790.5/1–2953
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State
Subject:
- United Kingdom and ANZUS
The memorandum which Mr. Churchill left with President Eisenhower1 concerning the relationship between the United Kingdom and ANZUS states that he and Mr. Eden have been “disturbed by reports of the proceedings of the ANZUS staff planners, which seem to show that ANZUS was seeking to extend its scope throughout the Pacific area including Southeast Asia.” Mr. Churchill added that it was not reasonable that such planning should proceed without direct United Kingdom assistance as their interests were closely involved.
The memorandum then goes on to put forward a suggestion made by Mr. Menzies of Australia that it should be possible to proceed by stages to reach a solution of the problem of United Kingdom participation in Far Eastern planning which would be satisfactory. Mr. Menzies suggests that the first step would be to give reality to ANZAM (the Australian, New Zealand, Malayan staff setup) and that then there should be a system of liaison on a high military level between ANZUS and ANZAM. Mr. Menzies concludes that it would then follow as a natural consequence that “the planning performed separately by the ANZUS and ANZAM organizations should fall into the hands of a joint ANZUS–ANZAM Committee.[“] These proposals were endorsed by Mr. Holland of New Zealand.
[Page 264]While it is true that the report of the first meeting of the military representatives of ANZUS2 does indicate that their planning tasks covered a wide field, including such United Kingdom responsibilities as Hong Kong, Malaya, the Crown Colonies of Singapore, and British North Borneo and Sarawak, nevertheless in actual practice it is believed the main activity concerning these areas will consist of exchange of intelligence information rather than any actual planning for military operations. Admiral Radford’s terms of reference as the United States Military Representative are extremely limited and it is not believed that Mr. Churchill’s concern over the activities of the ANZUS military representatives is fully justified. It is the opinion of those officers in the Department concerned with the matter that as long as ANZUS remains in its present form the United Kingdom should not be formally associated with it even as an observer. This is based upon, among other things, our definite belief that any expansion of ANZUS by the addition of the United Kingdom would (1) entail a demand from the French for similar representation and (2) give fuel to Communist propaganda which tells the Asiatic nations that the United States is not in fact interested in them but only interested in an association of western powers for the purpose of dominating the East. In this latter connection, I am attaching a memorandum3 by one of the officers of my staff discussing the problem of the exclusion of Asians from Far Eastern defense arrangements. While I do not associate myself entirely with everything Mr. Ogburn says, nevertheless I do believe he makes an interesting and valuable presentation of the point of view which is shared, I am sure, by most of our friends in Asia. I strongly urge that you take the three or four minutes necessary to read this memorandum.
Should the British and the French be admitted to ANZUS, it would immediately, as you pointed out to Mr. Churchill,4 enlarge the scope of United States commitments in Asia to include Hong Kong, Indo-China and Malaya. While I believe that it may be to our ultimate interest to assume eventually some increased responsibility with respect to those areas, I do not believe we are ready at this time to make definite commitments that the United States armed forces would be used in the defense of any of these areas. However, I believe it important that you be able to give some sort of encouraging response to Mr. Churchill, as I think we must do whatever we reasonably can to encourage the British to go along with us in Asia. I therefore suggest that you inform Mr. Churchill [Page 265] that the suggestion in his memorandum put forward by Mr. Menzies about a progressive development of the ANZUS–ANZAM relationship commends itself to you and that you will recommend to your government that the possibilities be thoroughly explored.
The greatest difficulty we will have in this connection is undoubtedly with the Pentagon. As you know, the present Joint Chiefs are adamant in their determination not to be involved any more than absolutely necessary in planning with other countries, and they shy away from anything which might conceivably take the form of a Combined Chiefs of Staff. I do not believe they are realistic in this as I cannot conceive how we can engage in efficient planning for military defense of the Pacific or any part of it without engaging in some form of joint planning with our allies. In talking with Admiral Radford, I believe that he has a much more liberal attitude in this regard than that now being displayed in the Pentagon. I therefore hope that his influence can be brought to bear with a view to obtaining more flexibility on the part of our Joint Chiefs in giving us more leeway for cooperation with our allies. I am afraid, however, that as things stand at present, the most you can say to Mr. Churchill is, as indicated above, that you will recommend an immediate and urgent study of the possibilities of carrying out Mr. Menzies’ suggestion.