Office of the Historian

690D.91/7–152: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret
Washington, July 2, 1952—6:12 p.m.

4. Re Kashmir, USUN’s 1 July 1. In view Graham’s request for suggestions as to next steps based on assumption that Nazimuddin has lost GOP fight for his proposals we suggest Graham consider the fol line of action:

1.
He make specific proposals with regard to troop quantum, the date for end demilitarization period and the date for installation of PlebAd. We suggest with regard to troop quantum the fol figures: On Indian side of cease-fire line 18–21 thousand combat troops with no armor or artillery, such troops to include the state militia. On Pak side of cease-fire line 4–6 thousand without armor and artillery but constituted from present Azad Kashmir forces. Comment: These figures [Page 1267] are suggested as bracketing a ratio approaching that suggested by Nehru (21 to 4) as being only acceptable figure to GOI. These figures also bracket the ratio of 4 to 1 which Nazimuddin himself has indicated in extremity he might be willing accept. In stipulating that forces on Pak side of line wld be Azad Kashmir troops we believe lowness of figure is compensated by better military organization of these troops. End Comment. With regard to dates for end of demilitarization period and installation of PlebAd we believe that since Paks are not likely to agree to troop quantum without agreement of PlebAd question, date for installation important. We recomm Sept 15 so that if we decide Kashmir case shld be taken to GA performance or non-performance on demilitarization program wld be clearly indicated in time for matter to be placed on GA agenda.
2.

As of poss assistance to his negots with Pak and Indian Dels we suggest the fol amendments to his 12 point program which may warrant consideration. We do not recomm that these amendments be submitted at the same time that he submits specific proposals in para 1 above. (a) We suggest that in-order to meet arguments possibly from both sides that over-all limitation of troops might permit unwise concentration of troops in one area i.e. in the valley or in the Pak held areas opposite Punch and Jammu.

Para 7 might be amended to read as fol:

“(c) On both sides of the cease-fire line: that of the forces permitted on either side of the cease-fire line under the provisions of this para or under the programme of demilitarization referred to in para nine, no more than one-half shall be stationed in any one of the provinces of Jammu, Kashmir, Gilgit, or Ladakh. This sub-para shall remain in effect unless, pursuant to paras 4 ‘a’ and ‘b’ of the 5 Jan 1949 UNCIP res, the PlebAd and the UN Rep for India and Pak, in consultation with the indicated authorities, determine that final disposal of the remaining troops requires revision of this agreement.”

(b) We suggest that in order to meet argument most likely to come from Indian Del concerning threat to security of state para 7 might be amended to have as part 2 of that para the fol:

“Further agree that if either govt believes that adjustments in the level of troops on its side of the cease-fire line shld be made in the interest of the security of the area under its control it may, at the end of the demilitarization period, but not prior to its carrying out the provisions of this para, request the UNRIP to undertake the negot of such an adjustment with the other govt, or to request the PlebAd to undertake the negot of such an adjustment pursuant to para 8 of Jan 5, 1949 res.”

3.
We believe specific suggestions cld be submitted to GOP and GOI in formal note from Graham asking their acceptance his proposals as a basis for discussion at a mtg at high governmental level at which these proposals and the rest of his demilitarization program [Page 1268] wld be discussed. He might suggest such mtg if held take place in New Delhi and indicate an early date with an intended termination date for discussions.
4.
These proposals if acceptable to Graham shld not in our opinion be handed to Ayub until July 4 on assumption that we shall hear from Karachi by that date.

Bruce