Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/7–1553

Memorandum of Conversation, by Armistead M. Lee of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 15, 1953.

Subject:

• ANZUS

Participants:

• Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman, JCS
• Colonel Robert Ferguson, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
• Mr. Amos Peaslee, Ambassador to Australia
• Mr. Avery F. Peterson, BNA
• Mr. Armistead M. Lee, BNA

Admiral Radford spoke warmly of both Mr. Menzies and Mr. Casey, and asked Mr. Peaslee to convey his best regards to them. He had much enjoyed his contact with Mr. Casey at the ANZUS Council last year, and with the Australian and New Zealand officers at the meetings of the ANZUS Military Representatives, as well as those on establishing a 5–power staff agency on Southeast Asia.

Admiral Radford said that he hoped that we would not change our opposition to the inclusion of the U.K. in ANZUS. Even without the U.K. in ANZUS there had been enough misunderstanding in other Pacific countries where the impression persisted that this was a Pacific Pact. He recalled that it had been necessary to have a special conference with the Philippines in order to placate Quirino’s concern.²

Pointing out that the British were kept fully informed of anything substantive that was discussed at ANZUS gatherings, and that the previous Labor Government in the U.K. had concurred in this arrangement, the Admiral expressed the view that this was purely a prestige question on Churchill, who seemed to feel that it reflected on the Commonwealth for Australia and New Zealand to sit down with the U.S. in the absence of Great Britain. Although at the first ANZUS Council meeting last August both Casey and Webb had made a pro forma request for British observer status, the Admiral felt that they were quite happy to have us turn down the suggestion. He was quite certain also that neither the Australian nor New Zealand military representatives wanted to have British participation, since this would have a dampening effect on their freedom of expression.

Questioned as to his views on a possible link between ANZAM and the ANZUS Military Representatives, a suggestion which had been discussed in some Australian papers, Admiral Radford said that he regarded this as just another effort of the British to get into ANZUS by the back door. He had already had a conference, two years ago, with the Australian, New Zealand and British naval representatives, defining areas of operational responsibility for convoying and antisubmarine warfare, etc., as between CINCPAC and ANZAM.³ But this was now settled, and there was no need for periodic meetings with ANZAM, which had a quite different function from that of the ANZUS Military Representatives.

He recalled that the Australians and New Zealanders had wanted to station ANZUS liaison officers continually at Pearl Harbor and that he had succeeded in talking them out of this. While assuring them that such officers would be made welcome, he had made it clear that there would really not be enough for them to do to justify the expense, and that the needs for consultation could be met by periodic get-togethers.

Admiral Radford said that these meetings had been worth while, and that experience with them had proved most useful, from his point of view, in the subsequent discussions which had included British and French representatives, over the establishment of a 5–power staff agency for Southeast Asia.

Asked whether he thought that the staff agency would meet the British demand for inclusion in ANZUS, Admiral Radford indicated that it could hardly meet this prestige issue since there has been absolutely no publicity on the entire staff agency project. He pointed out also that the 5–power group had an entirely different function and geographic scope from ANZUS. In his opinion there was justification for continued and separate existence for both organizations.

1. Drafted on July 17. Avery F. Peterson, a participant listed below, was the Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs.
2. Apparent reference to the meeting described in circular telegram 38 from Manila, Oct. 29, 1952, not printed. (796.5/10–2952)
3. Apparent reference to the Radford-Collins conference held at Pearl Harbor, Feb. 26–Mar. 2, 1951. For background information, see HON Special 4 of July 30, 1952, p. 161.