Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Minutes of Meeting of the Manila Pact Working Group1

confidential

Participants:

  • United States
  • C—Mr. MacArthur
  • EE—Mr. Sebald
  • Defense—Mr. Sullivan
  • PSA—Mr. Young
  • PSA—Mr. Bell
  • BNA—Mr. Horsey
  • SOA—Mr. Collins
  • C—Mr. Galloway
  • Australia—SirPercySpender
  • France—M. Pierre Millet
  • New Zealand—Ambassador Munro
  • Pakistan—Ambassador Syed Amjad Ali
  • Philippines—Minister S. P. Lopez
  • Thailand—Ambassador Sarasin
  • United Kingdom—Sir Robert Scott

Public Announcement of Bangkok Meeting

Mr. MacArthur opened the meeting commenting that all the Manila Treaty governments had agreed to a simultaneous public announcement of the Bangkok Meeting at 10:00 A.M. on Monday, January 3.

Discussion of Military Advisers Paper, MP(IWG)D–S2

Mr. MacArthur commented that the phrase “short of a general emergency” in paragraph 3–d was misleading. This phrase had been included to indicate in a geographic sense that military planning under the Treaty should be related to the treaty area and should not deal with emergencies arising outside the area. He suggested a rephrasing to make this clear. The rewording was agreeable to all representatives and incorporated in a redraft of the paper, MP(IWG)D–2 a.3

Sir Percy Spender stated that although he had no specific objection on this point he feared there might be a tendency to compartmentize and isolate Manila planning from global planning. He reminded the group that during World War II military operations in Asia had been severely affected by events elsewhere (European demands [Page 1076] on resources, etc.) and suggested that the Manila Treaty planners should be able to consider their problems against the background of over-all planning. Messrs. Sullivan and MacArthur pointed out that the military advisers of countries with responsibilities outside the treaty area would have these responsibilities in mind when planning under the Manila Treaty. However, there were so many imponderables involved in over-all planning that the Manila advisers would have to proceed on certain assumptions and limit themselves to treaty area planning. Moreover, the first stage of estimating the threat and drawing up requirements would represent an immense task which would have to be completed before considering questions of availabilities and commitments. Sir Percy said he would be satisfied on this point if the military advisers were not to be precluded from considering the effects of outside events (such as a general emergency) on the treaty area. Mr. Sullivan agreed this would be possible.

The Philippine representative commented that his government would like to strengthen the military organization under the Manila Treaty and suggested establishment of a permanent military committee to perform tasks similar to these outlined in the U.S. paper. He stressed the importance of creating genuine strength in Southeast Asia and mentioned in addition the Philippine desire to have an organization which would give more “appearance” of strength than that envisaged by the U.S. Finally, the Philippines believed that anti-subversive activities could not be separated from military planning and believed the military advisers should be able to consider this question.

The U.S. representatives explained the importance of creating genuine strength in the Manila Treaty area was reflected in the U.S. proposal that military advisers be high ranking officers assisted where necessary by planners drawn from existing national staffs. The U.S. envisaged the paper under discussion as a flexible directive from the Foreign Ministers to the military advisers which would permit the latter to get on with military planning and to recommend their own organizational arrangements. Messrs. MacArthur and Sullivan opposed the Philippine suggestion for a permanent military committee because the U.S. did not wish to specify in advance how the tasks of the military advisers were to be performed. Other representatives supported this position and pointed out that the Philippines would be free to make similar recommendations during the organizational meetings of the military advisers themselves. Minister Lopez appeared satisfied with this understanding.

Commenting on Minister Lopez’s last suggestion, Mr. MacArthur agreed that anti-subversive activities could not be divorced entirely [Page 1077] from military planning. He explained that one type of subversive activity was open insurrection and that military forces could legitimately be used both to deter and control such activity. However, the second type of subversion was covert boring from within and would have to be handled by a different mechanism. Mr. MacArthur reminded the representatives that the U.S. would very shortly be presenting a paper on this subject to the Working Group. This concluded discussion of the paper on military advisers which was set aside pending the final review process of the Working Group.

Preliminary Discussion of Agenda for Foreign Ministers Meeting MP(IWG)D–3/14

A suggested agenda for the Foreign Ministers at Bangkok was distributed by the U.S. After a very brief discussion the U.S. agreed to circulate a revised paper changing the order of the agenda items to provide that organizational discussions would take place following a general exchange of views on matters affecting the security of the treaty area.

While agreeing that Indochina should not be specifically mentioned on the Agenda, the U.K. Representative remarked that all the Ministers would have to have this question on their minds and that it would probably be necessary to discuss Indochina as it affected the security of the treaty area. Sir Robert pointed out, however, that such discussions should not touch on internal affairs in the Associated States or on activities in contravention of the Geneva Agreements.

Economic Discussions Under the Manila Treaty

Ambassador Ali asked if the U.S. intended to submit a paper on economic questions relating to the Manila Treaty. Mr. MacArthur replied that the U.S. was not planning to submit such a paper but would be quite willing to discuss economic questions in the Working Group. He mentioned that the U.S. was working intensively at a high level on Asian economic problems and, although the study was not concluded, he hoped that Secretary Dulles would be able to outline in some detail the U.S. approach to Asian economic problems during the Bangkok meeting. Mr. MacArthur reiterated the U.S. view that Asian economic problems embraced an area extending beyond the Manila Treaty members and that consequently there should not be a separate economic organization established under the Manila Pact. He also said the U.S. did not wish to interfere with or duplicate the activities of existing economic organizations, such as the Colombo Plan, etc. The Pakistan representative stated that he felt it essential that the Working Group discuss this [Page 1078] question since it was on the agenda at Bangkok. With the agreement of the Working Group he proposed to outline his government’s views on this matter during the third week in January. The Philippine and Australian representatives evinced great interest in such a discussion.

Date of Next Working Group Meeting

The Working Group was adjourned until 2:30 P.M. Thursday, January 6, in Room 5106 New State.

  1. Drafted on Jan. 2, 1955 by Gleysteen who is not listed among the participants.
  2. See footnote 3, p. 1049.
  3. Not found in Department of State files.
  4. Not found in Department of State files.