611.89/10–252: Telegram
The Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State1
niact
176. Ref Deptel 112, Sept 29. I feel that Dept seriously underestimates present and future potentialities Sov pressure on this country, and utterly neglects regional aspects. Further, no account seems to have been taken of Afghan psychology or existence of important elements here willing to come to terms with Sovs.
During past five or so years, western (and especially US) prestige here has been mounting fairly steadily. Effects of delivering message along lines reftel almost certainly will be (a) to cause consternation among our numerous and influential friends within and without govt, (b) to give aid and comfort to those who seek an accommodation with Sovs, (c) to cause Afghans of all persuasions to think that we regard this country of negligible importance to our effort to stem flood of Sov aggression.
I am even more disturbed over possible consequences of implementing Dept’s instructions by recent information coming to attention UK Amb and myself that Cabinet coming around to view that accommodation with Sovs must be sought at almost any cost. According Mines Min, both PriMin2 and FonMin now of opinion that Sovs mean business [Page 1457] and that development of north must proceed along lines agreeable to USSR. If this is true, it seems to me we shld act promptly and positively and not wait until enemy is already within gates.
Emb comment on specific points follows:
- (1)
- “Démarche need not—UN auspices” unless GOA shows unsuspected spirit standing alone, realistic UN aid will not be possible in view improbability using NATO and other western technicians. Noteworthy that all econ development in north so far has been by Bank Milli, and that overall exchange resources (largely derived from north) now must be earmarked support Helmand commitment.
- (2)
- “GOA may well be capitalizing on démarche” only natural that such condition may be present, but Afghans have requested only econ and moral support, and stiff reply to Sov note was sent without consulting us thereby throwing away useful bargaining counter for US aid.
- (3)
- “Dept does not see—point of sensitivity in these relations” modest econ program outlined Embtel 147, Sept 23 designed primarily allow Afghans fighting chance withstand Sov econ and subversive pressure. If Dept does not envisage with favor an Afghan firmly withstanding all Sov attempts at interference [economic?] development, will not also object to any other development using fon technicians?
- (5)
- “Transportation problems admittedly great” even if transport problem cld be solved in next few years without extensive fon aid (inconceivable to Emb), price of northern cotton wld decline and prices petrol, textiles and other imports wld rise, thereby increasing discontent and subversion potential.
- (6)
- “It seems clear—less amenable” obviously proposed US aid wld be conditioned on substantial Af steps toward reasonable settlement Pashtun dispute. US positive pressure on Pak at same time cld well result in acceptable solution. See Emb desp 41, Sept 13, 1952.3
- (7)
- “Parenthetically—money and rifles” Emb thus long believed (Emb desp 131, Oct 12, 19514) that while tribes not likely rise on Pushtoonistan issue against GOA or GOP, nevertheless complete retreat by GOA from its admittedly unreasonable stand on this issue wld represent dangerous loss prestige to Kabul Govt. FonMin’s remark on nature tribes designed emphasize danger Sov meddling in tribal areas.
- (8)
- First point proposed remarks to GOA in reftel wld appear to GOA as pious platitude. Second point means that US, upon request, will not advise GOA to reject Sov interference in purely domestic affair. To Afghans, remarks on other types development will be limited to those projects to which Sovs might not object. Presumably Sov objections to other types development wld again be “decision for Af Govt to take”. Third point meaningless to GOA in present position unless accompanied by concrete offers. Fourth point wld have no weight whatsoever in view contents second point. Statement regarding improvement Pak trade relations wld be taken by GOA as confirming GOA accusations deliberate Pak econ blockade. Ref to US agencies might be taken as offer increase Point Four assistance, if Pashtun dispute settled. Does Dept mean to hold out such promise?
In view my firm conviction that delivery reftel observations wld be serious blow to US policy objectives in this area, I request specific instruction deliver reftel views and wish record that I cannot take responsibility for consequences.
Brit Amb telegraphing FonOff along similar lines.