790.5/8–954: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
194. I called on Prime Minister Nehru today to present Kennedy2 and to say farewell before my departure on home leave tonight.
In a 45 minute talk he made abundantly clear, if his statements in response to my questions can be accepted at face value, that he is strongly opposed to any collective security pact involving this area, even if it were confined to the Colombo powers or to any four or three or two of them. He flatly (though calmly and pleasantly) turned his back on anything involving military commitments because, first, he thought it unnecessary since no one threatened this area, and secondly because he disliked military approach in principle. He thought pacts involving military commitments lead to less security because they increased tensions on both sides. He felt confident that best way to reduce chances of war would be for nations outside Communist bloc to accept Peking’s assurances of non-aggression as bona fide and to convince Peking that no effort would be made to overthrow regime or invade Chinese mainland. He said projects like SEATO merely caused Communist bloc to join together more closely.
I recalled basic reasons for our adoption of collective security policy, pointing out that if NATO had existed, we believed World War II might have been avoided. I said Chinese expansionism in Korea and Indochina during past four years had created need for extending collective security to Pacific area. He had spoken of desire of Peking for assurances. I asked whether he did not agree that we had reason, from actual experience, to want some assurance ourselves regarding Peking’s peaceful intention. He had referred to SEATO as undesirable initiative on our part. Did he not [Page 714] think Communist bloc had long ago become closely knit collective security group? Could not present effort of free world to develop collective security system be traced to initiative already taken by other side?
He agreed that situation in Europe might have called for some reaction but difficulty was that each military step by one side was answered by similar step by other, with always increasing tensions. Need was to relax tensions, and best way to do so was for free world to take different approach. This would lead to “collective peace”.
I said for sake of argument suppose everybody, including Syngman Rhee and Vietnam nationalists, agreed with US that no military effort would be made to upset present status quo in Korea and Indochina, and suppose we convinced Peking that we would neither invade mainland nor try to overthrow regime, what assurances could we expect from Peking in return? Would Peking say it would not invade Formosa, for example? I referred to statement last week by Ho Chi Minh calling for “further tightening of our brotherhood with people of Laos and Cambodia and consolidation of great friendship between Vietnam and Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China”. Nehru said he had not heard of this statement. I asked him to send for a local paper in which I had seen it today. He did so, read the statement carefully, and said he could not be certain Ho was making anything more than a friendly appeal in contemplation of elections.
I asked whether he thought there was any danger that nations of this area might fall one by one if each adopted his policy of no military commitment. He said he did not think so because he was convinced China had no aggressive intentions and desired peace to work out own problems. He agreed that sense of security was important for any country, to enable people to give attention to economic and social matters, but problem was to decide what policy would produce more rather than less feeling of security. I said Burma today had no assurance that anyone would come to its aid if its northern border was crossed. He said any assurance to Burma would obviously be directed against China and this would increase Peking’s feeling of insecurity and consequently its belligerent attitude. He was confident that outright Chinese aggression against Burma would in fact lead to World War without any specific commitment and he believed Peking was already well aware of this fact.
Nehru said collective peace was needed to establish some kind of status quo in Pacific. He himself had never been supporter of complete status quo but he thought no major upset in present situation should be attempted. When he said he did not support complete [Page 715] status quo I smiled and said he did not seem to support status quo in Goa, for example. He recovered after a second, smiled and resumed.
Comment: It now seems abundantly clear that Chou En-Iai “sold” Nehru that Peking has no aggressive designs at least for a decade or so.3 Canadian HICOMer Escott Reid who is generally inclined to go along with GOI and who reported following Chou visit that Nehru had not swallowed Chou’s line entirely, told me yesterday he had recently had long talk with Nehru and had been “shocked” at extent to which Nehru seemed to place full confidence in Peking’s good intentions.
Only extenuation I can suggest for Nehru’s apparent blind faith in Red China may be that he is deliberately trying to offset what he regards as US aggressive intentions against Peking and our over-emphasis on military security. It is possible that if he becomes convinced, through experience in Indochina, that Viet Minh have aggressive intentions against Laos and Cambodia, he may become somewhat less active in his opposition to collective security arrangements covering this area. Under existing circumstances, I can only report that I was wrong when I expressed opinion to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April that I thought Nehru might join security pact if Colombo powers took initiative and were not faced by decisions made in Washington or London. Unless and until Nehru comes to doubt Peking’s good faith, he is not likely to give a military assurance even to Burma.
British authorities still hope Nehru can gradually be brought to commit India to some kind of collective action. They are following toe-in-water tactics, trying to get him gradually committed by indirection, and perhaps even against his will, just as British now admit they tried to get US to abandon neutral attitude during late 30’s, and which it claims was successful.