790.5/1–2153
Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Ogburn) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)
Subject:
- Exclusion of Asians from Far Eastern Defense Arrangements
At the risk of being repetitious, I should like to emphasize the dangers, as they seem to me, of our appearing to join with other Western powers behind the backs of the Asians in organizations for the defense of the Far East or parts of the Far East. The ANZUS Treaty contributed significantly to the impression that that is what we are up to and it is evident that we shall continue to be under strong pressure from the British Prime Minister—pressure which is not easy to resist—to agree to British participation in ANZUS in one form or another, which would of course intensify that impression. Last week a British official in London gave out to the press that plans for liaison arrangements among the U.S., the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and France for an exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia have been made. Moreover, as I understand it, a proposal for a joint statement by the U.S., the U.K., and France with respect to aggression in Southeast Asia is still under consideration.
It is difficult to believe that any practical gains we shall make through teaming up with the other Western powers in Asia, whether for the defense of Asia or for any other purpose, will offset the resentment we shall arouse among the Asians themselves. This resentment, it may be noted, would be felt not simply by one category of Asians; all the Asians would feel it, South Koreans and Nationalist Chinese as well as Indonesians and Indians. Miss Catherine Porter of FE/P has brought back from the conference of Public Affairs Officers in Rangoon a report of widespread suspicion of ANZUS in the Far East (according to the Public Affairs Officer in Canberra, ANZUS is not even popular among the Australians). It is evident that in developing further organizational relationships with the Western powers in Asia we shall be creating more difficulties for ourselves. My own feeling is that we shall be surrendering [Page 261] the substance of strength in Asia (the readiness of the Asians to make common cause with us) for the sake of the form of strength (an organization that will effect very little material improvement in the prospects).
There is no explanation, so far as I can see, that we can offer the Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will allay or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must regard such a development. We cannot say that we are excluding the Asians from such relationships because the Western powers have superior military potential. Most of the Asian countries are a good deal stronger militarily than New Zealand. The armed forces of the Chinese Nationalists should soon, if they do not already, exceed in capabilities the present forces of Australia. The Republic of Korea will before long have a stronger army in Asia than any of the Western powers. It is true that the Korean, Chinese Nationalists, and Philippine armed forces derive their strength from American support. Without American support, however, the British and French would not be in Asia at all. Moreover, the dependence of the stronger Asian powers on American material aid does not mean that the Asians are prepared to regard their own military potential as negligible. The Indonesians believe (and believe with some warrant) that their guerrilla forces, with no help at all from the outside, defeated the Dutch army while the latter was amply supplied with British and American equipment. The Asians have not overlooked the good account of themselves as fighters that has been given by the Chinese Communist terrorists in Malaya, by the North Koreans, by the Chinese Communists in Korea, and by the Vietminh, which fought the French to a standstill for three years before it was able to receive supplies from Communist China. If the Asians read history, they cannot but be aware that we have consistently underrated their abilities as fighters.
If we cannot maintain that we are leaving the Asians out of our special arrangements because their military potential is too low to warrant their inclusion, neither can we maintain that we are leaving them out because they are not sufficiently anti-Communist. All the Asian countries but China have been shown to be far less vulnerable to the Communist ideology than Italy and France, which we have welcomed as allies. Certainly a firmer stand against Communism than that which has been taken by the Republic of Korea and the Philippines could scarcely be asked for. It is to be doubted, to say the least, that in the event of general war we should witness any firmer stand on the part of France.
[Page 262]Finally, it will not be sufficient for us to say that some of the leading Asian states would not be willing to participate in our special arrangements with the white powers. In the first place, a number of them would be eager to do so. In the second, the non participation of the others should be the result of their own refusal, not of our failure to extend an invitation, if we wish to retain a modicum of their trust.
The plain fact is that any exclusively Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the clear implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferiors. We shall not be able to avoid this implication because that is indeed our attitude.
Accordingly, I believe that if we are to avoid a great mistake we ought either to refuse to involve ourselves in any special relationships with the Western powers in Asia or else give the Asian governments an opportunity to participate in those relationships on a basis of equality. Unless we are ready to admit the Asians to full partnership, I believe we should put aside the thought of developing partnerships with the other Western powers in their part of the world.
As between the two alternatives, my hunch is that we should offer to take the Asians into our councils and to hold with them such military conversations as we have been engaging in with the Western powers in Asia and may plan for the future. Should the Chinese Communists invade Burma and Thailand, I think we would feel very foolish if we were caught without having had any conversations with the Burmese or Thai as to what could be done jointly in the event of such a development. Whatever we may think of Burmese military capabilities, I am sure we must rate their potential contribution to the defense of Southeast Asia a great deal higher than that of New Zealand and I venture to suggest that we shall not in the eventuality of a major conflict be above accepting help from any quarter. In this connection, it might be recalled that we have just encouraged the Filipinos to send a mission to Malaya to show the British how to clean out the Communists. I am also mindful of the fact that during World War II we were at great pains to establish and maintain communications with a Siamese underground with Pridi1 as our contact-man. If the Chinese Communists strike, we shall find it hard to explain to ourselves why we have made no provisions for communications with other indigenous groups in Southeast Asia.
I think it is not enough to say that the Burmese and Indonesians, for example, would not be willing to have such conversations with [Page 263] us. While the Burmese and Indonesian governments undoubtedly would refuse to identify themselves with us in any kind of security arrangements or formal talks, I am by no means sure that the chiefs of their armed forces would not be willing to go pretty far with us on an informal basis. In any case, I believe that an invitation to the Asians to take part in our arrangements with the Western powers would be received as a compliment and would relieve us of the odium we may expect to bring upon ourselves by excluding them. If we expect to consolidate a position in the Far East through association with the French (who of all peoples are probably the most suspect and unpopular among the Asians) and the British, then it must appear that we are naive.
- Pridi Phanomyong, Prime Minister, March-August 1946.↩