Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/7–952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India¹

secret
niact

Washington, July 9, 1952—7:11 p.m.

74. Be Kashmir, urtel 100 niact.²

1. We appreciate your detailed reporting conversation with Nehru and share your indicated doubts re likelihood change Nehru’s probable position on GOP proposal. Nevertheless we feel opportunity provided you by your engagement Nehru July 10 might be occasion for follow-up on presentation made. You may inform Nehru that you have now received further indications from Wash that US regards GOP offer as reasonable and encouraging.

2. We believe follow-up shld cover fol points:

a. Expression your hope that Nehru has given further consideration to GOP proposal and is prepared indicate what may be nature his reply to be conveyed by you to GOP.

b. You firmly believe that GOP proposal eminently just and reasonable. You might indicate at your discretion that, while we do not know what Dr. Graham may indicate on subj troop quantum in forthcoming report, we wld find it most difficult, shld he indicate troop quantum along lines GOP has privately put to Indians, not support in SC such figures as mtg GOI’s previous position re quantum more than half-way.

c. GOI’s insistence on absolute disbandment Azad–Kashmir forces is not part UNCIP agreement. To bargain for this is of course GOI privilege, but insist upon it is, in our opinion, not consistent with what we understand be Indian willingness to carry out the UNCIP ress. At same time, since Nehru does appreciate that some forces must be available too preserve order in Azad–Kashmiri occupied areas, he surely must also appreciate that experienced mil forces wld be more effective in assuring order and security of area.

d. We honestly can not see ratio in any way reflects on either Indian or Pak rights to Kashmir. US for its part believes that ratio so far as GOP proposal is concerned was coincidental with GOP desire meet GOI’s highly disproportionate figures. While as we see it nothing is to be gained by long legal discussion at this point on Indian rights in Kashmir, we believe attitude most likely induce settlement problem is to assume that rights respective govts pending settlement of question exist only in areas of physical occupation and that commitment of 2 govts to resolve Kashmir through UN limits their auth over the other part of the state to the provisions of UNCIP ress and the SC ress on the problem.

e. Re Nehru’s remarks concerning Pak Armoured Brigade at Sialkot, (Dept has no info this movement), you might indicate Nehru that it wld be reasonable expect, once agreement reached on basis GOP offer, demilitarization in Kashmir wld not be vitiated by existence army formation in threatening positions outside but on borders state. You may add it is self-evident that interests GOP wld obviously be adversely affected by any mil move against Kashmir or India.

3. Basic objective this further discussion is that you obtain from Nehru reply which you may convey GOP.

4. We urge you to repeat effective presentation which you made to Nehru in para 7 of urtel. While you shld avoid any discussion alternatives (see Deptel 42 July 5) at least until GOP given Nehru’s answer their proposal, if Nehru reiterates view GOP shld initiate any steps re alternative solutions, you mght indicate belief Nehru has stature and world position warranting taking such initiative. If he bases reluctance take such step on allegation GOP rejected Dixon proposal for partition and Pleb in Vale you mght indicate we under impression from Dixon’s report to SC Nehru rejected it because he cld not agree Dixon’s minimum suggestions for administrative arrangements in Vale necessary for conducting fair Pleb i.e. steps to reduce Abdullah’s polit control peoples in Vale.

5. FYI re your comments and suggestions: (a) we will advise Graham informally of your suggested figures re quantity and nature of troops; (b) in absence of initiative by either GOI or GOP in raising subj partition with Pleb in Vale, we do not believe Graham shld be urged to add final statement on subj in report to SC; (c) as we have already indicated to you we agree that there is nothing to be gained in an SC res which censures either party. However, depending on nature of Graham’s report, it wld seem inevitable course for US indicate general support for what Dr. Graham wld recommend, even at possible risk of pointing a finger.

Bruce

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi, London, and New York.
2. Supra.