Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/7–852: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State¹

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New Delhi, July 8, 1952—8 p.m.

100. Met Nehru 11 a.m. Tuesday for discussion Nazimuddin proposals basis cables from Wash and Karachi. Fifty minute discussion inconclusive. Conversation proceeded along following lines:

1. I told Nehru frankly I had stopped Karachi en route Delhi that Warren informed me GOP seemed be taking most reasonable attitude towards Kashmir, that tentative proposals had been suggested and might be wise for me talk directly Nazimuddin.

2. I said that as result I had seen Nazimuddin with Warren. I reported that Nazimuddin had opened conversation by saying with great earnestness time running out on Kashmir question an Pak considering making major concessions secure agreement.

3. I stated Nazimuddin asked me if in my opinion Nehru would agree establish plebiscite administration if agreement reached on quantum forces. I had replied it my understanding GOI had always made it clear appointment of plebiscite administration would not be an issue under such circumstances and indeed Graham had so stated in his last report to SC. I asked Prime Minister if his interpretation correct.

4. Prime Minister agreed there should be no difficulty on question appointing plebiscite administration if other questions which were principally military problems were once decided. He said demilitarization could go forward promptly and there should be no delay on appointment plebiscite administrator himself. Nehru not 100 percent clear on exact timing but I believe it fair assume this not problem.

5. I then presented Nazimuddin proposition i.e. Indian regular army in Kashmir be limited 15,000 with 3,750 Azad Kashmiris on four to one basis; that 3,500 northern scouts and 6,000 Kashmir militia should not be counted; and that this proposal predicated on assumption there be no delay establishing plebiscite administration.

6. For three or four minutes Nehru did not speak. He then said Indian position quite clear.

a. 21,000 Indian regular army troops without heavy equipment (when I reminded him on occasions he had stated would go below this figure he said this quite correct but that in last month GOP had moved armored brigade into Sialkot 22 miles from City Jammu and these troops in position cut Indian’s communication with valley. He stated if security situation became easier with removal this brigade as one demonstration this easing his statement that he might go below 21,000 still held good).

b. That India insisted present Azad Kashmir forces be entirely disbanded. He said, however, that it clear some force be available preserve order and therefore GOI had stated their willingness allow 2,000 regular Azad Kashmir troops be recruited for police duty with 2,000 additional police recruited other sources. He said ratios were not the way to approach problem since this implied Pak had definite rights in Kashmir which Indians had consistently denied. He stated in event plebiscite Indians would of course not enter Azad Kashmir and UN officers would be in entire control Azad Kashmir police force.

c. Although I tried pin him down he noncommittal about northern scouts and Kashmir militia. This does not necessarily mean his agreement.

7. I then made strongest possible plea for his cooperation reaching settlement. I said even though he objected Nazimuddin presenting his concessions basis troop ratio this been part discussion from beginning. Important point as I saw it was GOP seemed earnestly anxious meet him halfway. I said world covered with trouble spots which threatened peace that Kashmir one of these and that he as man dedicated peace, within his grasp tremendous opportunity demonstrate it possible through negotiation and reasonable approach ease situation such as Kashmir; that I understood tremendous complexity Kashmir situation but certainly he must agree not as complex as Germany or Korea two questions on which he often criticized us. I said I speaking solely as individual but I also speaking for many tens of millions of people when I urged him demonstrate to world that even as difficult a problem as Kashmir subject to reasonable discussion and solution. This statement made with considerable emotion and he seemed impressed and uneasy.

8. I then said to Nehru I had responsibility reporting result my talk and asked what he wanted me say. I added I hoped if negotiations were to continue they could be handled through Graham in New York or if he wished I quite sure Graham willing return subcontinent. He stated thought proper thing do is for Graham make any recommendations to negotiating bodies New York that seemed to him be fair and with some chance success.

9. I asked Nehru if he had anything specific add this general statement since I afraid whole UN negotiations fast approaching crisis and if Graham’s next efforts failed whole issue likely be back in SC. Nehru said I knew very well India had always been interested partition possibility as outlined Dixon report omitting requirement Kashmir Government should give up its sovereignty during demilitarization and plebiscite period. I stated Graham felt it impossible bring up question partition because his terms reference did not cover it and if Nehru felt this suggestion might bring solution closer he might ask his representative in New York open up question with Graham on his own directly. Nehru answered he thought everyone understood India’s attitude on this that it really Paks who had turned Dixon down flatly and if they now mood discuss it they should open question. I ended discussion Kashmir with renewed plea he do everything within his own power make agreement possible. Again I pointed out Pak and India an economic unit and even though two countries would always remain independent politically they as well as world in general had everything gain in material as well as moral sense in finding solution. He stated he not discouraged that India pledged plebiscite under proper conditions.

Nehru’s manner and one throughout entire conversation most pleasant and friendly. However, he definitely did not give very much and result generally disappointing. Pessimistic interpretation of meeting might be Nehru determined avoid agreement and would continue avoid coming grips with situation on general theory if it allowed drift present status Kashmir might gradually become accepted. More optimistic interpretation would be Nehru did not want be position accepting what is actually generous gesture from Pak.

Similar proposal made by Graham might succeed provided its language and implications do not run counter to GOI position that Kashmir legally part India and that plebiscite if held solely based on desire of GOI to take reasonable position and not because of any inherent right GOP. This may be hard swallow but it basic to GOI position.

We need not of course accept this GOI interpretation. But any language or proposal that fails even by implication take it into account is doomed failure. My recommendation is Graham without mentioning Pak proposal should state he more less final recommendation make to the two parties.

a. That Pak brigade be withdrawn from Sialokot and Pak army troops be kept reasonable distance from Azad Kashmir frontier.

b. That once this accepted Azad Kashmir army should be disbanded and Indian troops Kashmir reduced to 1,600.

c. That under UN direction police force be immediately organized keep in Azad Kashmir consisting 2,000 former Azad Kashmir soldiers and 2,000 recruited other sources.

d. That Kashmir military be limited 6,500 men (their strength estimated by Nehru in Parliament yesterday) and northern scouts limited no more than 3,500.

e. That plebiscite administration be immediately appointed that agreed demilitarization program be carried out under his direction and that he have power decide when situation enables fair plebiscite be held.

f. I personally like see Graham add final statement that while question partition as originally suggested by Dixon outside his jurisdiction he would be interested in attitude both GOI and GOP on question whether or not plebiscite limited to valley would make entire settlement easier achieve. Warren’s judgment would be better than mine but it my guess based on talk Nazimuddin Pak would not object partition plus plebiscite in valley. Many believe GOI is bluffing on this but time running out and if it is bluff it should be called.

Whether India would accept this series proposals quite uncertain. But taken together they answer almost every question Nehru raised with me and he would be in extremely weak position if did not accept. If either or both parties refuse accept this proposal by Graham seems to me no other alternative but for him take question SC and make his report. In that case it my hope US Govt take neutral position regardless what may appear be rights wrongs case. SC vote to censure either GOP or GOI may give us sense moral righteousness otherwise it will only enable Soviet Union take advantage this situation and further to muddy waters. Resentment towards US would be great and position UN and US in either Pak or India would be seriously undermined.

As background this whole situation we should not forget that India itself in very ticklish position subject Kashmir. Few months ago most people agreed Kashmir clearly favored India and would so vote in any fair plebiscite. In recent months most observers believe there definite shift toward Pak and even stronger towards idea independence. Sheikh Abdullah statements critical India may simply have reflected his belief public moving away from India and he better move with it or his statement may be largely responsible for shift.

India cannot possibly win plebiscite in valley without solid backing Abdullah and for last several weeks Abdullah has steadfastly refused even come Delhi discuss situation with Prime Minister. As result top GOI officials negotiating with second rank Kashmiri and they frustrated and angry. Reports Abdullah’s growing insistence on independent Kashmir have increased.

Nehru may now feel waters so thoroughly muddy there nothing him do but sit tight in hope situation may become more favorable. Or he might decide to take chance and use plebiscite as method whipping Abdullah into line. If Nehru stated flatly to Abdullah independence not possibility, that he morally pledged plebiscite and intends adhere this pledge, that if Pak wins plebiscite Abdullah definitely finished while if India wins Abdullah can continue enjoy semiautonomous set up within Indian Republic there might be chance his swinging Abdullah and his village to village organization again squarely favor joining India.

However, it quite possible Nehru feels damage already created by Abdullah’s actions so serious that India’s former position Kashmir cannot be recaptured for sometime. Exactly where this would leave India hard determine. In absence any clear solution GOI might simply adopt political drift.

I have just received telephone call from Nehru’s office. He would like Mrs. Bowles and I come dinner alone July 10. This may or may not be desire continue today’s discussions.

Bowles

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London and New York.