661.89/9–2352: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan1
112. In Dept opinion Sov démarche when considered in historical perspective does not pose any substantially new polit problem for GOA, though seriousness over-all problems econ development and internal admin northern provinces in context Afghan-USSR relations fully appreciated. Démarche need not discourage continuation econ development North Afghan which has proceeded for several years with and without UN auspices; and it may have salutary effect on Afghan-Pak relations. Dept inclined believe that aside from desire for friendly advice from US and UK, GOA may well be capitalizing on démarche in attempt to achieve (1) increased econ asst (2) mil asst and (3) US–UK pressure on GOP to negot Pushtoonistan agreement with GOA, thereby hoping minimize concessions GOA may otherwise have to make.
GOA is understandably nervous over démarche but Dept finds it difficult to determine precise kind support US can usefully offer. Dept does not see how large scale US econ and mil aid program of which north wld be substantial beneficiary (urtel 147 Sep 23) can be solution to polit problem in Afghan-USSR relations when fon aid is very pt of sensitivity in those relations. Afghan reflected appreciation this basic situation in decision few years ago to restrict outside aid in [Page 1455] North Afghan to UN. This is third choice referred para 2 urtel 1462 and in Dept’s opinion, still remains most practical course to follow.
Dept cannot wholly accept FonMins black and white description of Afghan dilemma (Embtel 1253) re econ development in North Afghan. First, Dept considers statement “country wld fall apart unless econ asst is accorded north” an exaggeration. Second, it is certainly inaccurate to assert “nothing whatsoever has been done in north.” Textile mill of Pul-i-Khumli, beet sugar refinery of Baghlan and cotton ginning facilities of Kunduz region alone belie that statement. Even if oil project abandoned, which is by no means backbone of development program in Afghan, various fields econ development can be pursued which can be of demonstrable benefit to inhabitants within relatively short space time and which wld be less provocative to USSR. This seems to be line of action best suited to circumstances.
Dept agrees with Emb that atmosphere may be more favorable for improvement in Afghan-Pak relations which is certainly of priority importance. In this connection dept notes with interest Najibullah’s talk to Emb Delhi officer (Delhi desp 686 Sep 64). Pts 2, 3, 6 are recital of what USReps have been telling GOA for past few years. Essential to recall GOA avowedly concluded barter agreement with USSR in 1950 primarily because of difficulties arising from Pushtoonistan dispute. Fact is that Afghan can get gas and cloth in subcontinent if Sov barter agreement abrogated, though transportation problems admittedly great. It seems clear Afghans are not sufficiently worried over supply problem and relations with USSR in general even to take minimum step of reciprocating Pak’s move by sending Amb to Karachi. Hence does not follow that greater econ aid to Afghan wld make it more amenable to settle dispute. On contrary good case can be made that it wld be less amenable.
Parenthetically it is interesting to note (Embtel 125 para 4) FonMins time-worn assertion that regime “inevitably” will be overthrown if face saving Pushtoon settlement not achieved, while on other hand he characterized tribesmen as “irreligious” and interested in nothing but “money and rifles.” This patent inconsistency may be pointed out if this line presented to Emb officers.
By way of advice to GOA Dept desires that you (1) tell FonMin US applauds GOA rejection Sov protest which is only position hon sovereign [Page 1456] state cld take; (2) express hope that regardless final decision re oil exploitation, which is decision for GOA to take, other types econ development in north proceed as usual not only for their intrinsic econ and polit advantage but also to avoid appearance capitulation to USSR; (3) reaffirm contd US interest and efforts to help Afghan with econ development; (4) reiterate US govt earnestly hopes GOA will make effort to settle its outstanding issues with GOP. Such settlement wld not only strengthen GOA position vis-à-vis USSR and therefore be in mutual security interest but wld also make for improvement in Afghan-subcontinent trade relations. Latter factor in particular shld have consequence of placing Afghan in better position to more successfully absorb econ asst, a condition of significance to US executive agencies and Congress in studying development problems. You may say GOA desire settle Pushtoon wld be demonstrable by reciprocating GOP gesture good will by sending Amb to Karachi and toning down anti-Pak propaganda. Both steps shld have immed salutary effect on Afghan-Pak relations and provide basis for settlement outstanding issues without loss of face to tribesmen or Afghan people in general.
- This telegram was drafted in SOA; approved for transmission by Byroade; and repeated for information to London, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, and New Delhi.↩
- The second paragraph of this telegram, dated Sept. 23, reads as follows: “As Emb has already indicated, GOA plans exploit oil represent only initial phase gen econ plans for development north Afghan. By same token, Sov démarche is aimed at total effort block any econ progress in north, leaving that area a ripe plum to be plucked at leisure. Essentially, when [what?] GAO is being confronted with [is?] choice of three alternatives: (1) to cease from any effort develop north; (2) to accept Sov proffers of tech and other assistance in the development of north; and (3) to take the calculated risk of a strong Sov reaction and proceed with econ development plans under UN aegis.” (661.89/9–2352)↩
- Dated Sept. 9, p. 1447.↩
- Ante, p. 1368.↩