Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/1–2954

Report by the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives of the Five Powers on the Conference Held June 15 to July 1, 1953¹

top secret

Pearl Harbor, T.H., [undated].

I. Purpose of the Conference

To consider the following courses of action as possible measures to counter further Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia:

1. Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Indochina.

2. Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Hong Kong.

3. Maintain the security of Hong Kong by the introduction of appropriate reinforcements.

4. Conduct air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland.

5. Conduct a blockade of the China coast.

6. Conduct psychological warfare.

7. Conduct guerrilla warfare.

8. Provide naval and air support to friendly forces in Thailand.

9. Provide ground forces along with appropriate naval and air support to reinforce friendly forces in Thailand.

II. Terms of Reference

1. This conference was conducted within the framework of, and in accordance with the recommendations contained in Five-Power Conference report of 6–10 April 1953.²

2. Assumptions. The following assumptions are applicable to all of the courses of action considered:

a. Conditions short of general hostilities will exist.

b. The USSR will not overtly intervene.

c. Weapons of mass destruction will not be used by either side.

3. National Forces Availability:

The forces which were considered available for any or all courses of action are attached as Annex H.³

III. Consideration of Courses of Action

Indochina

1. Study of this problem did not cover Indochina as a whole, but evaluated the effect and feasibility of the provision of naval and air support to French Union Forces in North Vietnam in the initial phase of an attack. As a result it was concluded that the provision of this type of assistance, including air attacks against certain selected targets in South China, was not only feasible, but essential since without such aid the ability of the French Union Forces in Tonkin to withdraw from their present positions into the vital Hanoi-Haiphong area and to hold it for even a limited period is extremely doubtful.

2. The effectiveness and even the feasibility of this course depends to a large extent on the prior improvement of some existing airfields, the setting up of an adequate control and reporting system and certain logistical preparations. The cost of such measures is not considered excessive when considered in relation to the advantages which would result.

3. It is strongly recommended that this course be approved and the necessary preliminary preparations be undertaken, since it is felt that the security of Southeast Asia depends largely on the maintenance of the integrity of the Tonkin Delta.

Hong Kong

4. The retention of Hong Kong in the face of Communist attack would uphold the major aim of the Five Powers by containing Communism. A clear indication of a firm intention to hold the Colony would also be a considerable deterrent to further aggression. Furthermore, a secure Hong Kong with an effective air establishment would be a threat to enemy communications in South China.

5. Annex B specifies the military requirements which must be met if Hong Kong is to be held. These include the presence of two infantry divisions, less two battalions, and a force of high performance fighter aircraft in Hong Kong on D-day. So long as the period of warning remains short, these forces must be a part of the normal garrison. Another pre D-day requisite is the construction of a new airfield in Hong Kong. If these preparations are to be effective, a considerable scale of air and naval assistance as well as ground reinforcements must also be available at short notice. Owing to the time factor the naval and air assistance would necessarily be provided largely by the U.S. forces in adjoining areas.

6. Until the necessary forces are allocated and the other requirements to maintain the security of Hong Kong are met, Allied cooperation in the defense of Hong Kong by the provision of naval and air assistance is the only feasible course. Assistance limited to these categories could not ensure a successful defense of the Colony against a full scale attack, but it would compel the enemy to deploy larger forces against it, delay its fall and assist the evacuation of non-combatants. The most important form which this assistance could take would be air action, particularly against the Chinese Communist Air Force.

7. To enable such naval and air forces to make their due contribution, prior coordination of plans, agreed command and liaison arrangements and certain new communication facilities are necessary. The establishment of such machinery is essential to the implementation of either course of action and completion of these preparations involves only a small outlay.

Attacks Against Selected Targets

8. The air forces that might be available are not large enough to conduct an effective campaign against the whole of China, but could be used to great advantage against targets south of the Yangtze in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. This course would be most effective when supplementing other courses of action such as blockade of the China coast, and certain elements of it would be essential to the defense of Indochina or Hong Kong.

9. The air forces listed as those that might be available are deficient in medium and light bombers particularly in the event of strong counter air force action being required and in the event of withdrawal of the CCAF to bases outside the range of carrier aircraft. With the short range air forces possibly available, there would be a considerable strike capacity against targets on the coastal belt to a distance of about 250 miles inland. This capability would be greatly reduced in the event of a large Korean commitment.

10. Any restriction of air attacks to targets within a radius of two or three hundred miles of the area of aggression would substantially reduce the effectiveness with which the forces available could be employed. Such a policy might seriously limit the type of target that might be engaged and the weight of effort that could be brought to bear.

Blockade

11. Study of the problem of blockading the China coast in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia indicates that it is feasible and has military advantages, provided that it is coupled with a declaration of contraband, with air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland and perhaps with other measures. It could virtually stop strategic materials reaching China from overseas, disrupt sea communications south of Tsingtao and impose a strain on the internal communications of China, thereby reducing the ability of the Chinese Communists to sustain military operations in Southeast Asia.

12. The blockade forces required are not excessive, but they must be supported by aircraft based on Formosa and the part-time efforts of a naval task group of four attack carriers and supporting ships. Mining by aircraft is an important element of the blockade.

Psychological Warfare

13. Psychological warfare can and should play a valuable part in countering Chinese Communist aggression by weakening the enemy’s will to fight, influencing neutrals and stimulating friendly peoples. The cost of the psychological warfare effort would be comparatively small.

14. Planning for the conduct of psychological warfare should continue within the framework of the existing Five Power military coordinating machinery.

Guerrilla Warfare

15. There is a guerrilla potential throughout Southeast Asia from South China to Malaya which, if developed, could have a considerable long term effect on further Chinese Communist aggression. To gain the maximum effect, guerrilla operations must be coordinated to assist the main military operations that may be undertaken. Each Power should continue independently to develop guerrilla potential and national plans.

16. Limited coordination could be achieved by:

a. Exchange of information on targets suitable for engagement by guerrillas, in support of military plans.

b. Each nation maintaining an estimate of the contribution that could be made in support of the military effort by the guerrilla operations it could sponsor. Such an estimate could be held ready for communication to the Allied Power attacked or seriously threatened.

Thailand

17. Allied military assistance to Thailand should be provided only at the request of the Thai authorities and would depend for its effectiveness on the morale of the Thai people and the will of the government to resist internal subversion and Chinese Communist aggression.

18. To meet the internal threat the Thai forces are in need of three infantry brigades and one air transport squadron. To remedy this deficiency the U.S. should examine its military air policy with a view to influencing the Thai government to modify its troop basis under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). At the same time the U.K. should examine the feasibility of furnishing one infantry brigade if required.

19. The real defense of Thailand against the external threat lies in the success of other Allied courses of action in Southeast Asia. Should, however, these other courses fail, or not be undertaken, the defense of a portion of Thailand would be desirable. It would be feasible, providing Allied forces of the order of 4–6 divisions with appropriate naval, air and logistic support were available, and providing also that the necessary infrastructure, including airfields, could be constructed in Thailand in the time available.

IV. Inter-Relation of Courses of Action

1. The relationship of the possible courses of action to each other is such that no course should be considered for implementation in isolation.

2. Great emphasis must be placed on the defense of the Tonkin Delta in Indochina. The loss of this area to the Communists would simplify their continued expansion while compounding the difficulties of the Allies. Under the conditions of the study, defense of the Tonkin Delta, to be successful, must be accompanied by air attacks on certain selected targets on the Chinese mainland and might also require implementation of a blockade of the China coast. Those in turn could cause a reaction by the Communists in the form of action against Hong Kong.

3. A direct Chinese Communist attack against Thailand by-passing the Tonkin Delta is also a possibility. To counter this threat, aggressive Allied action in the form of intensified operations in Indochina and air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland might be necessary. Here again a blockade of the China coast could progressively reduce the Chinese Communist offensive capability.

4. A fundamental requirement for the success of any Allied counter action against the Chinese Communists is the early neutralization or destruction of the Chinese Communist Air Force. It is considered that Allied counter action against Communist attack would include immediate support at the point of aggression and that the early reduction of Chinese Communist capacity for offensive operations could best be achieved by continued air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland and the early dislocation of Chinese coastal shipping.

5. Allied guerrilla and psychological warfare capabilities could and should be implemented in conjunction with any other course of action as their results would be reflected in the overall reduction of Chinese Communist offensive capabilities.

6. It is apparent that not all of the courses of action considered could be implemented at the same time with the forces available. Certain courses might be implemented concurrently depending on the availability of forces. While the optimum effect of each course might not be achieved, the results would be worthwhile.

7. Certain of these courses involve a risk of widening the conflict both in Asia and elsewhere. These risks could not be taken into account in this purely military conference and in some circumstances these may not be acceptable. The question of widening the conflict may not, however, arise, e.g., if the initial aggression itself is widespread. This consideration should not be allowed to retard the preparation of coordinated military plans.

8. The inter-relation of courses of action has been considered only in relation to Southeast Asia and not to other courses of action in the Far East, e.g., Korea, which might make demands on the same forces.

9. Some additional remarks are at Annex J.

V. Recommendations Relative to Courses of Action

The following recommendations, particular to the various courses of action, are made as a result of conclusions reached in the planning studies. Should they be adopted, it is recommended that early action be taken to give effect to them, since the quick and effective implementation of any of these courses will depend on the degree of readiness when the emergency arises.

Indochina

It is recommended that:

1. Approval be given for the preparation of coordinated plans for the provision of Allied naval and air assistance in the defense of Indochina.

2. Subject to the approval of paragraph 1, above, the following action be taken:

a. A United States commander for U.S. forces supporting Indochina be designated.

b. The designated U.S. commander and the French commander be directed to coordinate plans for naval and air support of Indochina.

c. Communications required for the successful operation of U.S. naval and air forces in support of Indochina and the coordination of operations be established.

3. The following be provided or established:

a. An early warning and intercept radar system.

b. Improved airfield facilities.

c. Additional AA defense for the Haiphong area.

d. IFF responders Mk III for all French land-based aircraft.

e. Stocks of fuel, bombs, ammunition, etc., and associated equipment for the support of Allied aircraft.

Hong Kong

It is recommended that:

4. Approval be given for the preparation of coordinated plans for the provision of Allied naval and air assistance in the defense of Hong Kong.

5. Consideration be given to improving the defenses of Hong Kong to make it secure against possible Chinese Communist aggression.

6. Subject to the approval of paragraph 4, above, the following action be taken:

a. A United States commander for U.S. forces supporting Hong Kong be designated.

b. The designated U.S. commander and the Commander British Forces, Hong Kong, be directed to coordinate plans for the naval and air support of the Colony.

c. Communications required for the successful operation of U.S. naval and air forces in support of the Colony and the coordination of operations be established.

7. Subject to the approval of paragraph 5, above, the following steps should be taken in addition to those in paragraph 6, above, to provide:

a. One additional airfield with adequate facilities at Hong Kong.

b. Adequate radar facilities.

c. Land and air garrison forces as indicated in Annex B.

d. Essential reinforcement as indicated in Annex B.

Attacks Against Selected Targets

It is recommended that:

8. Approval be given for the preparation of plans for attack on selected targets in Communist China.

9. Subject to approval of Paragraph 8, above, the following action be taken:

a. A designated U.S. commander be directed to effect liaison as necessary with Allied commanders in Hong Kong and Indochina in connection with routing and identification, communications, weather, rescue and other matters of mutual concern.

b. Studies be undertaken on a national basis with a view to improving airfields in Southeast Asia to meet the needs of modern military aircraft.

c. The requirement for more light and medium bombers be noted.

d. Intelligence be exchanged with a view to arriving at an accurate and up-to-date survey of targets in Communist China together with an assessment of the likely Chinese Communist air opposition.

e. A further study be undertaken to determine an agreed estimate of bombing accuracies of Allied air forces that might be engaged.

f. Depending on the conclusions reached in d. and e., above, a detailed assessment be made of the force requirements necessary for specific target systems.

Blockade

It is recommended that:

10. Approval be given for the preparation of plans for a blockade of the China coast.

11. Subject to the approval of paragraph 10, above, the following action be taken:

a. A United States commander be designated as Blockade Force Commander.

b. The designated U.S. Blockade Force Commander be instructed to initiate and coordinate the necessary outline plans.

c. The designated U.S. Blockade Force Commander be instructed to prepare a communication plan for coordination between blockading forces and operational control authorities.

d. A U.K. Joint Naval/Air command be designated for the Southern Area blockading forces to control such U.K., French, Australian and New Zealand forces as may be allocated.

e. The Allied powers develop, within their capabilities, improved methods of destroying junks and exchange information on this subject.

Psychological Warfare

It is recommended that:

12. Approval be given for the continuation of planning for psychological warfare, to be undertaken within the framework of the existing Five Power military coordination machinery.

13. Subject to the approval of paragraph 12, above, the following tasks should be carried out:

a. Develop and coordinate a psychological warfare program for Southeast Asia.

b. Study the relative efficiency of the various methods which can be employed in specific regions of Southeast Asia.

c. Review the technical facilities available.

Guerrilla Warfare

It is recommended that:

14. Approval be given for planning and coordination of guerrilla operations to continue on the basis that each nation should:

a. Continue independently to develop guerrilla potential and national plans for guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia.

b. Exchange with other powers, information on targets suitable for engagement by guerrillas.

c. Maintain, as applicable, an estimate of the contribution their plans could make to the main defense plans and hold such estimates ready for communication to any Allied Power attacked or seriously threatened.

Thailand

It is recommended that:

15. To meet the internal threat:

a. The United States should examine its military air policy with a view to influencing the Thai Government to modify its troop basis to provide an additional three infantry brigades and one air transport squadron under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

b. The British Defense Coordination Committee should examine the feasibility of furnishing one infantry brigade for employment in Thailand.

16. Since the provision of naval and air assistance to Thailand would do little more than delay a Chinese Communist invasion, it should not be considered further at the present time.

17. Approval be given for planning to proceed, on a low priority, for the deployment of naval, land and air forces in the defense of at least part of Thailand.

• T. J. Daly
  Senior Representative,
  Australian Delegation
• L. Pennacchioni
  Senior Representative,
  French Delegation
• H. E. Gilbert
  Senior Representative,
  New Zealand Delegation
• E. A. Whiteley
  Senior Representative,
  United Kingdom Delegation
• A. P. Storrs
  Senior Representative,
  United States Delegation⁴

1. This report is an enclosure to a letter of Jan. 29, 1954, from Vice Adm. A. C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense, to the Secretary of State. For another enclosure to this letter, a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense dated Dec. 4, 1953, see p. 355.
2. Ante, p. 303.
3. None of the annexes to this report is printed.
4. Rear Admiral Storrs was Chief of Staff to CINCPAC.