Office of the Historian

790.5/6–1854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

top secret
[Washington,] June 18, 1954.

Subject:

  • Possible Burmese Participation in Collective Defense for Southeast Asia.

Participants:

  • Ambassador Heeney, Canada.
  • Mr. MacArthur, C.

Arnold Heeney, the Canadian Ambassador, dropped in to see me this afternoon. We had a very general talk about Geneva, during the course of which he said he wished to pass on some information regarding Burma. It was to the effect that the Burmese views regarding the problems of Southeast Asia have evolved enormously in the past several months. In strict confidence, he said he could tell me that Ambassador Barrington believes in the desirability of Burmese participation in collective defense in Southeast Asia. While Barrington has influence, the situation in Burma itself does not seem to have evolved to the point where the Burmese would be likely to participate at this juncture. However, if we exercise patience and restraint, and don’t try to prod them or drive them into a collective defense arrangement, it is very possible that they will subsequently come along.

Heeney regards the Burmese attitude toward collective defense in Southeast Asia as being a key with respect to the Indian position—that is, while the Indians regard the Thais and Filipinos as American stooges, they look at the Burmese with whom they have had close relations for a long period, in quite a different light. If Burma is unwilling initially to join in collective defense of Southeast Asia, but expresses endorsement of such an organization, the Indians will be careful before taking a position which will put them headlong into contradiction with Burma. If Burma should join collective [Page 569] defense, the possibility of gaining India’s tacit acceptance would be much greater.

I have written this brief memorandum because I think there is a great deal in what Heeney says. If we are successful in organizing a collective defense arrangement in Southeast Asia and Burma is unwilling to join initially, I think we should endeavor, by material assistance possibly, to aid the Burmese Government in strengthening its own internal security. If we gave such aid with no strings attached, and without fanfare or publicity, I think we might succeed in bringing Burma along much more rapidly than if, under the circumstances above, we gave aid with some kind of stipulation or lots of publicity.