Conference files, lot 60 D 627
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Acting Secretary of State
Subject:
- Background Material for ANZUS Meeting.1
A summary of recent pertinent conversations is being prepared for you. Until April 28, both Australia and New Zealand were, publicly and privately, in substantial agreement with us. Menzies then apparently felt obliged to line up with the British in opposing the present initiation of “united action” discussions, and the New York Times of April 29 reported from Geneva: “Canada, Australia, and New Zealand Are Said To Support Opposition of Britain”. This is not quite the ANZUS spirit of solidarity about which so much has been said in the past few weeks.
A meeting of the ANZUS Council in Geneva will, if publicized, offset to some extent this trend away from our position. It will, however, accentuate U.S.-U.K. differences and the exclusion of the British from ANZUS, but Casey and Webb will no doubt take care of this point in their suggestions for a communiqué after the ANZUS Council Meeting.
We considered suggesting to you that, in view of apparent backsliding by the Australians, we hold them off a little on an ANZUS meeting, but think it best to go ahead and bring them back on course a little, laying the groundwork for more active support from them after the general elections in Australia on May 29 for their House of Representatives. (Current estimates are that the present Liberal-Country Party coalition will win by a small margin over the Labor Party opposition headed by Dr. Herbert Evatt. If Labor should win, we would have much more difficulty in getting Australian support. Evatt could not be counted on to the same extent as Menzies.)
Pertinent records of the 1952 and 1953 ANZUS Council Meetings will be available at Geneva. It has been agreed that the Council will meet annually, alternating “in principle” between Washington one year and Canberra or Wellington the next year. The 1952 meeting was in Honolulu and the 1953 one in Washington. The Australian and New Zealand Governments have been counting on the 1954 meeting being out there. Depending on events in the next few months, the Secretary may or may not want to go out there for another Council meeting this year, and he will no doubt bear this in mind in discussing future plans for the ANZUS Council.
[Page 435]Summary of Recent Consultations with Australia and New Zealand
April 4 Secretary saw Spender and Munro, with General Smith, Admiral Radford, etc. Reference was made to ANZUS by the Secretary.2
April 5 Merchant saw Spender to suggest Australian initiative in current crisis. Merchant asked if it would be helpful if meetings with the two Ambassadors were called “Consultative Meetings of the ANZUS Deputies”. Our Embassies in Canberra and Wellington were later asked to raise same question informally.
April 6 Secretary saw Munro, who sought further consultation concerning April 4 meeting and stressed importance of fullest possible US–UK agreement as basic to policy of his Government. ANZUS apparently not mentioned specifically.
April 10 General Smith saw Spender and confirmed Spender’s understanding that the Secretary’s proposal called for a coalition of interested states to render aid required to prevent further deterioration in Indochina. Proposal did not constitute declaration against Communist China. General Smith suggested possible ANZUS Deputies meeting to discuss results of Secretary’s discussions in London and Paris. Spender agreed such meeting might be profitable.3
April 12 Embassy Wellington reported that External Affairs felt no public pressure on the necessity of the ANZUS label, but had no objection if Australia and US so desired. UK non-inclusion issue might crop up but New Zealand officials were willing face this.
April 14 Webb said in Wellington that New Zealand Government welcomed US–British statement of April 13. He referred to “… Communist expansionism … serious position … in Indochina … our special interest in security of Pacific … loss of this area would pose serious threat to security of Australia and New Zealand … ready to accept fair share of responsibility … prepared to enter into discussions … to conclude system of collective defense … within UN Charter.”
April 14 Acting External Minister McBride said in Canberra that “… activities of the Communists in Indochina … endanger the peace and security of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific … recognition of the strategic importance of this area … is of great significance to Australia … Australia will be a willing participant in the discussions on the collective defense of Southeast Asia (within the framework of the UN Charter)…”.
April 15 General Smith saw Spender and outlined results of Secretary’s trip to London and Paris. Spender said it was important [Page 436] not to allow any new Southeast Asia arrangements to interfere with close consultative relationship established by ANZUS.
April 17 General Smith and Merchant briefed Spender, Munro and Heeney4 on Secretary’s trip and plans for Geneva Conference.5
April 18 Plans for April 20 meeting changed after Secretary’s discussions with British Ambassador.6
April 20 Australian Embassy Counselor Blakeney told Bonbright that Spender would see General Smith the next day to say that the Australian Government had been quite prepared to attend a meeting of the Ten powers with a view to inauguration preliminary and exploratory conversations. Blakeney said he wanted to make plain the Australian Government did not agree with the British Government’s changed view on this point. Blakeney said also that his Government was anxious to follow up the “suggestion”, which he said had been put forward on April 4, that meetings on this subject be considered as meetings of the ANZUS Deputies. Australia did not want ANZUS to be submerged and thought that occasional meetings of the Deputies would show that the organization was operating.7
April 21 General Smith saw Spender.
April 23 Embassy Canberra reported that External Affairs cabled Spender it favors labeling meetings as of ANZUS Deputies. (Canberra Top Secret telegram No. 239, 5:00 p.m., April 23.)8
April 26 General Smith saw Munro. Munro was told that the President and Congressional leaders felt US should be willing to do anything it could to assist the Indochinese but those who are closer to danger should come along. No desire to coerce allies or give ultimatum to China. British position was key to situation and Munro commented his Government’s attitude depended on the British. Munro asked for consideration of possibility of ANZUS meeting. General Smith agreed this might be desirable and suggested Munro speak to Spender and let General Smith know their joint views.
[Page 437]April 29 Prime Minister Menzies in public statement commenting on local press headline “Australia to Back US–Indochina Policy” said “The story is completely untrue. We are … in close contact with the UK … We have entered into no new obligations but we have … very special interest in the future of Southeast Asian countries.” He also said that after Casey’s return from Geneva next week cabinet could consider any suggestions. He noted proximity May 29 elections and said it would not be normal practice to make material changes in foreign policy and deprecated statements suggesting conflict between US–UK on matters obviously requiring closest mutual understanding.
- A consultation of Foreign Ministers under the terms of the ANZUS Pact was held at Geneva on May 2.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1231.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is printed ibid., p. 1304.↩
- Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney of Canada.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. xvi, p. 530.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is printed in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1349.↩
According to Bonbright’S memorandum of this conversation, Blakeney had also brought up the question of membership of a regional defense arrangement:
“Australia would favor approaching other Asian nations in addition to Thailand and the Philippines, and each of them would require special handling. For example, they believed that it should be made clear to the Burmese that the choice was theirs to join the Ten or not to join. The three Asian members of the Commonwealth, Pakistan, India and Ceylon should at least be kept informed as our thinking developed. As to the Indonesians, the Australian Government was not certain what should be done. There would be real hesitation in Canberra about having them join the Ten.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 236)
↩- Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 236)↩