661.89/9–2352: Telegram
The Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State1
147. Re Delhi desp 368 [686,] Sept 6th2 and Embtel 1463 to Dept rptd info Karachi 27, London 28, Moscow 5.
[Page 1453]Emb feels US shld develop more powerful counterweight than moral support to Sov pressure on GOA. Present GOA fears center on econ results possible abrogation Sov barter agreement and politico mil potentialities Sov subversion in north. Probable that gas shortage resulting from cut-off Sov trade wld very seriously cripple north area, and glut of unwanted raw cotton along with immed shortage cotton cloth cld bring about grave situation even without Sov subversion.
Main limiting factor in internal economy is poor north-south communications. Sufficient gas and cotton cloth for north available from Pak side but present condition roads and transport across Hindu Kush [would limit?] flow to mere trickle. Recent drouth in north and resulting discontent and unrest wld sharpen effects of Sov action.
Afganistan Press announced GOA plans float first internal loan Afghanistan history to pay for roads program. Afghanistan anxiety (particularly on part of King) to construct modern road to north already well-known to Emb and Dept.
Emb requests serious consideration be given US dollar contribution matching GOA funds for improvement and construction highways including suitable north-south road, and dollar loan to govt monopoly or private Shirkat for setting up modern motor transport maintenance and repair depots on road and purchase suitable trucking units. Cost of US contribution highway project wld be about $5,000,000 equip project about $1,000,000. Resistance potential to Sov econ and subversive pressures wld be further strengthened by establishment agricultural development bank at cost of $500,000 to US.
Projects cld fall under heading TCA general econ aid or even, in view north oil possibilities, basic materials development. Proposals for roads development and agricultural bank are key points in US—UN working paper of Jan 26,4 which has been accepted by GOA as basis econ development planning.
Further projects which cld supplement above wld include Kabul-Kandahar Road and assistance to Af Air Force towards purchase of and facilities for medium transport aircraft which wld provide regular govt air service to north and at same time greatly strengthen govt mil strength as against subversion and tribal uprising without giving justifiable cause for alarm to either Pak or Soviets.
Emb realizes consideration these measures can be justified only on basis revised high level estimates US policy toward Afghan. Emb believes implementation, or, to lesser extent, announcements assistance outlined above wld:
- 1)
- Strengthen Af will resist Sov pressure;
- 2)
- Provide additional incentive toward development of north;
- 3)
- Provide effective means over-all econ-strengthening Afghan;
- 4)
- Reduce possibility successful Sov econ pressure on North Afghan;
- 5)
- Increase GOA potentiality combat subversion and subversive rebellion in north;
- 6)
- Afford no cause for alarm in Pak;
- 7)
- As long as Sov pressure is applied, or probably even without such pressure, net effect of projects wld make GOA, in pure self-interest, more amenable to settlement dispute with Pak which wld be even more important as route exports and imports.
Emb feels existence proposed facilities wld not to any appreciable extent facilitate Sov overt [garble] against Afghan, Pak or Iran and wld assist in preserving what might be invaluable base for covert action against Soviets in time of war.
Understand Brit Emb Kabul has suggested inclusion Afghan in Colombo plan.5
- This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi and London; Department passed Moscow.↩
- Ante, p. 1368.↩
- Dated Sept. 23, not printed, but see footnote 2, infra.↩
- Reference is to the Joint Working Paper on Technical Assistance to Afghanistan prepared by the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission and the American Embassy, Kabul (enclosure 1 of despatch 242, Jan. 14, 1952 from Kabul; 889.00 TA/1–1452).↩
- See footnote 2, p. 1437.↩