The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1
1873. For Amb. Re Kashmir. FYI only. During Graham visit Wash Feb 11 prior to his departure subcontinent Dept officials indicated desire to be maximum assistance to him in his final effort achieve Indo-Pak agreement.2 Informal suggestion made that if Graham believed Presidential appeal Nehru and Nazimuddin wld be helpful Dept wld consider recommending such a move. Timing wld be contingent upon some indication from Graham as to possible effectiveness. Graham expressed considerable interest in above suggestion but stressed appeal shld appear as spontaneous as possible.
In view limited period Graham negots such an appeal if made wld have to be forwarded within ten days or so. Appeal cld express sincere hope success Graham’s efforts stressing settlement Kashmir dispute vital to peace of subcontinent and Asia as a whole.
Dept believes advantages such appeal can be gauged only in light negot situation facing Graham at moment and his as well as Embs estimate effectiveness such a move. Fol possible disadvantages occur to Dept. 1) Nehru and/or Nazimuddin might interpret appeal as unwarranted interference and stiffen attitudes; 2) Effectiveness appeal contingent upon confidential nature and strong possibility leak which might disrupt negots cannot be overlooked.
In view foregoing Dept requests Embs assessment wisdom despatch [Page 1197] of Presidential appeal at this time. Emb shld if feasible confer with Graham and obtain his reaction possible consequences such a move. Utmost discretion of course imperative. Dept believes joint Truman–Churchill appeal not likely in view Dept understanding UK insistent that any appeal to PMs shld be for purpose getting them together under Graham’s aegis. Graham advised Dept before leaving for subcontinent he believed getting PriMins together now might be premature and dangerous.