Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 348

Minutes of a Meeting on Southeast Asia¹

top secret
SEAP Special 1

[Washington,] July 24, 1954.

Participants:

• Vice President Nixon
• The White House
• Mr. Cutler
• Defense
• Secretary Wilson
• Admiral Radford
• Admiral Davis
• FOA
• Governor Stassen
• State
• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Morton
• Mr. Drumright
• Mr. Stelle
• CIA
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• Mr. Bissell

The Secretary said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the next steps to be taken in Southeast Asia. Pursuant to the Eisenhower–Churchill agreement to examine the problem of the defense of the area, a joint US–UK Study Group met in Washington and produced a report which, while there were two or three points of disagreement, was in the main an agreed draft. In accordance with the terms of reference, the group considered the problem on two contingencies: 1) assuming no settlement was reached at Geneva and 2) assuming a settlement. Now that the first contingency has been eliminated and the provisions of the Geneva agreements are known, we can proceed with the next step. The Secretary believed that we should move ahead quickly with those countries in the area who are willing to join in a Southeast Asia Pact, the primary purpose of which would be to deter open aggression by the Chinese Communists. Another important objective would be to combat subversion and infiltration in the non-communist states of the area. This could be done principally by helping to build up local security forces, by economic support, and possibly by underground intelligence support.

The Secretary said that the two primary advantages to the US in the proposed treaty would be that it would give the President discretionary authority—which he does not now have—to use in the event of the overt Chinese aggression in the area and it would ensure that we would have the support of other nations in any action we are forced to take.

The Secretary stressed that in his view, the treaty should not be drafted in such a way so as to lead the other signatories to expect large amounts of US military assistance to build up their armed forces nor should it require the stationing of large US and other forces in the area. He did not visualize the necessity for a large NATO-type organization in the area. The treaty should permit us to draw a line which, if crossed, would permit us to retaliate at the source of aggression and to do so with the support of other nations.

The Secretary said that we would, of course, wish to strengthen the local forces in Cambodia and Laos and retained Vietnam to the extent possible under the terms of the armistice agreement.

Military Equipment now in North Vietnam

In response to a question from Mr. Allen Dulles, General Smith said that it would be possible under the terms of the armistice agreement for the French to move equipment from the North to the South of Vietnam. He added that Mendes-France had stated that he had given priority to the movement of heavy equipment, particularly that furnished by the US and that Mendes-France expected that the French would be able to move the vast majority of the equipment in the Delta to South Vietnam, although it might be necessary to destroy some material in the more remote areas. General Smith said that the French might approach us for some assistance in moving the equipment, perhaps the loan of a few LST’s.

Elections in Vietnam

Secretary Wilson raised the question of elections in Vietnam in 1956 and asked if we were likely to lose the whole country. The Secretary said that—in view of the population distribution: 13 million in North Vietnam; 9 million in the South—he thought that we would have to take the position in 1956 that conditions were not favorable for the free expression of the will of the population. Even though there would probably be some movement from the North to the South, the fact that the people in the North would probably vote as a block made it extremely unlikely that the results of an election would be favorable to us.

The Proposed SEA Pact

The Secretary raised the problem of the type of pact we should try to get. He said that from a military standpoint, we should proceed rapidly with the UK, France,² Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand to draw up a treaty which would be deterrent against possible aggression by China and which could “Draw a Line” to include the Associated States even though they were not members. He referred to the fact that Canada and Greenland were covered in the Rio Pact, even though Canada and Denmark were not signatories. This type of military alliance would probably not attract any adherents except the seven he had listed. On the other hand, a treaty which contained provisions regarding the economic welfare of the area, while it might eventually attract some of the Colombo powers and Japan, would delay the formation of a defense arrangement if we waited for some of these powers to come in. He thought that the best solution would be to proceed immediately with those who are ready to draft a military treaty and to perhaps include language in the treaty regarding economic and cultural cooperation which might attract other Asian nations towards associated membership, leaving the treaty “open-ended”, so that they could come in later.

Secretary Wilson asked about India and added his view that without the Colombo Powers, we wouldn’t have much in Southeast Asia. Mr. Cutler asked why we couldn’t begin with the economic treaty first, thereby attracting those Asian nations who would not sign a military agreement and giving the whole project an Asian flavor from the start.

The Secretary said that the UK had already extended invitations to the Colombo powers and that Pakistan would probably be willing to join but this would raise the problem of East Bengal. General Smith said that Pakistan would probably follow our advice in this respect. He said that Eden had asked us not to press for Cambodian membership, since the British thought this would be in violation of the implied “neutralization” of the Associated States in the Geneva agreements. Eden believed that this might jeopardize eventual association by the Colombo powers. General Smith said that Cambodia could not contribute much in any event. He added that the British were willing to move ahead with us in this matter much more rapidly than we had expected and that they had handled the Colombo powers very skillfully so far.

The Vice President said that it might have a salutary effect on world opinion if Cambodia could be included in the pact. He wondered what the interpretation would be if Cambodia were left out. The Secretary pointed out that Vietnam and perhaps Laos were precluded by the terms of their armistice agreements and would be left out. It might look bad to have Cambodia in and the other two out.

General Smith stated his belief that the only thing that produced an agreement at Geneva was the fear of the Chinese, probably strengthened by that of the Indians, that we would intervene. The Vice President agreed and said that it was necessary that we promptly show strength in the area.

Secretary Wilson said that he thought we should back away from the idea of a military pact and go ahead with the economic aspects. Secretary Dulles said that it would be an unmitigated disaster to abandon the Southeast Asia Military Pact now.

The Secretary said that we must create immediately authority to act in the event of Chinese aggression and that this pact was the best device to do that since it ensured that we would not act alone. Mr. Cutler asked if it was contemplated that the announcement would include a reference to the economic aspects of the treaty. The Secretary said that it would and read the appropriate section of the draft declaration. General Smith said that if we had an “openended” treaty so that the Colombo powers could associate themselves with the economic aspects, it would make it easier to obtain at least their benevolent neutrality in the event of hostilities. He said that Burma had its own military problems at the moment but might associate itself with the economic and cultural aspects of the treaty. Secretary Wilson asked about Indonesia, which he described as the most vital part of the area to us. Mr. MacArthur said that we had received a report which indicated that Indonesians would reply to the invitation in the negative, stating that they wished to maintain their “active neutrality.” He said that their stance would probably be determined by the attitude of the other Colombo powers. The Secretary said that in drawing the line, what was inside the line was not as important as the notice we would give to the world that if the line were crossed, we would retaliate. Secretary Wilson asked where in Indochina we would draw the line. The Secretary replied that it would include Laos, Cambodia and retained Vietnam. Governor Stassen asked if the UK was willing to draw the line there. Mr. MacArthur replied that the UK had agreed to that line in the Study Group but that both governments had participated on an ad referendum basis. The Vice President asked if there were any precedent for a treaty under which certain powers could associate themselves with part of the treaty, but not with all of it. The Secretary replied in the negative but said that if the two aspects could be combined in one treaty, leaving open the future association of other Asian nations with the economic and cultural aspects, it might be the most astute way to approach the problem. He was skeptical, however, regarding the likelihood of the association of the Colombo Powers. General Smith said that we might get one of them now and perhaps more of them later.

The Vice President wished to confirm that we would proceed with the military aspects first. The Secretary said that this had been agreed to by the President and Sir Winston, that the text of a draft treaty had already been considered and circulated on a limited basis, and that it would be very harmful to back away from the military treaty at this point. The Vice President asked if we would start breaking ground now on the economic aspects. The Secretary said that we would. Governor Stassen said that he would designate appropriate officers in his agency to contact Mr. Baldwin in State regarding the economic aspects of the SEA treaty.

The Secretary said that we would like to get Admiral Radford’s views on the nature of the proposed treaty. Admiral Radford said that the JCS were concerned that a NATO-type treaty would involve commitment of US resources and manpower to defend the local area and that the other powers to the treaty would be stimulated to make requests for military assistance which would be far out of proportion to our present capabilities and to the relative importance to our national security.

Governor Stassen understood Admiral Radford’s concern but said that the MAAG’s were one of the most effective ways to combat subversion in under developed countries. They were a great contribution toward political stability. He referred specifically to the case of Iran. Admiral Radford agreed, but said that the presence of advisory missions always added impetus to requests for assistance.

General Smith said that no massive Chinese invasion was expected at this time; rather we should be prepared to meet the “Viet Minh type” of warfare. This was why he had insisted that the French retain two bases and their training missions in Laos. He told Mr. Allen Dulles he had asked Mendes-France to send one of his best men here to talk with him. He hoped that an able and intelligent Vietnamese might be able to join them in discussing the covert side of the picture.

Retention of the MAAG in Retained Vietnam

There was a discussion as to whether we could retain our MAAG in South Vietnam. The Secretary said that we had not reached a final conclusion on this and certain other questions involving interpretation of the agreements but that Mr. Phleger was giving it his full attention now and we would pass on our conclusions to the other interested agencies as soon as possible. Mr. MacArthur said that Embassy Saigon had recommended that the air force technicians in Vietnam be transferred to the MAAG roles, thus giving us an additional 100 figures to play with. It was generally agreed that this would be a good idea which Defense would pursue.

Consulate in Hanoi

Regarding the maintenance of a consulate in Hanoi, there was general agreement that it would be to our advantage to keep as many people in North Vietnam as possible and that we should allow the Communists to take the initiative in any sealing of the area.

Trade with North Vietnam

The Secretary said that Secretary Weeks had raised, in the last cabinet meeting, the problem of cutting off trade with North Vietnam and that he understood that Commerce would refuse to issue export licenses pending further clarification of our position. It was agreed that this policy should be examined carefully and that all aspects of the problem should be considered.

Forces in the Area

Governor Stassen suggested that it might be a good idea from a psychological standpoint, if not a military standpoint, to have a regimental combat team or a regiment of Marines showing the flag in the area such as Bangkok. Mr. Allen Dulles said that he hoped we could obtain a volunteer air force in Thailand similar to the Flying Tigers.

Announcement Regarding SEA Pact

The Vice President said it might be helpful for the President to make a major foreign policy speech to coincide with the announcement regarding setting up of SEATO. Mr. MacArthur said that the present plans were for identic announcements to be made in the capitals of all seven powers (US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) stating that the governments were appointing representatives to meet to begin drafting the treaty. Mr. Cutler asked if our tactics were to put ourselves forward as the leaders in this exercise. He cautioned that we must not play up our role domestically so that we alienate potential Asian members. The Vice President recognized this danger and said that a second possibility would be for the Senate to pass a resolution endorsing our participation in the treaty. The Secretary said that this had merit. Governor Stassen suggested that it might be useful to have the Senate resolution follow the joint announcement by the seven powers.

Indonesia

The Vice President said he wished to stress the importance of doing everything we can in Indonesia since this was an area which could easily go either way.

Governor Stassen said that he believed the Chinese Communists would concentrate on the off-shore islands, Formosa, Malaya and Indonesia. Admiral Radford said that one of the urgent tasks was to assist the Chinese Nationalists in working with the Chinese minority groups in the countries of Southeast Asia.

Northeast Asia

The Vice President urged that we should step up, rather than cut back, our aid to Formosa and Korea. Admiral Radford said that the JCS agreed that we must maintain and strengthen our position in Northeast Asia. He hoped that we could eventually have a pact covering the ROK, Japan, Formosa and perhaps the Philippines. The Vice President said that he hoped that the Secretary would be able to give his personal attention to the problem of Japanese-Korean relations, which was one of the stumbling blocks to effective defense arrangements among the countries in that area.

1. Drafted by Trulock on July 26. Trulock is not listed among the participants in the meeting, which was held from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

   A memorandum of the same meeting by Cutler is an attachment to a memorandum from MacArthur to the Secretary, July 27, neither printed. (790.5/7–2754)

2. In telegram 299 to Paris, July 23, repeated for information to London and Saigon, the Department reported that at the request of the French Embassy, and with the agreement of the United Kingdom, France had been brought “up to date on present situation re Southeast Asia collective security arrangement. French reaction obviously relieved and pleased France to be included as founding member in any SEA collective defense. Embassy Officer gave his informal opinion Paris feels urgent press ahead with creation collective defense that area.” (790.5/7–2354)