Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 357

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Manila,] September 3, 1954.

In connection with the meeting of the Ministers on the Southeast Asia Treaty (text of working draft attached as Tab A),² the following questions will need either to be decided by the Ministers or will require instructions from you so that we may settle them before the meeting begins.

1. use of the word “Communist”

In the Working Group, all the other Delegations except Thailand are strongly opposed to the use of the word either in the Preamble or in Article IV. Their opposition is based principally on three counts:

a. that other collective security treaties have not been so drafted as to be directed against one specific threat but have been based solely on the right of self-defense against any attack;

b. that the use of the word “Communist” psychologically might make other Southeast Asia and South Asia powers more reluctant to associate themselves with the treaty in the future, and, also, that its use might be unduly provocative to the Communists;

c. that the word is not a legal term appropriate for inclusion in the treaty.

We have stated on many occasions both in the Working Group and privately to the individual Delegations why the US desires the inclusion of the word in the treaty. While some of the others admit that this probably is the best formula to make exactly clear what the commitments under the treaty are and what it is directed against, they still are not disposed to agree with our position. They recognize, with the exception of Pakistan, that the treaty should not be so drafted as to encompass disputes between non-Communist states, but none have suggested any language to accomplish this purpose.

We have prepared for discussion with you possible alternative language and also possible US reservations at the signing. (Tab B).

2. NATO vs. ANZUS language for Article IV, paragraph 1

We have explained both in the Working Group and privately to the Delegations why the ANZUS and Philippine Treaty language is preferable to the NATO language. While recognizing in the bosom of the family the validity of our arguments, the Filipinos are pressing strongly for the NATO–type language, principally for public opinion reasons. Unfortunately, the Filipinos have built up the public impression that the NATO commitment is strong and ANZUS weak, and are thus victims of their own booby trap. Based on our Working Group discussions, I believe that all the other governments will accept an ANZUS–type formula.

I recommend that you discuss this question with President Magsaysay this evening and urge him to accept our proposed language, which is that of the ANZUS and Philippine Treaties.

3. Philippine Draft of a Pacific Charter

In the Working Group the Philippine representative submitted a draft Pacific Charter for discussion (attached as Tab C).³ None of the other Delegations wished to discuss this draft before having opportunity to consult their Ministers, and it is being held over for ministerial discussion so as not to delay progress in the Working Group on the draft treaty.

In the Working Group, however, the Pakistan representative immediately stated that something along the lines of the Philippine draft would be acceptable to the Pakistan Government.

The draft Charter will require careful study, as certain of its provisions as presently drafted are unacceptable. The Filipinos attach great importance to issuing such a “Pacific Charter” and Magsaysay will undoubtedly raise this tonight.

4. Organization to be established under the treaty

While there has been no formal Working Group discussion of this question, all the other Delegations are intensely interested in it and have been pressing their views with us informally. The Filipinos will take the lead in pressing for a NATO–type organization, particularly as regards military machinery. They will probably be supported by the Thais and Pakistanis. The Australians and New Zealanders, while not urging a NATO–type organization, strongly desire the establishment of some organization under the treaty. The Australians have proposed an addition to Article V which would specifically state that the Council shall set up subsidiary machinery (set Tab D).⁴

We have maintained the US position which envisages the ANZUS–type of arrangement for Council meetings without the establishment of any permanent machinery.

I am sure that most of the other Ministers will request opportunity to talk with you on this problem. The New Zealand Working Group representative already has asked me to relay to you his Minister’s request for such a talk.

I believe that the Ministers will have their hands full with the draft treaty during the present meeting and that we should seek to avoid discussion of the organizational problem. We could take the position that the Council itself should be given the task of considering and reaching agreement on what machinery may be necessary to implement the pact. In adopting this position we will doubtless have to agree on a meeting of the Council in the relatively near future. Late October or early November might be appropriate, as this would be after the Colombo meeting in Ottawa which will provide a forum for exchange of views on how the economic problems of Southeast Asia might best be dealt with. If such a Council meeting is to be held, Honolulu might be an appropriate place since it has excellent facilities and will provide a pleasant atmosphere which might facilitate the meeting.

[Tab B]

top secret

[Manila,] September 1, 1954.⁵

Alternatives

1. a. In Preamble, substitute “international totalitarian” for “Communist”.

b. In Article IV, substitute “international totalitarian” for “Communist”.

2. a. In Article IV, paragraph 1:

• Line 1, omit “Communist”;
• Line 2, substitute “from without” for “in”, insert “in the Treaty area” between “Parties” and “or”.

b. Substitute a new Article VIII as follows:

The Treaty area comprises the general area of Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific lying south of the line: 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude in the Pacific to a point due north of the Paracels, thence south to the Paracels, thence west to the northeastern point of the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese government, thence generally westward following the northern boundaries of the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese government, Laos, Burma, India, Butan, Nepal, and Pakistan, and terminating at the junction of the Pakistan border and the Gulf of Oman.

Reservation of the United States of America

The Delegation of the United States of America in signing the present Treaty does so with the reservation that the aggression and attack referred to in Article IV are Communist aggression and attack insofar as its obligations thereunder are concerned.

Reservation of the United States of America

The Delegation of the United States of America in signing the present Treaty does so with the reservation that its obligations under Article IV are limited to Communist aggression and attack.

Article IV Third Alternative

1. Each Party recognizes that renewal of the aggression in Indochina or initiation of like aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties, or against any States or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

1. A marginal notation by O’Connor indicates that this memorandum was seen by the Secretary.

   The Secretary’s party arrived in Manila at 6 p.m., Sept. 3, Manila time.

2. Reference is to the U.S. working draft, SEAP D–2/1a, p. 784.
3. See telegram Secto 4, Sept. 3, p. 832.
4. Not found attached; but see telegram Secto 5, Sept. 3, p. 833.
5. This date is certain for the section headed “Alternatives” only. On the source text, the reservations and the “Third Alternative” are on separate pages with varying typefaces, and are classified “Secret”.