Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/11–852

Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[New York,] November 8, 1952.

Participants:

• For France:
• Foreign Minister Schuman
• Ambassador Hoppenot
• Mr. Francis Lacoste
• For the US:
• Secretary Acheson
• Ambassador Jessup
• Mr. Ridgway Knight

Subject:

• The Tunisian and Moroccan Items in the UNGA

After a exchange of preliminary remarks which centered on the peculiar difficulties resulting from the transition from one United States Administration to the next, Mr. Schuman referred to the various difficulties which had arisen in the path of the French Government during the past six months. While the Pinay Government had inaugurated a policy of governmental economies and budgetary discipline, this policy has not yet had time for consolidation and difficulties have occurred in the financial and economic fields. The current budget discussion has revealed some nervousness on the part of the Parliament which does not appear to have full and entire confidence in the Government. As a result thereof, the Government is nervous and the resignation forty-eight hours ago of a Cabinet Minister is a bad symptom.

The Foreign Minister then referred to developments in France in the foreign policy domain over the last six months. The Parliament, to a greater degree than the nation, is worried by the present Government’s general European policies and, more particularly, by the European Defense Community. Special mention was made of Mr. Herriot’s speech at the recent Radical Socialist Party Congress. Mr. Schuman expressed his personal regret over this development which, while it came from an old man whose outlook had been “over-shot” by events, nevertheless had had some influence in France. However, such incidents should not be allowed to assume exaggerated proportions and should be compared to brief fever spells. While these do not indicate a deep-seated illness, they must nevertheless be treated with care, as one of these fits of nervousness could well lead French public opinion astray. In concluding, Mr. Schuman stressed that on the whole, French foreign policy of the last four years has received extensive popular support and that it was natural that there should now be a mood of hesitation.

I expressed my understanding of the French Government’s difficulties and then asked Mr. Schuman what his plans were.

Mr. Schuman answered that he would be here next week and would return to France as soon as possible thereafter, depending on the course which the general debate would take.

Mr. Schuman then proceeded to outline the course of action of the French Delegation concerning the North African items as it had been set by the French Government. The French Government cannot participate in the debate in Committee I. It believes that, as a result of the violent and extreme character of some of the statements which will be made in Committee, France would be put in the position of the accused in the dock. This, French public opinion would not accept. Furthermore, it is essential that France not appear diminished in stature and prestige in the eyes of the local North African populations.

Should France appear to have been humiliated, this would immediately be exploited by the Nationalist elements in Tunisia and Morocco and this in turn would increase France’s difficulties in North Africa. In the opinion of the French Government, one of the main difficulties facing it is the reconciliation of the deference which it owes to the UN and to her friends with the safeguarding of her dignity. At first, the French Government had thought in terms of instructing Mr. Schuman to make a statement in Committee I and then leave the Committee Room with no French participation in the activities of the Committee thereafter. Upon second thought, however, it was believed that such a procedural incident might possibly increase France’s difficulties by embittering further the subsequent debate in Committee I. Furthermore, such an action on the part of the French Delegation could be interpreted as an act of defiance toward the United Nations, and this the French Government does not desire. Therefore, the French Government decided on another course of action which has been mentioned to no one until now. Mr. Schuman took special pains to impress upon me his great anxiety to maintain complete secrecy on the proposed French course of action until the general debate on Monday. After I had assured Mr. Schuman that I would respect his confidence, the latter told me that his instructions provided that he should speak only once on the question of Tunisia and Morocco and that this should be in his general debate speech. While referring to other problems, this speech would principally dwell on Tunisia and Morocco. His presentation will avoid polemics, and will set forth the French point of view as impartially and dispassionately as possible. He will say why France cannot accept UN interference in North African affairs. At the same time he will talk about France’s accomplishments in that area and refer to the reforms which she intends to implement in the future. He will stress France’s desire for negotiations and for an understanding with her Tunisian and Moroccan interlocutors. Once this plenary speech is delivered, the French Delegation will say nothing more concerning Tunisia and Morocco and the debate in Committee I will take place with the French Delegation absent from the hall.

In answering Mr. Schuman, I first referred to my speech in the General Assembly in which I stressed that collaboration, and only collaboration, could provide the key to the solution of the problems of non-self-governing areas. A successful future could only result from the development of good relations between the directly interested parties. The UN could not impose solutions; these must result from bilateral negotiations. I referred to the belief which I had expressed that the only contribution which the UN could make would be the development of an atmosphere which would favor and facilitate such bilateral procedures.

I then went on to say that I had lost no occasion to express these same views in the various conversations which I had had with representatives of the Arab-Asian countries, some moderate, and some extremists.² I had pointed out to them that they could do more to destroy the possibility of solutions than anybody else. Should they pursue an extreme and abusive course of action, the resulting resolution could do only harm. I had stressed to them the tremendous importance of the French position in North Africa in the light of the dangers facing the world today. Should confusion result in North Africa, only the USSR would benefit therefrom. I told Mr. Schuman that I had formulated to the Arab-Asians certain tests which I would apply in order to determine their good faith in really desiring a solution. For example, should they make an effort in Committee I to admit Tunisian and Moroccan representatives, I would interpret this as a proof that they were not acting in good faith as this could only dangerously embitter the debate. I had also told them that I would speak in Committee against admitting such representatives as being of no utility. Then I would say that there was no need for commissions of inquiries or for UN “judgments” in the matter, and that all the UN could do would be to seek to create a helpful atmosphere. Zafrulla Khan had expressed his agreement with this and his desire to be helpful. I had told the Arab-Asians that their support of an extreme type of resolution would also be interpreted by me as a lack of good faith on their part and repeatedly urged that they understand the most useful outcome would be a reduction in the tension between France and her North African protectorates and that the matter should be left to France’s initiative without meddling by the United Nations. I said that I believed such leaders as Zafrulla Khan and Mrs. Pandit understood and agreed with this point of view but that it was uncertain as to how much influence they could exert on their more extreme colleagues. I also told Mr. Schuman quite frankly that our task in achieving moderation would be rendered considerably more difficult by France’s absence from Committee. In this connection I pointed out the definitely unfavorable impression which France’s non-participation would have on the Arab-Asian countries who will probably view this as an affront.

Mr. Schuman expressed his sincere gratitude for my efforts and especially mentioned his appreciation for our position opposing the admittance of Tunisian and Moroccan representatives. He was especially happy over this US decision as otherwise the door would be open to the troublemaking nationalist representatives now in New York and primed to avail themselves of this opportunity. He said that, while some favorable results appear to have been obtained already in developing an attitude of responsibility regarding the aggravation of the North African items in Committee, it could not be expected that all Arab-Asian countries would display such reason. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the more these countries are pressed by internal difficulties the more bitterly they criticize other countries in order to deflect the attention of their own public opinion from the internal scene. Answering my point about our difficulties resulting from France’s absence from Committee I, Mr. Schuman explained that France could not risk having to listen to extremists and inflammatory harangues which she could do nothing to prevent. If placed in this position, it would be not only more difficult to explain to French public opinion, but even more difficult to explain to the local North African populations. Should France answer such charges she would then find herself in the untenable position of engaging in a dispute with parties not qualified to complain and criticize. Mr. Schuman stressed the extreme sensitivity in France relating to North Africa as a whole and therefore the French Government was obliged to take the greatest precautions. Indeed, the Parliament was unanimous in opposing any kind of outside interference and would react violently. As a matter of fact, this would probably result in the Parliament blocking certain concessions which the French Government wished to make to the Tunisians.

Ambassador Hoppenot intervened to say that in accordance with information which he had received and notably from Entezam, Zafrulla Khan was one of the “most excited” Arab-Asian leaders. Mr. Lacoste chimed in to the effect that he was “fanatical”. Ambassador Jessup suggested that the explanation might lie in the fact that Zafrulla Khan was under bitter attacks at home. I expressed my opinion that the views which Zafrulla had expressed to me were real and that Zafrulla was an honorable man.

Ambassador Jessup then reverted to the concern which I had expressed over France’s silence in Committee I and her total absence therefrom. He emphasized the difficulties which would result for all the friends of France and mentioned the Latin American group which on the whole was desirous of helping.

Mr. Schuman answered that he did not think that the French could be of any real help in the First Committee and that it would be better in his opinion if they provided what help they could in his speech in the general debate. He said that the French Government had seriously considered this matter and had come to the conclusion that a French departure from the Committee after a statement would make matters worse. Such a course of action would probably be interpreted as an act of French defiance and would receive much more publicity than her absence from the start. He said that the French position would be fixed by his speech in plenary which would be “constructive and completely objective,” avoiding “polemics”.

My French colleague then expressed the importance which France placed on having the debate as brief as possible and the hope that France’s friends would understand this. It is most important that the Tunisians should not be led to believe that another intervention of the UN could occur later. Indeed, as long as the debate lasts and a hope of UN immixture persists there can be no possibility of fruitful bilateral action between France and her protectorates. This, according to Mr. Schuman, is definitely more important than the precise kind of resolution coming out of the debate. At the present time, the Bey of Tunis refuses to see the Resident General and the Sultan of Morocco is avoiding conversations with General Guilluame while, until recently, he had been willing to talk rather freely. It was clear that these negative attitudes would persist as long as both rulers believe that an intervention by the UN is possible.

I asked Mr. Schuman what he thought of a resolution which would set forth that the solution must be of a bilateral nature. Mr. Schuman answered that while this would be desirable, it was even more important that there should be an expression of confidence in France. He went on to say that France had no wish for a discussion on the question of the UN’s competence and that he would avoid stimulating any discussion of this aspect of the problem. In making his presentation on Monday, he will handle the matter of competence as secondary and accessory.

I then expressed the opinion that the task of the US Delegation would be easier were there a resolution which the United States could support instead of no resolution at all. Mr. Muniz is anxious to help and seems to have considerable influence on his South American colleagues. I expressed my belief that it would be helpful should Mr. Schuman talk to him in order to influence him in drafting a resolution “with which the French could live”. Mr. Schuman agreed, but made it quite clear that obviously, in view of France’s position, there could be no resolution “officially acceptable to France”; they will work with the Brazilians and with us closely and informally so as to let us know what would or would not be acceptable in fact from the French point of view.

Mr. Lacoste expressed some concern over a tendency which he had noticed among the Brazilian Delegation to think of themselves as “mediators”. Obviously, any kind of mediation is unacceptable to France.

I then pointed out the importance which I placed on devising a resolution not unacceptable to the French and which would receive a plurality in the General Assembly. While of course it would be preferable if such a resolution were adopted by the required two-thirds majority, I nevertheless thought that our objective would be on the whole satisfactorily attained if we achieved only a plurality. Ambassador Jessup expressed the belief that the Arab-Asian desire for some kind of a resolution to result from the debate was such that this might in the last analysis influence them towards supporting a moderate resolution rather than securing none at all. Mr. Schuman agreed, but asked that France’s friends make no concessions to the Arab-Asians which might be offensive to French public opinion in order to achieve the two-thirds majority required in the General Assembly.

Ambassador Hoppenot pointed out that the preamble and “whereas” clauses could be just as obnoxious as the operative part of the resolution.

I told Mr. Schuman that we should not be under any illusions and that we were faced with a very difficult operation as it was certain that many delegations will not be able to understand the full depth of French feelings in the matter. Mr. Schuman said that the French Delegation would be willing and anxious to provide maximum assistance to the US Delegation through close and constant informal contacts. They will make all data available to us, including the recent exchanges with the Sultan of Morocco which Mr. Knight pointed out were not yet known to us in any detail.

There then followed an exchange of views as to whether the Moroccan and Tunisian items should be bracketed. Mr. Schuman concluded that while he will think it over, he thought on the whole it was preferable to have them come up separately, even though this should tend to lengthen the debate in the UN. In particular, he felt that bracketing Tunisia and Morocco, where the situations differed, might result in unnecessarily worsening the situation in Morocco by assimilating it to the conditions prevailing in Tunisia. Mr. Lacoste observed that the Sultan in contrast to the Bey appeared to be anxious to avoid being indebted in connection with the emancipation of Morocco to anyone, including other Arab countries. Finally, Mr. Schuman pointed out the basic differences in the characters of the Bey and of the Sultan, the former being weak and under the influence of extremists, be they members of his family or nationalist leaders, while the latter was in control of the situation in Morocco, played his own game and “used” the Moroccan nationalists for his own purposes.

A brief communiqué for simultaneous release by both delegations was then agreed, and it was decided that both delegations, including pre s officers, would refrain from any amplification or speculation thereon.³

1. This draft memorandum of conversation was prepared by Ridgway Knight.
2. Memoranda of conversation Secretary Acheson and other members of the U.S. Delegation had with representatives of the Arab-Asian countries are in the S/A–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, “Tunisia, Memoranda of conversation”.
3. The text of the one-paragraph communiqué is in the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 771.