Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116

Background Paper Prepared for ANZUS Council Meeting, by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Foster) 1

HON Special 4

Australian and New Zealand Position Toward the Problem of Machinery for Military Consultation

Based on conversations during the past six months with officers of the Australian and New Zealand Embassies, on the views of the New Zealand Government as communicated to the Department by Ambassador Munro in a memorandum of May 27, 1952,2 and on the three Australian Government documents (Nos. A 1/8, A 1/9, A 1/10)3 which were submitted to the Department on July 25, the Australian and New Zealand position towards the problem of machinery for military consultation under the ANZUS Treaty may be summarized as follows:

Australia and New Zealand Want to be Cut in on Planning at the Washington Level

1. Accepting the proposal of the JCS that “military representatives be accredited to the Council”, Australia and New Zealand take the position that these representatives should be set up as a group in Washington and should have a direct relationship with the JCS. In the words of the New Zealand Government’s memorandum “We had conceived the military committee as a standing body which would be concerned with general strategic problems arising in the Pacific area (which is broader than CINCPAC’s command) and their implications for New Zealand and Australia. Some forum of the kind where we can discuss these broad issues is necessary, so enabling us to appreciate their relationship to global strategy and the possible effect on our commitments in other theaters.” In the words of the Australian Government, “Australian and New Zealand representatives in Washington together with representatives of the U.S. JCS would be the Military Committee to provide general guidance to the Council on military matters.” The Australians also maintain that “the approach to defense planning for the collective [Page 162] security of the democratic nations has been by regional arrangements and it is essential that planning for the defense of the ANZAM * region be related to Allied global strategy.”

They Consider the JCS Formula Inadequate

2. Australia and New Zealand have found unsatisfactory the JCS proposal that the Military Representatives Group should be headed by CINCPAC and equivalent Australian and New Zealand representatives and located in the Pacific. You will recall Mr. Menzies saying that much as the Australians like Admiral Radford they wanted to be in on planning in Washington rather than hear from Admiral Radford after the event about decisions taken in Washington.

Machinery in World War II and now in the Commonwealth

3. The Australian documents put considerable emphasis upon the machinery for military consultation which existed among the Allies during World War II and upon the existing machinery for military consultation in the British Commonwealth. In each case the machinery, described at some length, may be summarized as follows:

Wartime Machinery for Military Consultation. Australia was represented on the Pacific War Councils in London and Washington and also in the U.K. War Cabinet. Australia and New Zealand had a “link” with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff through their Military Missions in Washington. (We understand that this “link” was largely titular and that the Department of Defense officers concerned with it were hard pressed, except in the case of the U.K., to find matters of consequence to discuss with these Missions.)
Australian-New Zaaland-U.K. Military Liaison Machinery. According to the Australian documents (No. A 1/8) the U.K. and New Zealand maintain in Australia a Joint Staff Representative and staff accredited to the Australian Defense Department. The U.K. and New Zealand representatives are invited to attend meetings of the Australian Defense Committee and Chiefs of Staff Committee when matters affecting their countries are under consideration. The Representative is responsible to and instructed by his Government, High Commissioner or superior authority in such manner as his Government may prescribe. Similarly members of the staff of the Representative are invited to attend the meetings of the Joint Service machinery subordinate to the Australian Defense Committee and Chiefs of Staff Committee. Reciprocally the Australian Government has the right of similar representation on the same basis on the corresponding machinery of the U.K. and New Zealand. There is assigned to the Australian defense machinery, in [Page 163] conjunction with representatives of the U.K. and New Zealand, responsibility for planning for the defense of the ANZAM region which in war becomes the operational responsibility of the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff. ANZAM planning presently includes Australian home defense plans; regional defense plans, logistic and production plans, and related plans for other countries or responsibilites such as the defense of sea communications in New Zealand waters and the defense of Malaya, British Borneo and Fiji.

Recommended Link Between ANZAM Planning and U.S. Planning

4. Having outlined the organization and work of the U.K.–Australia–New Zealand military liaison machinery, the Australians proposed (in document No. A 1/10) that ANZAM planning should be linked with U.S. planning. They propose that the ANZUS Military Representatives Group initially might draft basic conditions somewhat on the lines of the ANZAM enterprise to provide for the linking of planning for the defense of the ANZAM region with U.S. planning relating to areas contiguous to the ANZAM boundaries.

Already a Link between CINCPAC and ANZAM

5. The Australians point out that an initial step was taken in naval planning at the Radford–Collins conference at Honolulu in February–March 1951. (This conference, which is described in a separate U.S. paper, No. D–2/2,4 was attended by New Zealand and U.K. representatives in addition to Admirals Radford and Collins,5 Chief of Naval Staff, Australia, and made recommendations concerning the coordination of naval operational matters as between CINCPAC and the ANZAM authorities.)

Planning for Defense of Malaya also Needed

6. The Australians go on to propose (in document A 1/10) that in addition to the need for coordination between the naval authorities “the other major consideration is the defense of Malaya and its military importance to the ANZAM region.”

Relate ANZAM to Global Strategy

7. The Australians argue (in document A 1/10) that the defense of the ANZAM region must be related to Allied global strategy, particularly in the Pacific, so that the planning of Australia’s military role in both the cold and hot war can be determined as clearly as possible.

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ANZAM Chiefs of Staff

8. The Australians state (in document A 1/10) that “It is necessary to establish agreement on the status of the ANZAM region as a possible war theater in which planning would be conducted in peace and operations would be directed in war through subordinate commands by a Chiefs-of-Staff organization equivalent in status to U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff and responsible directly to Allied authorites for higher direction in war.”

Military Relationship with NATO

9. The Australians maintain (in document A 1/9) that “Since it will inevitably affect the pattern of global strategy and the allocation of forces and resources, it is desirable that Australia and New Zealand, with responsibilities outside the NATO area, should receive information regarding NATO developments which have a direct bearing upon their interests. Consideration might also be given to ways of enabling Australia and New Zealand, when NATO is dealing with matters affecting them, to express their views to NATO.” The Australians consider that the ANZUS Military Representatives Group, in consultation with the higher defense machinery of the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, should study the question of a possible military liaison with NATO to be established for Australia and New Zealand and should report thereon to the ANZUS Council.

Australian and New Zealand Participation in the Middle East Defense Organization

10. Finally, the Australians recall that their agreement to participate in the Middle East Command was dependent on their having an effective voice at both the political and strategic levels. The Australians mention that the U.K. has been consulting with them and the New Zealanders on the Middle East Defense Organization. They suggest that the question of representation (by which we take it they mean a possible link between ANZUS and the MEDO) might await the outcome of the proposed conference of participants in MEDO.6

  1. File copy attached to a covering note of the same date by Christopher Van Hollen of the Executive Secretariat, who was Chairman of the Steering Group which assembled briefing materials for the Honolulu meeting.
  2. Ante, p. 98.
  3. Not printed. They are filed under cover of the Australian Embassy’s note No. 401/52, July 25. (Lot 59 D 95, CF 115)
  4. ANZAM” means “Australia-New Zealand-and-Malaya” and the so-called ANZAM area embraces Australia, New Zealand, the East Indies (including Indonesia, Borneo, and New Guinea) and Malaya. [Footnote in the source text.]
  5. “The Radford–Collins Conference at Pearl Harbor, February 26–March 2, 1951”, July 28, not printed. (Lot 59 D 95, CF 119)
  6. Rear Adm. Sir J. A. Collins, First Naval Member of the Naval Board of Australia.
  7. HON Special 5a, “Analysis of Australian-New Zealand and United States Proposals for Military consultation”, July 31, 1952, not printed, contains a tabular comparison of the proposals of the three powers on military consultation issues. (Lot 59 D 95, CF 115)