Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116

United States Minutes of the First Meeting, ANZUS Council: First Session¹

top secret
HONMIN-1

Kaneohe, T.H., August 4, 1952—10 a.m.

[Here follow a list of persons present (33), a description of the public opening ceremonies, and an account of procedural arrangements made in closed session. The text of Acheson’s remarks made during the public ceremonies is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1952, page 243.

[Richard Casey, Minister of External Affairs and External Territories, headed the Australian Delegation whose principal members were Spender, McNicol, Sir Frederick Shedden, (permanent) Secretary of the Department of Defence, Alan Watt, (permanent) Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, and Laurence McIntyre, an Assistant Secretary in the Department of External Affairs.

[The New Zealand Delegation, led by Webb, included also Munro, Laking, and Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of External Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Department.

[Acheson led the U.S. Delegation whose principal members were Admiral Radford and Jessup, Perkins, and Allison.]

D. Usage of Term “ANZUS”

The Secretary suggested that the treaty and the Council needed a name for convenient reference and ready identification. He recalled that the use of the term “Pacific” was considered undesirable because some of the countries of the Pacific area, vitally interested in its security, were not included in the ANZUS arrangement and because use of the word “Pacific” might be misconstrued in countries such as the Philippines and Japan. There was agreement that the term “ANZUS” should be used.

4. Organization of the Council

The Council then proceeded to agenda Item B, “Organization of the Council”.

A. Political Machinery.

Under this heading consideration was first given to Item B–1 “Continuing Political Machinery and Initial Tasks”.

The Secretary summarized the U.S. understanding of the Australian and New Zealand proposals² for a continuing political organization, stating that we found them sensible. He said that the annual meeting should be attended by the three ministers themselves and that the place of meeting should be determined on the principle of rotation. He explained the heavy burden which would rest on his successor in view of the numerous meetings throughout the year which the Secretary of State normally attends, mentioning the UN, NATO and OAS.

Mr. Webb suggested that the annual council meeting be held usually in Washington. The Secretary stated that the annual meeting should be held one year in Australia or New Zealand and the following year in Washington. He said that the principle of rotation should be followed as a general rule but that there might be occasions when the three countries would want to depart from it. He said that it was important to meet special situations. Mr. Spender agreed that although there should normally be one annual meeting of the Council, provision should be made for more than one meeting under special circumstances. The Secretary agreed with this.

Mr. Casey asked whether the deputy selected by the Secretary to attend meetings other than those attended by the Secretary himself would always be the same individual. The Secretary stated that his deputy would be the Under Secretary of State. He said he assumed there was no intention to avoid using the channels and staff already directly involved with problems of mutual interest and that he expected these channels would also be used for the usual business conducted with Australia and New Zealand. This point was accepted by the Australian and New Zealand delegations.

(For the purpose of reaching common agreement on the political organization, Mr. Foster³ extracted from the negotiating paper⁴ on this subject, that part outlining our understanding of the Australian and New Zealand suggestions. The contents of this paper were cleared by Mr. Foster through Mr. McIntyre for Australia and Mr. Laking for New Zealand and were incorporated in final form in the “Agreed Record of Proceedings”.) (See ANZUS 1/7 [HON D–7 page 5])⁵

The Secretary then outlined briefly his concept of the functions of the council, stating that it would doubtless wish to give continuing consideration to the political and strategic situation in the Pacific area and that he welcomed the opportunity, as the deliberations of the council proceeded, to give a frank and full exposition of U.S. thinking on a wide range of international situations of mutual concern. He also stated that the Council would consider possible relationships with other states and regional organizations as mentioned in Article VIII of the treaty. In this connection there would be a discussion of two particular aspects of this problem—one having to do with the matter of a UK observer and the other with the possible relationship between the Council and NATO. Mr. Casey expressed his satisfaction with the Secretary’s statement, indicating that it would be very helpful were he to take the Australian and New Zealand delegations fully into his confidence.

Mr. Spender mentioned, with reference to Article VIII of the Treaty, that he assumed in an emergency such vital questions as logistics and supply might be discussed. He thought that no limitations should be placed on the competence of the Council to discuss any matter of mutual concern. The Secretary agreed that as we were friends and allies we would want to discuss the kind of matters to which Mr. Spender referred.

The Secretary suggested that the first session of the Council be adjourned until 3 p.m.

B. Military Machinery.

Mr. Webb said that the New Zealand delegation had prepared a paper on military organization which it desired to circulate (see ANZUS 1/7 [HON D–7]).⁶ Mr. Casey suggested that there might be some discussion of the military organization problem before adjournment. Mr. Spender expressed the opinion that after the meeting was reconvened it should keep to the agenda. Mr. Webb stated his belief that it was too early to adjourn the morning session. The Secretary indicated that he preferred not to get into the question of military machinery until the afternoon session. Mr. Casey asked if there were any objection to his outlining Australia’s thoughts with respect to military organization. The Secretary said he would be glad to hear Mr. Casey’s exposition of this matter.

Mr. Casey said that existing military channels should be used as far as possible. He stated, however, that there must be planning on the military side and that this could only be done where there are planners and thinkers. Australia understood that this planning and thinking took place chiefly in the Pentagon although some of it was decentralized. When Australia talked of the ANZUS military committee it had in mind having a senior Australian military man at Washington attached to its Embassy. He supposed that the U.S. would designate an experienced person as its representative on the military committee in Washington. Similarly there would be a U.S. representative at both Melbourne and Wellington. He foresaw the necessity of having the military problem split up and the component parts allocated in accordance with some prearranged plan to the committees at Washington, Melbourne and Wellington. As the thinking would be done in the three committees, they would have to meet frequently to discuss the problems allocated to them. This would give Australia access directly to the thinking of the Pentagon. Australia would of course welcome having such parts of the military problem as might be agreed allocated to Honolulu. The senior committee, however, would be the one located in Washington.

Mr. Webb said that New Zealand supported those proposals and could add little to what Mr. Casey had said. He was anxious that New Zealand should know at all times what is going on. He did not know whether this was the best way to go about it but he did desire a common form so that what was going on in other parts of the world would be known to New Zealand.

Mr. Spender declared that Australia should have entry into U.S. planning at the central level. While admitting that Australian military officers already received substantial assistance, he said they had no access to planning. He presumed that at Honolulu the operational side would receive consideration. He said that it was equally desirable to have a representative of the U.S. forces sit in on planning in Australia.

Sir Frederick Shedden said that Australia did not know where it was going in ANZAM. It wanted access to global planning. AustraIia regarded the Pacific as important but did not know the American mind regarding Pacific defense. Australia therefore did not know whether it should send troops to the Middle East or keep them in the ANZAM area. This problem had become particularly obvious during the past year. As an example of the dilemma which Australia faces, Sir Frederick mentioned that prior to the last war the British fleet had agreed to hold Singapore. However, Singapore had fallen and this left Australia in a fix. It was essential for Australia to know when it would deploy its forces. Desert warfare was different from jungle warfare. The UK suggestion that Australia’s policy should be to keep from getting “bogged down” anywhere was not satisfactory. Australia would like to know to whom it should look and what the relationship should be between ANZAM planning and U.S. planning. Australia wanted to know about the planning going on in London and Washington. Australia was confronted with a further problem: it was impossible to plan for the hot war without knowing what role Australia should play in the cold war. Broadly speaking Australia desired to set up a combined chiefs of staff as it had found liaison machinery inadequate.

Mr. Casey supported Sir Frederick’s remarks, stating that Australia had not made a definite commitment to send its forces to the Middle East nor had it been able to determine where those forces should go in an emergency. However, Australian public opinion would not tolerate sending troops to the Middle East should an emergency arise in Southeast Asia. This area was close to Australia, a fact to which public opinion was very much alive. Australia found it very difficult to deal with the problem of allocation of forces to the Middle East. He said that Australia felt “the hot breath” of Asia on its back, far more so than New Zealand.

Mr. Munro said that the fact that commitments were being made which affected New Zealand made it necessary that New Zealand share in planning. It could not accept being faced with a fait accompli.

The Secretary said that he would take up the question of the military organization in the afternoon session but wished to make a few general observations. Many questions were raised by the Australian and New Zealand delegations such as a fait accompli arising from decisions of one party affecting the other and whether or not Australia should go to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He said we must realize that there were two dangers: first, the possibility of a global war, second and just as important, local situations with which we might not be able to cope. We must either meet these local situations or face a global war. This raised questions beyond the military field. There has been a tendency to believe that only through military consultation can we learn what is going on. However, there was a vast area for political agreement and this was an area in which we could frankly express our views. He said that he would talk about this later. Then with respect to the possibility of total war, i.e., war with the Soviet Union, broadly speaking it was fairly obvious that when war with the Soviet began the first objective would be to strike at their jugular. Developments would take place in many major fields at the same time. What these developments would be was hard to say. However they could include:

1. An attack on the United States.

2. An attack in Europe, plans against which are being made by SHAPE.

3. An attack on the Middle East—our present efforts there have been directed toward bringing about an organization of seven powers to develop a position of strength in an area which was particularly weak. We were trying to create something out of the indigenous resources. Effective consultation would have to be worked out. Australia and New Zealand would be in the center of whatever plans were made.

4. An attack in the Far East—there plans were made by CINCPAC. So far as knowledge of the Pacific area was concerned there was no better place to get it than through Admiral Radford, whose recommendations affect thinking back in Washington. But more fundamental, we were urging meetings of Australia, New Zealand, France, the UK and the United States to consider the defense of Southeast Asia. If the committee considering this matter were to come together with divergent political views, it could not succeed; therefore we wanted to draw up premises so that when the discussions took place military estimates could be based on these premises. There Australia and New Zealand would be very much in the heart of planning.

The real answer was to get the Middle East and Southeast Asian planning under way. But the premises must be agreed to so that the military could give its advice. Real military planning for the Pacific was done by Admiral Radford with whom Australia and New Zealand must work.

Mr. Spender said that although in the SEA Ad Hoc Committee discussions there was an overlapping of political and military factors, nonetheless the questions were xery largely political. It was not necessary that the governments agree on premises; before that, one must have from a military point of view an indication of what could be done under certain circumstances. One must make certain what could be done in the event of a global war. The question of a global war, however, raised a considerable problem. As local operations might merge into a global war, Australia must know in general what would happen in the Pacific. Mr. Spender agreed generally with what the Secretary had in mind but wanted to know what would happen in the Pacific were all the resources in the world mobilized to strike back at Russia.

The Secretary stated that the question of military machinery would be discussed in the afternoon session. He presented to the Council a suggested statement for the guidance of the officers briefing the press. A copy of the agreed text of this statement appears in ANZUS 1/7 (HON D–7).⁷

1. These minutes and minutes of succeeding sessions of the meeting were circulated Sept. 3.
2. The proposals of New Zealand form part of the memorandum presented by Ambassador Munro on May 27, p. 98. The Australian proposals are contained in Australian Document A1/6, one of several attachments to Australian Embassy note No. 399/52 of July 24. (790.5/7–2452)
3. Of BNA.
4. HON D–2c, “Political Organization under the ANZUS Treaty”, Aug. 3. (Lot 59 D 95, CF 115)

5. Brackets in the source text. ANZUS 1/7 and HON D–7 are the same document dated Aug. 11. The pertinent section reads:

   “The Council agreed that there should be regular annual meetings, attended by the three Ministers themselves.

   “The Council considered that in principle these meetings should be held in rotation: one year in the United States and the alternate year in Australia or New Zealand. The Council did not intend, however, that this principle should be applied inflexibly. It recognized that in some years circumstances may make it desirable to depart from the principle. It agreed that the place and date of the annual meeting should be determined each year with all these considerations in mind.

   “The Council agreed that special meetings of the Council, normally attended by the Deputies, will be held in Washington as required.

   “The Council agreed that each Deputy will hold the presidency of the special meetings in rotation for a year.

   “The Council decided that appropriate officers of the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington and of the Department of State should be designated to constitute the Council’s secretariat.

   “The Council considered that existing channels and agencies should be used to the fullest extent possible. It did not conceive that these channels and agencies would be superseded but rather that the Council would provide a focus where they may be utilized in the implementation of the Treaty.

   “The Ministers agreed to announce that they have designated as their respective Deputies: for Australia, the Australian Ambassador to the United States; for New Zealand, the New Zealand Ambassador to the United States; and for the United States, the Under Secretary of State.” (Lot 59 D 95, CF 119)

6. Annex I to the document cited in footnote 5 above. Brackets in the source text.
7. Annex C to the document cited in footnote 5 above.