Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 119

Negotiating Paper Prepared for ANZUS Council Meeting, by the Special State–Defense Working Group¹

top secret
HON D–2/1

[Washington,] July 30, 1952.

Machinery for Military Consultation in Regard to ANZUS Council

(This paper approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 1952)²

Problem:

To establish military machinery considered appropriate in implementation of the Australia, New Zealand and United States Treaty.

United States Objective:

To secure Australian and New Zealand agreement to the accreditation to the ANZUS Council of military representatives to act in an informal advisory capacity on a regional or area basis, as opposed to establishment of a formal military committee at Washington level.

Probable Positions of Australia and New Zealand:

Both Australia and New Zealand have expressed a desire to have a continuous arrangement preferably in Washington, DC. to keep their respective governments informed in regard to general strategic problems affecting their vital interests. They feel that the strategic considerations of the Pacific are beyond the latitude and responsibilities of CINCPAC and can be resolved only on the broader planning levels of Washington by a permanent military committee. It therefore seems probable that they will resist the adoption of the arrangements suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and communicated by Mr. Acheson in his notes to the Ambassadors of Australia and New Zealand on 13 May 1952³ and will press for the formation of a permanent military committee in Washington. (JCS formula quoted below under “Discussion”).

Position to be Presented:

a. To propose that:

1. One Military Representative from each of the governments signatory to the ANZUS Treaty should be accredited to the ANZUS Council.

(a) The Military Representatives will:

(1) Advise the Council on problems of military cooperation which may arise in connection with the application of the ANZUS Treaty.

(2) Consider and make recommendations to their respective chiefs of staff on the measures which might be taken to increase mutual assistance and self-help, looking to the improvement of the defense of Australia and New Zealand and their territories as related to the over-all strategic defense of the Pacific; and

(3) Furnish to the Council those recommendations which have received approval of their respective chiefs of staff.

(b) The Military Representatives will meet periodically, as required and shall rotate the seat of the meetings between Pearl Harbor, Melbourne and Wellington. When so requested by the Council, they would meet in Washington, Canberra, or Wellington in conjunction with regular annual Council meetings.

(c) The Military Representatives will draw up their own rules of procedure.

2. CINCPAC, or an alternate designated by him will be accredited to the Council as the U.S. Military Representative.

3. In order to provide the necessary exchange of information and to provide for continuity of effort among the three representatives, each government may assign to the offices of the Military Representatives of the other, not more than two liaison officers of a rank no higher than field grade.

4. If liaison is desired by Australia and New Zealand during the intervals when the Council or the Military Representatives are not in session or other than at a periodically agreed meeting, this will be accomplished through existing channels.

5. The Pacific Command is the major U.S. theater command most directly concerned with this area. Theater operations are planned and conducted by the theater commander who receives only his mission and allocation of forces from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. On any matter referred to the Military Representatives which does not fall within the scope of CINCPAC’s authority and instructions, the U.S. Military Representative would request guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. Existing agencies and military channels, which as far as we are concerned have proven very satisfactory, should be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in implementation of the ANZUS Treaty. These agencies and channels include:

(a) The Embassies of the three governments;

(b) The Australian and New Zealand Joint Services Missions in Washington (the successors of their wartime special military missions to the U.S.);

(c) The ANZAM–CINCPAC relationship (continuing consultation between the Australian and New Zealand naval authorities and CINCPAC with regard to certain naval operational matters);

(d) Exchange of intelligence through existing agencies;

(e) International Meetings such as the Ad Hoc Committee of January 1952 in Washington which discussed the defense of Southeast Asia, in which meeting Australia and New Zealand were represented.^*

discussion

a. The arrangements proposed by the JCS as communicated in your identical notes of May 13, 1952, to the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors were as follows:

“The Government of the United States suggests that in support of the Council military representatives be accredited to the Council to meet periodically as required at Pearl Harbor or to rotate between Pearl Harbor, Australia and New Zealand, if that seems preferable. The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, or an alternate designated by him, would be the American representative. In addition, in order to assure proper liaison, one or two Australian and New Zealand officers of field grade rank might be accredited to Pearl Harbor in a liaison capacity on a regular or an intermittent basis as developments may indicate.”

b. It is believed that military collaboration and coordination in full consonance with the obligations of the Security Pact and military realities may be readily effected at the Service level through existing agencies and the proposed arrangements for Military Representatives and Liaison. CINCPAC’S area of responsibility from a U.S. view overlaps that of Australia and New Zealand insofar as the Defense of the South Pacific is concerned. It therefore seems logical that such military collaboration as is considered necessary should be appropriately conducted at this level.

c. Overall aspects of regional strategy must be dealt with on a wider basis and higher level than a regional relationship such as ANZUS Council. The Military Representatives accredited to the Council should focus their attention on the defensive aspects of the region concerned. It is considered that the military representatives could provide their respective chiefs of staff with important information and recommendations which would contribute materially to the development of sound overall strategy.

d. The ratification and support of the ANZUS Treaty by the U.S. is indicative of the importance the United States attaches to the subject area. However, it must be acknowledged that due to the global remoteness of the area, it is highly unlikely that either New Zealand or Australia will bear the brunt of initial enemy strikes. Consequently, the defense of Australia and New Zealand is more properly related to the successful defense of Southeast Asia with which CINCPAC is vitally concerned. It is believed that such support and coordination of military effort should point to the successful achievement of the terms of NSC 124/2,⁴ paragraphs 7d and e being particularly applicable.

e. In this connection there is currently under consideration in connection with the implementation of NSC 124/2 the holding of a military and subsequently a political-military conference of representatives from United States, Great Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand to discuss the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of Chinese Communist aggression in that area. Overall Pacific strategy will in all probability be influenced by the agreements and recommendations of these conferees. The defensive arrangements and coordination of regional areas must of necessity be subordinate to the requirements of the overall area and should be readily determined by the commanders concerned.

f. In the present and previous Tripartite Intelligence Conferences⁵ on Southeast Asia, the U.S. delegation was headed by a representative from the Pacific Command and was responsible to CINCPAC. Since the Pacific Command is the major U.S. theater command most directly concerned with this area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated CINCPAC as the agency responsible for any conferences which affect that area. It has recently been approved that Australia and New Zealand will be full participating members of this conference.

g. Preliminary New Zealand views on the organization, functions and location of the ANZUS Council held that as a minimum the Council should provide effective means for exchange of views on political and strategic developments in the area and for cooperation at the Service level on joint defense planning. Ambassador Spender of Australia considered that the problems of the Council would include: logistics support of Australia and New Zealand forces in war and contribution from Australian production; free flow of information; responsibility for planning under Australian New Zealand sector; division of responsibility for collecting and collating intelligence data in the Pacific and adjoining territories; selection and preparation of bases; interchange of personnel; security of Australia in global war; coordination of Pacific planning with global planning; form of military machinery for cooperation.

h. It is believed that such consideration of the military aspects of the problems mentioned above as may be practicable are within CINCPAC’s area of responsibilities as contained in the Unified Command Plan. Final decision regarding matters of considerable strategic significance must, of course, be made at higher level.

1. This paper is attached to a covering note of July 31 by Van Hollen. The senior State and Defense Department representatives on this Group were, respectively, Foster and Rear Adm. Harold P. Smith, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2. On July 30 the JCS, in a memorandum signed by General Bradley, submitted to the Secretary of Defense a number of recommended changes in the previous draft (dated July 25) of the above paper. The changes centered around the substitution of the term “military representatives” for the words “military advisory group”. For instance, the JCS suggested:

   “A. Change the statement of the United States Objective to read as follows:

   “‘To secure Australian and New Zealand agreement to the formation of a military advisory group accredited accreditation to the ANZUS Council of military representatives to act in an informal advisory capacity on a regional or area basis, as opposed to establishment of a formal military committee at Washington level.’

   “Reason: To avoid the implication that the military advisers will be a formalized body. The use of the term ‘group’ in this paragraph and elsewhere in the paper would imply the establishment of a formal body.” (JCS memorandum forms enclosure to letter of July 31 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster to Secretary Acheson, not printed; 790.5/7–3152)

   Most of the recommendations of the JCS are incorporated in the paper printed here.

3. See the editorial note, p. 86.
4. The Australian and New Zealand Governments do not yet know it but they will be invited to the forthcoming Tripartite Intelligence Conference on Southeast Asia and to the military and political-military conferences which are being held to discuss the defense of Southeast Asia. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Dated June 25, p. 125.
5. The Third Tripartite Intelligence Conference was held at Saigon, June 26–28.