790.5/4–3054: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State1
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Dulte 30. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. London eyes only Ambassador. I had a very frank talk with Eden today, in the course of which he handed me the following memorandum:
“South-East Asian defence.
- “1. Communism in Asia cannot be checked by military means alone. The problem is as much political as military; if any military combination is to be effective, it must enjoy the widest possible measure of Asian support.
- “2. We should aim to get the support of Burma as well as Siam as the immediate neighbors of Indo-China. But Burma will not come in unless the project commands some sympathy from other Asian countries, particularly the Asian members of the Commonwealth.
- “3. If we cannot win the active support of all the Asian countries of the area, it is important that we should, at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality.
- “4. To secure this widely based Asian support, we must prepare the ground carefully for what is, in any case, intended to be a lasting defensive organization, not a hastily contrived expedient to meet the present crisis.
- “5. This does not mean that we desire to delay. On the contrary, we have already been actively using our influence, particularly with the Asian members of the Commonwealth, with encouraging results. Pakistan and Ceylon have already promised not to oppose a South-East Asian collective defence on the lines we envisage, and we have succeeded in diverting Mr. Nehru from his original intention of condemning it root and branch. We have thus averted the danger that the Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo would unite in [Page 438] condemning our project, and have grounds for hoping for the actual support of some of them.
- “6. Mr. Nehru’s latest statement shows that his ideas have moved closer to our own. With persistence, we may even secure his endorsement of the kind of negotiated settlement in Indo-China that would be acceptable to us.
- “7. While we do not believe that a French collapse in Indo-China could come about as rapidly or as completely as the Americans appear to envisage, this danger reinforces the need to lay the foundations of a wider and viable defence organization for South-East Asia.
- “8. We propose therefore that the United States and the United Kingdom should begin an immediate and secret joint examination of the political and military problems involved in creating a collective defence for South-East Asia, namely: (a) nature and purpose; (b) membership; (c) commitments.
This examination should also cover immediate aid measures to stiffen Siam.”
Report of my conversation follows by separate cable.2
- Repeated to London for information.↩
That report was transmitted in telegram Dulte 33 from Geneva, Apr. 30; see vol. xvi, p. 622. The portion most relevant to subsequent regional developments in Southeast Asia follows:
“I referred to the paragraph in the United Kingdom memorandum calling for immediate and secret joint examination between the United States and the United Kingdom. I said that this might be useful, but certainly it would not be useful if that was all there was, because we had already invited other countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines. Australia and New Zealand to share in creating a Southeast Asian defense: and the two first had definitely agreed and the two latter were interested. I also said I was confident we could not now rebuff them without serious consequences for the future. They would have to be brought in on some discussions, although probably not those of the intimate nature which were customary between the United States and the United Kingdom. I referred to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty had developed progressively, the first conception being the Brussels Pact, then the addition of the United States and Canada, then the addition of Scandinavian countries, then the addition of Portugal and Italy, and most recently the addition of Greece and Turkey. I said that surely any Southeast Asian arrangement would have to include at least Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the Associated States; and I did not see why we could not get started with that nucleus and let it develop as seemed natural. Mr. Eden made no reply.” (790.5/4–3054)
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