Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

889.2553/9–1652: Telegram

The Chargé in Afghanistan ( Horner ) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Kabul , September 16, 1952—1 p.m.

137. Kef Deptel 82, Sept 12.² I called on FonMin this morning to obtain clarification of points raised in ref tel. Ali Mohammad made it clear GOA was seeking joint advice and support of UK and US. Before UK Amb left Kabul last week on trip, he had been given an informal fill in, and Ali Mohammad intended to talk with him again as soon as he returns. In this regard, Ali Mohammad pointed out that Sov démarche on oil had directed accusations against “North Atlantic bloc.”

FonMin then proceeded to stress gravity with which GOA regards position. He did not believe the Brit were fully aware of implications, and in past he had made unsuccessful attempts to convey to Ambs Palmer and Dreyfus³ potentialities inherent in common border with USSR.

Ali Mohammad also referred at some length to extremely weak milit position this country. In approaching us last autumn for milit aid (Embdes 100, Sept 6, 1951⁴) GOA had in mind danger Sov subversion. If Afghan had two additional divisions equipped with modern arms, it wld send these to the north immed. Obviously Afghan army cld not attempt to hold back Red Army thrust which he considered unlikely, but it should be in a position to put down any internal uprisings financed or aided by Soviets.

FonMin said that in seeking US–UK advice on what next to do, GOA had in mind clarifying its general east-west policy. For considerable time Soviets have been complaining of GOA partiality toward West. They have pointed to activities USIS library and contrasted it with situation they are in of having to channel all pubs distributed through MFA. Shpedko has claimed that while Afghan officials freely visit with Amers, Sov dipls are under constant surveillance.

I had impression that Ali Mohammad is deeply disturbed over continued existence bad relations with Pak, but has no very concrete ideas of how the Pashtun issue can be solved. He did not make a direct reply to my question whether GOA prepared to recede from position that separate state of Pashtunistan shld be created, but he gave impression something in nature of cultural autonomy wld be acceptable. He said that if issue were simply shelved this wld be playing hands Sovs who cld exploit nationalism of Afghan youth and purchase support of tribesmen. In brief, GOA was seeking way out of dangerous position and sought our advice.

Horner

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Karachi, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Supra .
3. Ely Eliot Palmer was U.S. Chief of Mission in Afghanistan from December 1945 to November 1948. Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., was Ambassador in Afghanistan from August 1949 to January 1951.
4. Not printed.