Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116

United States Minutes of the First Meeting, ANZUS Council: Second Session

top secret
HON MIN-2

Kaneohe, T.H., August 4, 1952—3 p.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (30).]

Organization of the Council

Continuing Military Machinery

Mr. Casey suggested that the discussion of military machinery be deferred until after the Council had considered Item D on the Agenda, “Survey of Situations Affecting Security in the Pacific”. This survey would have a direct bearing on the decision reached with respect to military machinery. Mr. Webb supported Mr. Casey’s suggestion.

Relationship with Other States, Regional Organizations, etc.

A. UK Observer

The Secretary then referred to Item C on the Agenda, “Relationship with Other States and National Organizations—UK Observer”.

Mr. Casey said that the UK was anxious to have an observer attend the ANZUS Council meetings. Mr. Webb concurred with Mr. Casey, stating that this situation was awkward for New Zealand. He said the UK felt that as a Pacific power, it should not be left out of an arrangement in which two other members of the Commonwealth were taking part. He asked that every effort be made to bring the UK in by some means. He added that it was the hope of the UK to be admitted to the Council in a more intimate way than merely by being informed of the character of its deliberations. New Zealand, however, was cognizant of the US as well as the UK viewpoint.

The Secretary said that this was a very difficult and embarrassing question and the only way to treat it was with complete frankness. He had discussed this matter on five occasions: with the British Ambassador at Washington, with Mr. Menzies on his first visit to Washington early this year, with Mr. Munro, with Mr. Eden during the London talks and with Mr. Menzies on his return to Australia in June. The British Ambassador had mentioned two reasons why it was essential for the UK to be associated with the ANZUS Council:

1. There was a strong feeling among the British people and in Parliament on this issue and it would not be understood if the UK was not included.

2. The UK definitely wished to be associated with our thinking.

With respect to the second point, The Secretary said it was inconceivable to him that the ANZUS Council would decide anything that would take the UK by surprise. They already knew our plans through close collaboration in Korea, the Middle East and NATO. However, the Ambassador’s first point he understood very well and it was embarrassing. The UK Government had to take into account the will of the British people and Parliament and therefore needed both publicity and the widest possible association of the UK with ANZUS Council. The Secretary recalled that our first idea was to include the Philippine Islands and Japan in the treaty arrangements for security in the Pacific area. When this idea was found to be repugnant to the UK, we worked out three treaties. Were the UK now brought in, we would have difficulty with other countries also wanting an ANZUS link—with the French, for example—and we would soon have a group of colonial powers dealing with Asian problems. If we agreed to admit France and the UK, we would also have to include Japan and the Philippines. Therefore we should try to find a way of associating ourselves with the UK without bringing them into the actual machinery. This of course would not take care of the domestic political problem in the UK. The way out might be to refrain from deciding the problem and to leave it in suspense, meanwhile informing the UK fully as to what went on. It was pertinent that the Koreans and Filipinos had already asked that they be permitted to send observers to the Council. The Secretary expressed the strong hope that we might find a polite way out of the dilemma and still achieve the desired results.

Mr. Casey stated that this must be the eventual outcome but the difficulty was to devise words to explain our position. The Secretary felt we might find a formula in the reaffirmation of our interest in the free people of Asia. Mr. Casey asked if we could bring in the UK when their interests were involved. Mr. Webb stated that the French would say that no matter was of concern to Britain and not also of concern to France. The Secretary pointed out that we could not deny the interest of France, which had one-third of its army in Indo-China. Mr. Casey said that we could not get out of the problem without saying something. He felt sure the staffs could frame words which would be satisfactory. Ambassador Spender suggested that the wording be tied to the general problem as stated in the treaty. He further suggested admitting that there was a difficulty. As the press had got on to this question, they would demand an answer. Mr. Webb said that it was a French journalist who at the Honolulu Airport had asked if participation of other interested states in ANZUS was being considered at the official level. Ambassador Munro suggested that the matter be referred to a drafting group. Mr. Webb said that he would be asked in his country what we did to get Britain in. Ambassador Spender said that if the question turned on the admission of the UK it would be wiser to make a statement in terms of the general subject matter of the treaty, wrapping it all up in a phrase explaining the difficulty in moving too rapidly in extending relationships. However, he saw no reason to mention Great Britain specifically. Mr. Webb suggested an indication that for the time being there was no thought of enlarging the Council. If we were asked about Great Britain specifically and we said it had not been included, it would be worse than if we had said nothing at all. Mr. Casey suggested working along the line that there would be no accretions at the present time.

The Secretary suggested that the matter be left to the drafting group and urged that we not separate in two parts something which should be handled in one. He said there were many things that should be done and will be done but not yet, so far as ANZUS was concerned. Some of these things had already been done but we had to keep in close touch with the situation in the future. For example, there was already a clear link with the US and New Zealand and Australia on the one hand and with the US and the Philippines and the US and Japan on the other. It should be made clear to the UK privately by all of us that we were not keeping back any secrets.

Mr. Webb again suggested that we might say we could not at this early stage think of enlarging the membership of ANZUS.

B. Possible Relationship with NATO

The Secretary then raised for consideration Item C(2) on the Agenda, “Possible Relationship with NATO”.

Mr. Casey said that this question was linked to that of the proposed military machinery for the Council. He said that Australia had no great concern about the NATO but that as NATO became stronger and more all-embracing, it might prove to be disadvantageous for Australia not to be associated with it. However, he suggested that this matter be deferred until after the Secretary had completed the survey and that it then be taken up with the problem of military organization.

Survey of Situations Affecting Security in the Pacific

The Secretary said he would be glad to plunge into the general discussion and asked that he be interrupted whenever a question occurred to the New Zealand and Australian Ministers. (In the discussion the Secretary followed in general the outline contained in HON Special 7.)¹

The Soviet Union and the Nature of Communism

The Secretary said that the free world was threatened by a process of disintegration. We could deal with Soviet aggression, which was a factor in bringing about the disintegration, if the world were in a healthy state and if there were not in many areas the most virulent nationalism and xenophobia. We could deal with the weaknesses of Europe, Asia and South Africa if these regions were not always under the threat of the USSR, which seized on these weaknesses. As an example of the two forces, i.e., nationalism and xenophobia, he cited the case of Iran. If Iran were Guatemala, the problem would not be difficult. Our capacity, however, to deal with Iran was conditioned by its geographical location bordering on the USSR.

Another development since World War I has been the severe shock dealt to the balance-of-power concept. First the Austro-Hungarian Empire was destroyed as a result of tying into the settlement after World War I the principle of self-determination. With it went not only the destruction of a military power but of an important economic and social unit as well. Subsequently the Italian Empire had disappeared, France had been weakened, and the power of Germany and Japan spent. As a result the forces containing Soviet power had been removed. Meanwhile, however, the Russian Empire had lost its non-dynamic character. It had become a combination of the old Russian state and the conspiracy that brought the Communists to power. The Kremlin injected into foreign affairs a dynamic doctrine which had led others to become the tools of Communist Russia’s foreign policy. This doctrine was the instrument of the Russian foreign office and it had very great power. Soviet Russia regarded the world in terms of concentric circles. First there was Soviet Russia itself as the center of Russian power and world revolution. There was a certain aspect of fraud in the idea of world revolution as it was a convenient method of causing trouble. Next there were the satellites, which provided protection to the center and were extendable when situations of weakness made this possible. Finally there was in other countries the Communist Party, which constituted a sort of submarine warfare.

The Secretary said that we must know something of the Communist system and the Communist state. It was a very great autocratic military power. It was controlled by a few people. Therefore the ideas in the heads of these few people were important. The main idea in their heads was the danger to the regime. They were unappeasably opposed to the rest of the world and no approach would diminish their hostility. The current anti-American campaign was a disturbing manifestation of this hostility as it indicated that Soviet leaders had decided two things:

1. There was no use continuing to pretend that it was possible to be friendly with the Western Powers.

2. They were prepared to burn all their bridges and leave no room for retreat.

The latter point was new, since now the high command could not disavow its policy. To understand this one had to understand the Soviet concept of world revolution and the hierarchy of values in the USSR. Although the people might be bothered by the necessity for reconciling the idea of the Communist state and of world revolution, this had not been true of the leaders of the USSR. The whole conduct of these leaders had shown that they were never inhibited by the character of the Communist revolution. They had been prepared to overthrow their doctrine at any time. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Politburo had constantly left fellow Communists in other countries out on a limb. The best example of this was the Soviet attitude toward Hitler and the deal made with him. The explanation lay in the fact that Stalin saw no conflict in Communist doctrine and the Soviet Union but the Soviet Union came first. That idea had been accepted by those who had been often betrayed. This all meant that Stalin and the Soviet leaders were primarily interested in the preservation of the regime and that they were ruthless and pragmatic.

The above analysis leads to certain general conclusions: Soviet Russia would approach a general war with caution as it would involve a serious threat to the regime if the regime did not succeed in winning quickly. But in this there was no comfort. Soviet Russia would want to have large odds before engaging in a general war. If the risk were small, however, the Soviet would not hesitate. Moreover, under certain other circumstances they might precipitate a general war. If, for example, they believed they had reached the point of being immune from attack, they might occupy areas which would weigh the scales against the West.

The Secretary mentioned two common misconceptions concerning our policy toward Soviet Russia. First, many people believed that if Churchill, Truman and Stalin would sit down together they could work things out. That was not true. There could be no modus vivendi until it was to the advantage of the USSR. The best we could do was so to arrange things as to live along until the balance was in our favor. The second misconception related to the meaning of containment. Many people thought that we were trying to hold a ring around Soviet Russia. In fact, we were endeavoring to see to it that freedom of choice rested with us, not with the Kremlin.

What the US Has Tried to Do.

This brought us to what we were trying to do:

1. Redress the imbalance of military power between East and West which had precluded our having a choice.

2. Work in the field of economics so that our friends—particularly in Europe—might trade their standard of living for a better one. In this way they would be able to increase their economic and military strength and not succumb to the feeling that they might not be worse off under Communism.

3. Work in more primitive countries. This involved the development of their resources and the education of their people in order to make them friendly. This policy, which began in Latin America, had been extended to the Near East and South Asia.

[Here follow the Secretary’s remarks on and a general discussion of the situation in several countries and territories of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.]

1. “Outline for General Survey of World Situations Affecting Security in the Pacific”, July 30, 1952. (Lot 59 D 95, CF 116)