Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/8–452: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jones) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Tunis, August 4, 1952—5 p.m.

40. 1. ResGen invited us to call today and reviewed developments past few days, since he “wished Mr. Byroade and Dept to have full picture situation.” He confirmed generally Grellet’s account (Tun 38 and 39, Aug 2)² and stressed fol points:

A. Baccouche and Mins constitute legal advisory group of Bey: Baccouche and his Mins Bey’s choice made without ResGen pressure.

B. Bey’s new advisory group “abnormal and illegal” in that Tun Govt excluded. Thus “rules of game have been violated”.

C. Group not representative either politically or geographically, and “wld be hard to find two reasonable men among them”. Under stronger majority rejection reforms foregone conclusion.

D. Binoche, FonOff, arrives Tunis tonight for brief on-spot study.

E. Referred again importance sealing budget Oct 1 (Tun 36, Aug 1).³

2. ResGen said he had been busy calming Fr opinion both here and Paris. He had advised Paris that even though “rules had been broken and advisory group not representative”, France must stick to original plan because (a) world public opinion (including some opinion in France) wld tend sympathize with new procedure introduced by Bey and (b) delay by Bey inevitable anyway. He said France’s position unchanged insofar as Bey and reform program concerned. No drastic action contemplated against Bey because changing Beys would not change situation. ResGen will not hesitate take necessary steps to check any increase terrorists activity.

3. Speaking confidentially ResGen said Palace clique banks heavily on (a) recall Hauteclocque and (b) full US support nationalist position. Re (a) he stated categorically rumors without foundation. Re (b) he again mentioned letter which Hached allegedly received from US labor union (Tun 33 July 30)⁴ and likelihood US will find Bey’s advisory group reasonable and liberal step.

4. ResGen, making clear he was speaking without specific instrs Fr govt, asked us to let Dept know that he regards next two weeks as crucial in Tun situation. During this period Bey’s advisory group will be deliberating and he considers that favorable comment by US re substance of reforms offered by Fr might carry great weight with them. Reminding us that NATO grand strategy requires stable North Africa and that proof reform program liberality is bitter opposition local Fr, ResGen hoped very much Dept through any means at its disposal wld find it possible present current program to US public as “genuine, liberal and fair”. He is convinced these adjectives apply and that program goes as far as is now possible without risking internal disorder in Tunisia.

5. ResGen handed us on restricted basis Fr text preambles seven reform decrees and said these give clear picture substance reforms. Decrees themselves constitute files several inches thick but he wld give us these as well. Unless Dept instructs otherwise translations preambles will be pouched Aug 7. Decrees deal with (1) general admin of Tunisia, (2) civil service, (3) municipal reform, (4) caidal councils, (5) legislative council, (6) administrative tribunal and (7) financial council. Together they total approx 1,000 words.

6. Comment:ResGen’s “business as usual” attitude did not hide deep concern over latest developments particularly its impact on public opinion abroad. Decree preambles are in accord with earlier Fr ex position reforms contemplated but they are of necessity dry and unnewsworthy and some of their most liberal aspects are likely to be missed outside Tunisia. We doubt therefore that Dept will wish go much beyond Secy’s still valid June statement though France will hope for at least reiteration substance of this. In candor we think ResGen may overestimate effect on advisory group of official US statement. Attitude US labor leaders, without “official” stigma, more likely have some effect, (Tun 33, para 4.)

Jones

1. This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, Algiers, Naples, Rabat, and Tangier.
2. Telegram 38 reported the Bey had summoned approximately 36 leaders of Tunisian public opinion to the Palace the previous day. He asked them to study the reform decrees, consult the people they represented, and report to him in 15 days. Telegram 39 reported the Bey’s action caught the French Residency by surprise, and they considered many of the members of the group anti-French. An informal check by the Consulate General regarding the depth of Nationalist feeling in the group confirmed the Residency’s belief that the group would probably not approve the French program. The Consul General suggested the Department of State display extreme reserve on the matter, since the French had been put on the defensive and had little room to maneuver. (772.00/8–252) Despatch 32 from Tunis, Aug. 6, transmitted the available biographic information on the members of the Bey’s group. (772.00/8–652)
3. Not printed; it reported extreme concern on the part of the Residency at the Bey’s refusal to seal routine administrative decrees, which had led to a virtual standstill of the government. The temporary device under which the budget had been operating would expire on Oct. 1, and the French felt that something would have to be done before that date. (772.00/8–152)
4. Not printed; it reported the Consulate General had heard from two sources that the Bey’s resistance to the French reforms had been greatly stiffened by Farat Hached. Hached had read the Bey a letter from an American labor leader stating American labor was firmly in back of the UGTT leader and would pressure the U.S. Government to support him in the United Nations. In the final paragraph, the Consul General suggested that if American labor leaders wrote or phoned Hached counseling restraint, that action would have a great impact on Tunisian policy. (772.00/7–3052)