Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

751G.00/6–1554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs (Williams)

confidential

[Washington,] June 15, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. G. L. Mehta, Ambassador of India
• Mr. J. C. Kakar, First Secretary, Embassy of India
• Mr. William L. S. Williams, SOA

Mr. Mehta said that he planned to go to India for four or five weeks’ leave, and he had come to call on the Secretary on the possibility that he might not have another opportunity before he left on July 8. He said, however, that if the Secretary had any message which he wished the Ambassador to convey to the Government of India he would come to see the Secretary at a moment’s notice.

The Secretary said there might well be an occasion for a further talk before the Ambassador departed. He said something might arise out of the talks in Washington with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden who expected to arrive on June 25;¹ the talks might lead to some further activity with regard to the Southeast Asia problem.

Mr. Mehta said that Geneva appeared to have bogged down. The Secretary said he understood that the Geneva Conference had pretty well come to an end. He thought the conference would probably be kept going on a nominal basis for revival if this should seem useful in the future. He had always believed there would be no satisfactory solution at Geneva unless there were some sort of talks going on at the same time regarding collective defense in Southeast Asia. This had been a matter of difference between the UK and US. He thought it possible that the United Kingdom’s position had been reached perhaps as a result of consultations with the Ambassador’s Government. The question of a Southeast Asia defense arrangement has been in suspense for two months, but it appeared that Mr. Eden was discouraged by the course of the Geneva discussions and, therefore, it was possible that activity in connection with a Southeast Asia defense arrangement might be revived. The Secretary then said that the US Government would be happy if India would take an active part. He said that Southeast Asia is, in a sense, India’s part of the world. We have an historical interest in the western Pacific, but we feel it would be a splendid thing if the Indian Government would take an active role in South and Southeast Asia in view of the dangers there. Mr. Mehta said that while Mr. Menon at Geneva had no specific proposals but had gone merely to try to find out what was likely to happen, the Prime Minister did offer a six-point proposal for Indochina.² The Colombo Conference proposals also covered in general India’s feeling as to the next step in Indochina.³

The Secretary said he thought Menon did not always have a sound appreciation of possibilities and that he tends to over-estimate the possibility of getting results by negotiation and appeals to reason. He said we have only the greatest desire to see India’s interest increased and to see that interest take some practical form to the extent consistent with India’s own self-interest. He said that the direction in which the Communists will turn if they take over Indochina is a matter of concern. If they turn west to Thailand or Burma it would not be good for India. If they turn in the other direction it might not be of as intense concern to India but certainly would not be good for the United States. In either case it would be a matter of real concern to each of us, for, he supposed, India and the US have a concern for each other. Mr. Mehta said he understood that one of the problems was that the Communists had wanted political talks at the same time as military talks were going on. The Secretary said that in his opinion this was merely an excuse for postponing agreement on military matters until the Communists were in a position through additional military successes to exert maximum pressure on the political talks. He thought that actually there had been not even a beginning of an agreement on anything in Geneva. Mr. Mehta said that some effort to arrange a ceasefire before the Geneva Conference might have in the end proven wise.

Mr. Mehta inquired regarding the Chinese attitude at Geneva and asked if they were stubborn. The Secretary said they were and that they did not make a very good impression on most of the people there. They were fanatical and used intemperate language. The Secretary said that in general Molotov had expressed himself more temperately than the Chinese but there was no open difference between the Chinese and the Russians. The Secretary said that if the Communists act strongly and there is no strong reaction they then act even more strongly; the only thing that moderates the Communists is a strong position on the other side. He said he had sent a message to General Smith saying that “the Communists will stop where we stand”. The proper procedure for the Southeast Asia problem was to have some alternative to Communist demands in the form of collective security or collective action. The fact that there was no proposal for united action had been one of the things which had led the Communists at Geneva to take positions to which we had no alternative and this was not a good position to be in.

Mr. Mehta said he would get in touch with the Secretary before he left for India. The Secretary agreed and asked Mr. Williams to remind him of Mr. Mehta’s departure.

1. Regarding the talks held in Washington June 25–29 between the two Heads of Government, Dulles and Eden, and other officials of the United States and the United Kingdom, see volume vi.
2. Nehru had outlined a proposal for an Indochina settlement in an address before the lower house of the Indian legislature on Apr. 24.
3. For text of the communiqué of the Colombo Conference, issued on May 2, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs: 1954 (London, Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 166.