now has the machinery for carrying out his part of the coordination necessary.

  “The Australian delegation, whilst accepting the necessity for coordination, did not express a view upon the machinery which may be required.”

Early in December the French Government approached our Embassy in Paris and the Department stating that the report of the military conferees had received the approval of the French Cabinet and that, at the projected talks between Secretary Acheson and M. Schuman in Paris that month, the carrying out of the recommendation contained in paragraph 44 cited above would be raised, i.e., the establishment of whatever five power liaison machinery might be thought desirable. The subject was at once raised by the Department with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and after some delay the following position was telegraphed to the Secretary in Paris:³

• “1. If Schuman raises question of establishment of liaison staff organization for Southeast Asia, Secretary shall say that US, for its part, is prepared to designate CINCPAC to establish and maintain with appropriate military representatives of other four powers liaison arrangements for exchange of military information concerning Southeast Asia.
• “2. Secretary will make clear to Schuman that objective of such liaison arrangements, from US point of view, would be exchange of military information concerning the area on informal and need-toknow basis at the call of any one of the five, and that such liaison should provide, under concept expressed in paragraph 3 below, for:
  • “a. Appropriate exchange of intelligence;
  • “b. Establishment of such coordinated communications procedures as may be essential to effective implementation of plans; and
  • “c. Such coordination of appropriate portions of approved national plans as may increase the effectiveness of the over-all strategic defense of Southeast Asia.
• “3. From the US point of view machinery for undertaking the coordination envisaged above should be based on the following:
  • “a. It should permit participation on an on-call and need-to-know basis, not only by each of the five powers currently involved, but if subsequently it appears desirable by additional Southeast Asian countries.
  • “b. It should permit the designated military representatives of any participating country to communicate with any one or more of the military representatives of the other countries, in person or through appointed liaison officers, and at such times and places as those concerned in the specific matters to be discussed mutually agree upon. Under this concept it would not be necessary or desirable to invoke a meeting of all representatives each time a representative has matters to be considered. In each case only those directly concerned need meet.
  • “c. The machinery should not provide for establishment of a formal body or committee and in consequence there should be no requirement for a permanent chair nor for regular meetings.”

The Secretary at his meeting with Messrs. Schuman and Eden in Paris on December 18 made the following statement with regard to this matter:⁴

“… I said that instructions had been issued to Admiral Radford to detail an officer who would confer with the British and French officer and to set up a liaison group. I wanted it clearly understood that what Admiral Radford would discuss was the sort of liaison group which would operate under field conditions. We did not want a committee; we did not want secretaries; and we did not want minutes. All that was necessary was to have competent officers, who would exchange full information, so that the commanders of all three forces would be in touch and would be informed. I gathered from him that this was the sort of arrangement which he had in mind, although he did not commit himself in any detail. However, he said that what he contemplated in the first instance was a meeting of the commanders to work out the arrangements. Mr. Eden intervened to say that General Harding⁵ had instructed the British commander in Southeast Asia to meet at any agreed point. I said that this was anew idea to me and that I did not altogether see why Admiral Radford, who had just been in the Far East, should return there when some deputy might be adequate. However, I was not in a position to speak further on the subject, except that I could not commit Admiral Radford in person. I would report this suggestion to Washington and would then communicate with the Foreign Office as to whether Admiral Radford himself would be willing to meet or would send one of his staff officers.”

In order to facilitate a determination as to the next step to be taken in this matter, a meeting was held in the Department on January 12 attended by representatives of the Embassies of the four countries involved in addition to the United States plus Admiral H. Page Smith, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the Department Messrs. Nolting (G), Peterson (BNA)⁶ and Bonsal (PSA). A memorandum⁷ covering this meeting was made available to all US participants and copies were sent to the Embassies concerned and to the Consulate General in Singapore. Pertinent paragraphs from this memorandum are the following:

“Mr. Nolting expressed the general philosophy with which the Secretary approached this problem at Paris where he discussed the matter at a meeting with Messrs. Eden and Schuman on December 18. He said that what we envisaged was that each of the Commanders in the area would designate one of his officers for the performance of the functions described above. He said that we contemplated that meetings would be held on an ad hoc basis on the initiative of any one of the five commanders. He said that we did not envisage any permanent setup involving a secretariat, the keeping of minutes, etc. Admiral Page Smith confirmed this point of view.

“Mr. Millet stated that the French Government had in mind that the first step would be for the five military commanders in the area to designate representatives who would get together in order to formulate recommendations as to the liaison machinery (which might be a staff agency) required in order to achieve the purpose laid down as desirable by the military Conference of last October; namely, the full exchange of pertinent current intelligence, agreed communication procedures and such coordination of plans as might be necessary. He said that it was his understanding that these recommendations would then be submitted to governments for approval at the political level.

“Mr. Tomlinson, of the British Embassy, indicated that he had a different understanding of the situation. He understood that the British Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office were currently engaged in studying a French proposal involving ‘terms of reference’ for the setting up of a new international body to do what was contemplated in Article 44 of the Military Conference Report. He said that until this examination had been completed, he did not believe that the British Commanders in the Southeast Asian area could receive any instructions. It developed, upon further discussion between Messrs. Millet and Tomlinson, that the ‘terms of reference’ which Mr. Tomlinson alluded to were the same as those contained in Article 44 of the Military Conference Report.

“Mr. McNicol, of the Australian Embassy, and Mr. Laking, of the New Zealand Embassy stated that although they were generally aware of the fact that there had been discussion between Acheson, Schuman and Eden on this subject they were sure that their governments had no detailed views as to what should be the next step.

“The United States representatives stated that their view of future procedure was similar to that set forth by the French representatives and that they believed it would be desirable, when agreement has been reached by all five governments concerned, to issue instructions to Admiral Radford along the lines of those already issued to General Salan. There was general agreement to the fact that the proposed new machinery or arrangements were designed only to deal with the contingency of a further Chinese Communist aggression since the ‘terms of reference’ of the October Military Conference were addressed to this contingency.

“After considerable further discussion, it was agreed that each of the representatives present at the meeting would report back to their government and would endeavor to secure a further expression of views. It was also agreed that a further meeting would be called as soon as there were any further developments for consideration and at the call of any participant.”

Later developments were as follows:

(a) On January 28, Mr. Tomlinson left with the Department an aide-mémoire reading as follows:

“Her Majesty’s Government are agreeable in principle to the establishment of a Five-Power Staff Agency for Southeast Asia, whose functions would cover the exchange of intelligence, operational planning to counter possible further Chinese aggression and studies of logistics and communications. Her Majesty’s Government also agree to a preliminary meeting of the Allied Commanders concerned for the purpose of making recommendations to Governments on future procedure.”

(b) On February, M. Millet left with the Department a document said to have been discussed by Gen. Ely of the standing group with Gen. Elliot of the UK and with Gen. Omar Bradley and alleged to have the approval of the aforesaid generals. This document in the form of a proposed “Draft Resolution” to be accepted by all five powers concerned reads as follows:

• “1. The Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed, within the framework of the report of the military conference of the five powers (par. 43, 44), on the principle of establishing for South-East Asia, a staff agency of the five powers whose task would include exchange of information concerning the enemy, preparation of plans for the most efficient allied operational cooperation in the case of Chinese aggression and the study of logistical and transmission questions.
• “2. The five Governments are also in agreement for a preliminary meeting of the interested Supreme Allied Commanders and of the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of Australia and New Zealand, the objective of this meeting would be to prepare recommendations to be transmitted to the Governments as to the procedure to follow.
• “3. It is therefore recommended that:
  • “a) the French Government informs the General, Commander in Chief in Indochina, of these agreements and instructs him to invite the British Defence Committee Far East, the ‘CINC–PAC’ and the designated delegates of the Chiefs of Staff of Australia and New Zealand to participate or to send their representatives to the preliminary conference which will be held as soon as possible at a place to be agreed between them.
  • “b) The Governments of Australia, of New Zealand, of the United Kingdom and of the United States advise their military authorities of their agreement upon the principle establishing the staff agency as well as upon the meeting and the object of the preliminary conference and that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand send to the French Government the names of the military representatives they will have designated.”

This document was transmitted immediately to Admiral Page Smith and to the other US participants at the earlier meeting.

(c) On February 9 the British Embassy advised that the British Joint Chiefs thought it would be a good idea if the contemplated preliminary meeting to devise ways and means of carrying out the agreed objectives could be attended by the Commanders in Chief in Southeast Asia and that in any case no one of lesser rank than chief of staff of the Commanders in Chief should attend the proposed preliminary meeting.

(d) On February 10 the Australian Embassy delivered an aide-mémoire reading as follows:

“The Australian Embassy wishes to inform the Department of State that the Australian Government is agreeable to the convening of a preliminary meeting of staff officers for the purpose of discussing further the setting up of a staff agency in accordance with the recommendations set out in paragraph 44 of the Report of the Five Power Military Conference on South East Asia.

“It is the understanding of the Australian Government that the establishment of a staff agency will depend upon decisions by Governments following on the preliminary meeting of staff officers.”

This was distributed as above to the US participants in the meeting and to the Embassies concerned.

(e) On February 12 a communication was received from Admiral Page Smith⁸ to the effect that the French Embassy erred in stating that the memorandum set forth in paragraph (c) [(b)] above had prior approval of Gen. Omar Bradley. Admiral Smith stated: “On the contrary he (Gen. Bradley) has maintained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff a constant objection against use of the term ‘staff agency’ with its implication of a formal body or standing group in describing the agreed liaison arrangements.” Admiral Smith attached a proposed document in substitution of the French memorandum. This document is entitled “Proposed Method of Establishment of Liaison Machinery for Southeast Asia Military Discussion.” It reads as follows:

• “1. The Government of Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States have agreed, within the framework of the report of the military conference of the five powers (Paragraphs 43 and 44), in the interest of coordination of action in Southeast Asia, to establish liaison arrangements for exchange of pertinent intelligence, agreed communication procedures and such coordination of appropriate portions of approved national plans as may increase the effectiveness of the over-all strategic defense of Southeast Asia.
• “2. It is therefore recommended that the Governments concerned:
  • “a. Designate their military representatives who will undertake the necessary liaison and inform the other participants of their selection.
  • “b. Authorize the designated military representatives to establish liaison on an informal and need-to-know basis at the call of any one representative in accordance with the following concept:
    • “(1) The designated military representatives of any participating country should be permitted to communicate with any one or more of the representatives of the other countries, in person or through appointed liaison officers, at such times and places as those concerned in the specific matters to be discussed mutually agreed upon. Under this concept it would not be necessary or desirable to invoke a meeting of all representatives each time a representative has matters to be considered. In each case only those directly concerned need meet.
    • “(2) The machinery should not provide for the establishment of any form of standing group, formal body or committee and in consequence there should be no requirement for a permanent chair or for regular meetings.”

(f) On February 13 the New Zealand Embassy delivered an aide-mémoire which is quoted below:

“The New Zealand Government is agreeable to be represented at a preliminary meeting to discuss further the scope and implications of the proposal to establish a staff agency in accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph 44 of the Report of the Five Power Military Conference on South East Asia.

“The New Zealand Government considers that the functions of the agency should be limited to those contemplated by paragraph 44 of the Report, that meetings should be on an ad hoc basis and that the establishment of a permanent body or secretariat should be avoided.”

On February 13 the entire subject was taken up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁹ It is our understanding that General Bradley withdrew his approval from the memorandum cited in paragraph (e) above and that the question of any meeting at all between military representatives of the five powers in Southeast Asia was called into question. Among the various points raised was one to the effect that until political decisions had been reached regarding action which would be taken in the area, there would be no use having military meetings. It was not made clear just why liaison machinery of the type contemplated in paragraph 44 of the military representatives conference report of last October would not be of value even in the absence of political decisions in the event of an overt Chinese Communist aggression.

1. Filed with a covering memorandum of the same date from Bonsal to Allison, not printed.
2. The quotation is from the Conference Report of Oct. 17, 1952, p. 230.
3. Telegram 3411 to Paris, Dec. 16, 1952. (790.5/12–1652)
4. The quotation is from Acheson’s memorandum (drafted Dec. 22) of this meeting, at which Letourneau was also present. According to Acheson, Letourneau had stressed the fact that France regarded the recommendations as having considerable binding force. For the complete text óf the memorandum, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 323.
5. Gen. Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
6. Frederick E. Nolting, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, and Avery F. Peterson, Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs.
7. Memorandum by Bonsal dated Jan. 12. (790.5/1–1253)
8. Undated memorandum from Rear Admiral Smith to Bonsal. (790.00/2–1253)
9. A memorandum on the substance of discussions at a State Department-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting held on that date, at which the question of five-power talks was considered, is not printed. (State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417)