Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5416

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 5416

[Washington,] 10 April 1954.

Subject:

• United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC Action No. 1029–b)²

1. I have had forwarded to you a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject. This is responsive to the request of the National Security Council contained in NSC Action No. 1029–b that the Department of Defense review and report on the subject. I have not had time to study all the implications of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, but, recognizing the desirability of early Council discussion of the subject, I suggest that the memorandum be made available at once to the members of the Council.

2. I believe further work will be required, particularly to correlate these military views with the political, psychological, and economic factors involved, before an over-all statement of policy on the Far East can be developed. I agree, therefore, with paragraph 18 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum and suggest that, after initial discussion by the Council of the comprehensive subject, the Planning Board should be asked to prepare a recommended comprehensive statement of policy.

C. E. Wilson

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, April 9, 1954.

Subject:

• United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC Action no. 1029–b).

1. In response to the request contained in a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense dated February 23, 1954,³ subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on United States strategy for developing a position of military strength in the Far East.^*

2. Since the United States military objectives and programs with respect to a specific country or region stem from approved United States policy as it affects such country or region, the development of United States military objectives toward the Far East should, in the usual course, be within the context of an over-all United States policy respecting that area. Although the United States policy towards Communist China does set forth certain general objectives to be sought in the Far East vis-à-vis that country, the United States has not formulated a comprehensive policy in which the Far East is viewed as a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a postion of military strength in the Far East. Rather, our present policy addresses itself to the individual countries within the area or, as in the case of Southeast Asia, to a segment of the area. Inasmuch as the scope and objectives of these policies are familiar to you, it is considered unnecessary to recount them in detail here. Pertinent extracts of basic United States policy and of policies pertaining to the individual countries of the Far East, from which an evaluation of the strategic importance attached by the United States to the Far East as a whole may be derived, are quoted in the Appendix hereto for ready reference. Taken in the aggregate, these expressions of policy make it clear that the United States, from the standpoint of its security interests, attaches major importance to the Far East area and would be prepared to react with military force against an armed aggression by the USSR or Communist China in that region.

3. United States commitments in the Far East having military implications are a reflection of United States policy, and accordingly they also should directly influence the character and strength of our military position in that region. Foremost among these, of course, has been the commitment involving United States forces in support of the United Nations action in Korea. Other commitments are in the nature of formal agreements such as the mutual security pacts with Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Australia and New Zealand. Less formal commitments result from United States official pronouncements regarding the defense of Formosa^† and the possible consequences which might attend a Communist renewal of hostilities in Korea^‡ or Chinese overt intervention in Indochina.^§

4. Non-Communist military strength in the Far East now rests principally on United States military power, plus that of France in Indochina, the United Kingdom in Hong Kong and Malaya, the forces of Australia and New Zealand, and the indigenous forces of the Republic of Korea, Associated States, and Nationalist China. The military forces of the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia are considered to be reasonably adequate at present only to maintain the internal security of those countries. Japan’s National Safety Force, which is now in the process of transition into conventional military organizations, has not yet attained a significant combat capability.

5. Military personnel now under arms in the non-Communist countries of the Far East (exclusive of United States forces) total approximately 2,100,000 army, 111,000 navy, and 143,000 air. It should be recognized that these figures are not a true index of the present aggregate military capability of these countries. In terms of effective combat units, the capacity of the forces of Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines is of a relatively low order. Except for Japan, the indigenous countries in the area are lacking in the means of providing adequate logistic support and strategic mobility to their forces.

6. These countries do possess ample manpower resources. In general, the factor limiting the expansion of their military establishments is their inability to equip and support larger forces. In the case of Japan, a progressive expansion, with United States support, is now underway and when fully developed should result in a cohesive military force, capable of assuming responsibility for at least the ground defense of the Japanese main islands and possibly capable of contributing to the defense of the Far East area as a whole. The ROK and Nationalist China forces, with continued U.S. logistic support, and with adequate external air and naval support, should be capable of providing a reasonably effective defense of their respective territories. As the result of United States assistance, the organization and combat effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist forces have been materially improved in the last three years. With the amphibious lift now available to them they are capable of undertaking raids against the Chinese Communist mainland; with United States air, naval, and logistic support, they would be able to undertake larger-scale amphibious operations or to participate otherwise in the general defense of the Far East area. The Associated States have mobilized a sizable combat force which, however, has not developed to its full combat potential. Its major deficiencies appear to be due to inadequate training methods and facilities, lack of trained leaders, lack of confidence in the French, and lack of incentive. The United States has proposed steps which, with the cooperation of the French, could in a large measure remedy these defects and, in time, enable the Associated States not only to maintain their internal security once it is restored but also to become an effective element in the containment of Communist China.

7. The estimated combined strength of the Communist forces in the Far East (USSR, Communist China, and the Viet Minh) totals 3,260,000 army, 125,000 navy, and 117,000 air. The forces of the USSR are well organized and possess a high combat potential. They are more than adequate for the defense of Soviet territory in the Far east and are considered to be capable of launching combined operations against Japan which, at present, could only be effectively opposed by United States forces, employing their atomic capability. While by Western standards the Communist Chinese are deficient in strategic and tactical mobility, airpower, and technical and logistic support, they have demonstrated that with Soviet logistical assistance, and by virtue of sheer numbers alone, they constitute a formidable force and one which, if unopposed by United States power, is considered to be capable of overrunning all of Southeast Asia. The Viet Minh, although not highly organized nor self-supporting, have proved themselves capable of withstanding the combined efforts of the French and the Associated States in Indochina.

8. In assessing the factors which contribute to military power in the Far East, it is evident that insofar as the indigenous forces of the area are concerned, there is at present an imbalance which is heavily in favor of the Communist countries. The defeat of Japan and her subsequent demilitarization and disarmament removed from the scene, at least temporarily, the one Asiatic power which had the potential of denying the advance of Communist forces in that area. The collapse of Nationalist China on the mainland enlarged the military vacuum which Japan’s defeat had created and into which, in characteristic fashion, the Communist forces moved. The decline in the position of the former colonial powers in the Far East and the general distress which now characterizes the areas they formerly dominated, encourage the Communists to pursue their expansionist objectives, for which mainland China affords them an excellent base of operations. As opposed to the comparatively weak, insecure, and divided opposition presented by the non-Communist countries of the area, Communist China, closely aligned with the Soviet Union, stands as a powerfully organized and disciplined force, whose apparent immediate objective is to gain control of the strategic resources and rice surpluses of Southeast Asia. Once this is acquired by the Communists, Japan would be forced to terms, due to her dependence upon the resources of this area for her livelihood. The implications of such an eventuality as related to the security interests of the United States and the Free World need not be dwelt upon here. At present, it is only the power of the United States which provides a semblance of balance to the military positions in the Far East—a balance which will remain precarious so long as the non-Communist countries in that region remain individually weak and collectively unorganized to oppose the threat of Communist China.

9. It is obvious that for the foreseeable future United States power will be an essential element in developing and maintaining a position of military strength in the Far East. It is equally obvious that, under present circumstances, inordinate reliance is placed upon United States power to achieve that end, and too little upon the development of the collective military capabilities of the Asiatic non-Communist countries in that area. It is toward redressing this condition that the United States should direct its efforts in the Far East—to foster the determination and to enlist the combined strengths of those countries to oppose any aggressive advances by Communist China or by a minor satellite.

10. To the extent that Communist control in China can be disrupted and Communist China circumscribed by effective regional opposition in the Far East, dependence upon United States military power in that area will be decreased and United States freedom of action in its global strategy vis-à-vis the USSR enhanced. Even without substantial increases in the present military forces of the Asiatic non-Communist countries, their demonstration of a purpose to resist collectively will introduce a new factor to deter aggressive Communism in the Far East. With progressive improvement and, where feasible, expansion of their forces with coordination of plans, and with improvement in their capabilities to project their forces to assist in the common effort, this deterrent would take on added significance. Psychologically, such a community of purpose and effort would tend to remove the feeling of isolation and impotence now prevailing in the individual countries and to create the confidence essential for a resolute attitude in the face of the Communist threat, both internal and external. Moreover, such a concerting of effort would permit a coordinated development of military resources in which the military assets peculiar to each country could, to an extent, be exploited for the benefit of the whole. This could also serve to give direction to the military assistance furnished by the United States to the countries concerned.

11. The aggressive attitude and the growing military power of Communist China represent the primary and immediate threat to the non-Communist countries of the Far East. There is no unique prescription which would produce in short order a local counterbalance to that power. Nevertheless, the containment of that power within its present boundaries, the arresting of its internal growth, and ultimately its detachment from the area of Communist control should be the progressive objectives of United States policy toward the Far East. To accomplish these objectives without ever-increasing demands upon United States resources will require the development, organization, and effective application of the combined military potential of the non-Communist countries of that region. As a long-range goal in the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would envisage the emergence of a regional security pact with which the United States and possibly other major Western Powers would be associated and which would form the political and economic basis of an integrated military structure of indigenous armed forces, supplemented and complemented by the mobile forces of the United States and other associated nations. If this goal is to be attained, it is important that actions designed to reduce the internal growth of Communist China proceed concurrently. When this military posture has been developed sufficiently to permit the parent alliance to deal with Red China from a position of strength, military and other pressures should be brought to bear in such manner and to the extent required to reduce the Communist threat in the Far East to manageable proportions. It is conceivable that through a combination of political, military and economic pressures a separation of Red China from the Soviet bloc could ultimately be brought about, possibly followed by the reorientation of mainland China to the West.

12. The obstacles to the establishment, at this time, of a comprehensive regional security arrangement for the Far East are too well known to require restatement. However, until such an arrangement can be established the full potential of the collective capabilities of the Far East countries cannot be realized. In the meantime, as an alternative, bilateral and multilateral treaties among the countries of the area should be fostered. With the United States acting as the integrator among the treaty nations, it should be in a position to give direction to the development of forces and facilities in a manner which not only will provide for the local security needs of the respective countries but also make possible eventual contributions to a collective effort. If such a regional arrangement is to have substance, it will not suffice for each member country to provide only the minimum forces and facilities to meet its own internal security requirements. In the aggregate, the indigenous forces established should be designed to complement the United States forces—local deterrent strength to be reinforced, if necessary, by our more mobile military power.

13. Basic to the establishment of a non-Communist position of strength in the Far East is the rehabilitation of the Japanese military forces—not along the lines of the ultra-national military attitude of pre-World War II, but along moderate and controlled lines that will enable Japan to exert a stabilizing influence in the Far East. There are indications that the Japanese Government and people are beginning to view rearmament in an increasingly realistic light and that a healthy military revival will emerge in due course.^|| It is probable that this trend will be accelerated as United States forces are withdrawn from Japan. It is recognized that a military revival in Japan would be attended by certain risks, although there are counteracting factors which would materially limit those risks. In addition to restrictions which would be imposed upon Japan by economic and political factors, it is believed that so long as the United States furnishes the principal offensive air and naval elements of the combined military forces in the Far East, adequate safeguards against the recrudescence of Japanese military power as an aggressive force would be provided.

14. If Japan is ultimately to assume responsibility for her national defense and to join in a concerted effort to resist Communist aggression, the United States must accept the risks, while exerting its efforts to influence the course of Japanese policy to conform to our security interests. Even though, at this time, Japan would not be wholly acceptable as a member of a Pacific regional pact, it is considered to be in United States security interests to foster and support the healthy development of the Japanese military structure to the end that Japan will become capable of providing for her own security and of becoming a contributor to collective security in the Western Pacific.

15. Time will be an essential element in the dissolution of the obstacles to the formation of the comprehensive system of regional security in the Far East area, but this should not deter the United States from proceeding toward this as an objective. In the meantime, the urgencies of the developing situation may well require positive measures to counter the Communist threat until such time as it can be caused to recede. Providing for the security of the offshore island chain will not, of itself, be adequate. This measure constitutes merely a means toward achieving security in the Far East rather than the primary security objective to be sought.

16. In the light of the foregoing considerations affecting the security interests of the United States in the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that United States policy should view the non-Communist Far East as an entity, whose component countries are interdependent economically and strategically. Viewing the problem within this context, our policy should be directed toward achieving the following objectives, among others:

a. Development of the purpose and capability of the non-Communist countries of the Far East to act collectively and effectively in opposing the threat of aggressive Communism.

b. Eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional security arrangement among the non-Communist countries of the Far East, with which the United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly France, would be associated.

c. Reduction of the power and influence of the USSR in the Far East, initially through the containment and reduction of the relative power position of Communist China, and ultimately the detachment of China from the area of Soviet Communist control.

17. In order to achieve the foregoing objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should pursue the following courses of action:

a. Foster the progressive development of the military strength of Japan, to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.

b. Similarly, provide assistance and support for the forces of the ROK and Nationalist China, as prospective contributors to the community defense effort in the Far East.

c. Continue to foster the development and improvement of the forces of the Associated States in order to enable them, with continuing French support, eventually to be capable of maintaining internal security without the assistance of French units and also to become an effective element in the containment of Communist China.

d. Assist Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and the Philippines to improve the quality of their forces and, where feasible, to expand them beyond the minimum requirements to maintain their internal security.

e. Seek to reduce the friction and to resolve the differences which now constitute a major obstacle to a collective security arrangement in the Far East; more specifically, seek to promote the acceptance of a rearmed Japan as an important element in the common defense of the area.

f. Foster bilateral and multilateral defense treaties leading to improved cooperation, coordination of plans, and eventually to a comprehensive and cohesive system of security in the Far East area.

g. To the extent feasible, direct the development of the indigenous forces in the non-Communist countries along such lines as to complement United States mobile forces and to facilitate their employment in conjunction with our own and other forces, if required.

h. Maintain the integrity of the off-shore island chain.

i. Be prepared to prevent further territorial expansion by the Chinese Communists, and to take such measures as may be feasible to prevent them from consolidating the gains they have thus far achieved in North Korea and, through the Viet Minh, in Indochina.

j. In the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression, avoid the imposition of arbitrary restriction which would limit the counteraction to the area where the aggression occurs, but rather, retain freedom of action to apply the counteraction, as appropriate, against the source of the aggression.

k. Maintain sufficient U.S. forces in the Far East as a clear evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its full share of effective collective aid to the Associated States against the Communist threat, and to provide assurance to the people of the Far East of our intent and determination to support them in the event of Communist aggression.

l. Continue to support operations designed to disrupt Communist control and exploitation of China. To the extent feasible, intensify the scope and character of such operations without delay.

m. Seek to assure Japan sufficient access to raw materials and markets to support an independent Japanese economy thus assuring a livelihood for the growing Japanese population and the base for her rearmament.

18. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be presented to the National Security Council for consideration in the formulation of a comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Extracts of Policies Relating to the Far East

1. “Under existing treaties or policies, an attack on … Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand … or on the Republic of Korea, would involve the United States in war with the USSR, or at least with Communist China if the aggression were Chinese alone.”

“Certain other countries, such as Indochina or Formosa, are of such strategic importance to the United States that an attack on them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor. …” (Subparagraphs 13–a and b NSC 162/2)⁴

2. “In the Far East, strength must be built on existing bilateral and multilateral security arrangements until more comprehensive regional arrangements become feasible. The United States should stress assistance in developing Japan as a major element of strength. The United States should maintain the security of the offshore island chain and continue to develop the defensive capacity of Korea and Southeast Asia in accordance with existing commitments.” (Subparagraph 37–b, NSC 162/2)

3. “Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.” (Paragraph 1, NSC 5405)⁵ “… The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on United States and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere.” (Subparagraph 1–a, NSC 5405) “Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific off-shore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.” (Subparagraph 1–c, NSC 5405)

4. “The security of Japan is of such importance to the United States position in the Pacific area that the United States would fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of the territory of Japan.” (Subparagraph 2–a, NSC 125/2)

5. “Objective—Maintenance of the security of Formosa, independent of communism, as an essential element within the U.S. Far East defense Position,” (Paragraph 1, NSC 146/2)⁶

6. “… The loss of Indonesia to Communist control would have serious security implications for the United States and the rest of the free world.” (Paragraph 1, NSC 171/1)

1. This memorandum and its attachment are enclosures to a memorandum of Apr. 10 from Lay to the National Security Council. Lay recommended that “after initial discussion by the Council, the enclosures be referred to the NSC Planning Board for the preparation of a comprehensive statement of policy on the subject for early Council consideration.”

   On Apr. 13, the NSC discussed the enclosure and in NSC Action No. 1091–b “Referred NSC 5416 to the NSC Planning Board for the preparation of a comprehensive statement of policy on the subject for early Council consideration.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

2. See the editorial note, p. 385.
3. Not printed.
4. For the purposes of this paper, the following countries are included in the Far East area: Communist China, Korea, Hong Kong, Indochina, Indonesia, the Offshore Island Chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand), Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Statements by the President of the U.S. on June 27, 1950 and February 3, 1953 (Dept. of State Bulletin 574–July 3, 1950, and 711–February 9, 1953, respectively). [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Greater Sanctions Declaration. July 27, 1953 (S/D Bulletin 739–August 24, 1953). [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Statement by Secretary of State at St. Louis, September 2, 1953 (S/D Bulletin 742–September 14, 1953). [Footnote in the source text.]
8. See Department of State policy report “Current Foreign Relations”, dated March 10, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. For NSC 162/2, a report entitled “Review of Basic National Security Policy”, dated Oct. 30, 1953, see volume ii.
5. Dated Jan. 16, p. 366.
6. For NSC 146/2, a report entitled “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government”, dated Nov. 6, 1953, see volume xiv.