320/11–352

The Secretary of State to the French Foreign Minister (Schuman)1

top secret

Dear Mr. Schuman: During the years of our friendship and cooperation, whenever some incident threatened to disturb the harmony between our governments, I have written directly to you with the frankness which our relationship permits and requires. So I am writing you now about the Tunisian and Moroccan items on the United Nations General Assembly agenda.

I fully realize the intense interest with which every Frenchman regards North Africa. I understand his particular concern over this area now at a time when France is bearing such weighty burdens not only in Indo-China but also in Europe. For in Europe, even before completing the reconstruction of her own war damage, France has been preparing the way for the Europe of tomorrow.

Last May in talks with Prime Minister Pinay, yourself and other members of your Government I indicated the views of the United States Government on North African problems. I have not altered the views I then expressed. It was and is my hope that those problems will be handled so as to safeguard the vital interests of France in North Africa and to give satisfaction to the legitimate aspiration of the Tunisians and Moroccans to progress toward the autonomy which the [Page 838] French Government has announced as the goal of its programs of reform.

In those same conversations I said to you and your colleagues substantially what I recently repeated in my opening address at the General Assembly, that in such situations as this the role of the United Nations could not and should not be one of imposing solutions but one of furthering agreement between the parties, one of bringing about an accommodation. The primary function of the United Nations in this field, I said, is to “create an atmosphere favorable to settlements which accord with the Charter principles but should be worked out by the parties directly concerned”.2

Ever since these questions first arose I have been convinced that the United States and other nations can be most helpful by supporting in the General Assembly a vigorous and confident presentation by your Government, setting forth the detailed story of French achievements in North Africa, then going on to describe French plans for the protectorates.

Insofar as procedural as distinguished from substantive aspects of this problem are concerned may I review the attitude of the United States. As you will recall, we abstained in the vote to inscribe the Tunisian question on the agenda of the Security Council last Spring, because at that time we hoped that bilateral negotiations looking to a peaceful solution would begin. For the same reason we opposed the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss a solution. When the negotiations made no progress, the United States decided to vote for inscription at the present session of the General Assembly. As you have already been informed, the United States will also vote for the competence of the General Assembly in this question, in the event, which we believe undesirable, that this question is pressed to a vote. Our position in this regard is based solely on legal considerations. Our vote on October 22 regarding the order on the agenda of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions was cast on what we regarded as a purely procedural matter, dictated by the Parliamentary situation existing at that moment. M. Hoppenot will have reported to you my conversation with him on this subject.2

Because of our deep desire that the Tunisian and Moroccan questions be handled in the United Nations in the manner most helpful and constructive to the common cause, I hope that your obligations will permit you to come to New York in time for a full review of arrangements which should be made for proceeding in Committee One. If after we talk it over we conclude that there are ways in which my personal [Page 839] participation would be effective, I shall make every effort to adjust my other obligations to enable me to do so.3

I am looking forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of meeting with you again and of discussing with you personally not only the North African problem but other problems in which our two Governments have an active interest.4

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson
  1. The letter was transmitted as enclosure 1 to despatch 989 from Paris, Nov. 3. The despatch informed the Department of State that Ambassador Dunn had delivered the letter to the Foreign Minister on Oct. 31. Enclosure 2 to the despatch, not printed, was a letter from Schuman to Acheson, also dated Oct. 31. Schuman wrote that he wanted to talk to Acheson about the North African debate as soon as possible. He planned to arrive in New York on Nov. 7, and hoped to confer with the Secretary before Nov. 10, when Tunisia was expected to come up for discussion.
  2. This paragraph had been deleted from the suggested text of the letter transmitted to the Department in Paris telegram 2605, not printed. (320/10–2852)
  3. This paragraph had been deleted from the suggested text of the letter transmitted to the Department in Paris telegram 2605, not printed. (320/10–2852)
  4. The original version of this paragraph, in telegram 2389 to Paris, read as follows: “To demonstrate our deep desire that these matters be handled in the UN in such a manner as to improve the relationship between your country and the Fr North African protectorates, I am disposed, if my other obligations and the situation permit, personally to represent the US in Comite One when these agenda items are considered in New York.” The paragraph used in the source text was the one transmitted in telegram 2418 to Paris. (See footnote 2, p. 835.)
  5. This paragraph had been deleted from the suggested text of the letter transmitted to the Department in Paris telegram 2605, not printed. (320/10–2852)