690D.91/3–1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State


961. Zafrulla told me today he had a conversation yesterday with Graham, and today the Deputy Secy of Min of Kashmir Affairs has had a conversation with Marin Graham’s personal asst. Zafrulla is seeing Graham again tomorrow.

When yesterday’s meeting was arranged Zafrulla’s asst was told that Graham was very anxious to present some thoughts to the Min at his earliest convenience. Imagine his surprise when after a preliminary conversation of 20 minutes Graham said to him that he wld like his concurrence in an estimate that discussion of the four outstanding points might lead towards agreement between the two parties. Zafrulla replied as he understood the four points consisted in the establishment of the number of troops and their categories that shld remain on both sides during the plebiscite, the date when the troop reduction shld be completed and which wld terminate in the appointment [Page 1195] of the plebiscite administrator. In effect there are only two questions of importance that have to be resolved. One is the minimum security forces required and the second the date on which the operation, which wld be continuous, is to end. If Graham were to consider, and Nehru agree, these two essential questions Zafrulla said the next steps wld be a mtg of competent military authorities of both sides with Graham’s own military advisor. For Zafrulla, a layman, to approach the Pak military command with a dictum wld in his opinion subj himself to ridicule for moving into a specialists field. He will press Graham tomorrow to suggest a troop disposition arranged by his own military advisor working with the Ind and Pak military.

Later this evening Graham came to see me. He knew that I had talked with Zafrulla today. He said that for the Paks to hold out for an adjustment of differences in the number of troops as proposed by India (21,000 on the Ind side and 2,000 on the Pak) as opposed to Graham’s proportion of five to four wld be to play India’s game of further delay in decision on what Graham regards as the basic question namely the appointment of plebiscite administrator and his induction to office. I inquired if he had broached this subj to Zafrulla. He said he intended to tomorrow.

Then I told him I did not believe Zafrulla wld want to make too strong a position on this discussion because I understood from Zafrulla he did not regard himself as competent to make recommendations on a technical military matter.

I then raised the question with Graham as to Devers availability, he said that Devers has told him it is inconvenient for him because of his business commitments to come to the sub-continent again and that he is not disposed to press him. He then raised the question of my opinion of Nimmo’s competence to act as military advisor. I told him I had no basis of opinion for Nimmo’s standing with the Ind military, but I know that he has been discreet and correct and is certainly well informed on the Kashmir matter and is held in high regard by the Pak military. From the Australian HICOM1 I have an opinion that his status is equally good in India.

Graham then suggested that it might be useful to put it up to Nehru to have Nimmo preside over a military mtg of the Ind and Pak Generals to work out a recommendation for the troops disposition. In this way Graham’s earlier recommendation cld be modified and a new suggestion worked out. If Nehru were to agree to the thought that Nimmo might be available I said I thought the Paks wld certainly take it. The reason which cld not be advanced is that I have an opinion expressed by the Pak military as late as yesterday that they wld like to see the problem handled in simple and broad lines and that they wld agree to any number of Ind troops remaining in Kashmir provided [Page 1196] their artillery were taken out. As for themselves they are willing to put their own troop disposition in Graham’s hands.

Graham told me he is going to press Zafrulla strongly that the important thing is to remove this present obstacle of discussion on troop numbers in order to move into the next step which is agreement on the assumption of office of a plebiscite administrator. Graham feels strongly that if the Paks cld accept this point he cld prevail on Nehru to give effect to his statements that he is prepared to agree to the administrator assuming office.

It appears evident that Graham after drawing a blank in Delhi has now come to Karachi to get the Paks to accept a modification of troop dispositions that wld give him a basis for going back to Delhi and asking Nehru to agree on the next point which is the entry of the administrator into office. Zafrulla for his part seems determined to throw the military discussions into a technical field.

  1. J. E. Oldham.