751G.00/4–954
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs (Williams)
Subject:
- Indochina
Participants:
- The Secretary
- R.S.S. Gunewardene, Ambassador of Ceylon
- Mr. Bonsal—PSA
- Mr. Williams—SOA
The Secretary said he wanted to find out if the South Asian Prime Ministers would discuss Indochina at the Colombo Conference1 which would convene about the same time as the Geneva Conference.
Mr. Gunewardene said that no subject to which any of the participating countries objected would be discussed at Colombo. He said the conference would be “exploratory”, that mutual problems including economic matters would be discussed, and that there would be no agenda. Giving strong assurances, he said “no specific issues like Kashmir, Indochina, or military aid” would be discussed at least in overt fashion.
The Secretary then said that the United States was giving financial help and some military equipment to the French and the Associated States to help them in their struggle. It was not certain that the French were willing or able to carry through the present operation to a successful outcome, and if no new element were introduced they might be disposed to make some settlement that would in effect give Indochina to the Communists. The Secretary said that this would not end the danger but rather extend it. He then described our interest and concern in the whole area of Southeast Asia. He said that he had been discussing the problem with the representatives of interested countries, and was gratified to have word from the Ambassador of Thailand indicating strong support of our attitude. He said that willingness to take united action would strengthen our position at Geneva and if this fails it would be a base for more active military participation provided: (1) the French are prepared to give explicit assurances regarding the independence of the Associated States, and (2) other countries concerned feel the same way about the situation as we do and are willing to join in effective united action. The Secretary said he had been having exploratory talks with interested countries, and he was going to London and Paris to present this point of view to the British and French Governments. He said he hoped to create a basis for a stronger position in Geneva than otherwise might be the case.
The Ambassador of Ceylon referred to his Government’s anti-Communist policies and said that any extension of Communist power in Southeast Asia would “give alarm and dismay” to the Ceylon Government. He pointed out that Ceylon does not recognize the Associated States, although there are numerous ties between the people of Ceylon and the people of Indochina. Ceylon was not [Page 411] convinced these states were independent. He said his Government believed they should have freedom to leave the French Union if they wanted to, and that independence for these states should be the basis for any further action.
The Secretary said that this was the heart of the problem.2
- The Prime Ministers Conference, which met at Colombo Apr. 28–30, and which reassembled at Kandy, Ceylon on May 1 and 2, was composed of delegations from Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.↩
In another conversation held Apr. 9, Dulles outlined the united action program to Ambassador Amjad Ali of Pakistan. The conversation concluded as follows:
“The Secretary noted that the meeting of South Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo would coincide with the Geneva parley on Asia and hoped that proceedings at Colombo would not take a course counter to our objectives at Geneva.
“The Ambassador expressed satisfaction at being informed on this subject, awareness of the gravity of the situation, and stressed the importance from the point of view of Asian public opinion of the clear definition of genuine independence of the Associated States.” (Memorandum of conversation by Lee Metcalf, Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs; 751G.00/4–954)
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