772.00/7–1852: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
548. With expiration deadline for calling special session UNGA on Tunisian case, Arab-Asian bloc having failed obtain necessary votes, [Page 787] Dept believes we shld at once begin efforts avoid difficulties on both Tunisian and Moroccan cases at 7th GA.
While fully recognizing depth Fr feeling and their domestic polit difficulties, we are convinced most important aim to be sought at this time is gain Fr agreement not to oppose inscription Tunisian and Moroccan cases on the agenda.
At least Tunisian item seems certain to be inscribed regardless Fr position even if backed by US and UK and even if implementation reform program has made some progress (see USUN 60).2 It is likewise clear Moroccan item will most probably be raised and some sentiment exists that this question already on provisional agenda as holdover from 6th GA.
As indicated by Muniz of Brazil in USUN 60 Fr efforts again to block UN discussions on Morocco and Tunisia may lead to most serious situation whereas their willingness have items inscribed wld probably result in only mild debate and innocuous res and forestall anything worse such as condemnatory resolutions or efforts send UN good offices comm to North Africa.
We have believed in the past and believe even more strongly today that only wise and realistic course for Fr to take is acquiesce in discussion and take offensive by describing in detail what they have done and intend to do in North Africa. Fr cld do this while reserving position on question of competence, if they think it necessary. We hope that by autumn Bey will have accepted Tunisian reform program3 (and its implementation shld be under way) and Franco-Moroccan discussions on reforms will be in progress. If these hopes are realized we see little danger for Fr in such a course.
While our own position not yet formulated it is clear it will be even more difficult for us this autumn than it was before to oppose inscription. You will bear in mind that this issue will have to be faced immed on opening GA Oct 14. Fr undoubtedly aware practically unanimous public and press criticism in this country which followed our abstention last spring.
While we appreciate risks it seems to us Fr shld also be thinking about advantages which might be derived from inclusion of one or more Tunisian Ministers on Fr UN delegation, assuming of course that Tunisian reform program in operation by time GA convenes. However [Page 788] this is point on which Fr will be best judges and we wld not wish press it.
We recognize that it is by no means merely a question of persuading Schuman and FonOff of wisdom of proposed course of action. We leave entirely your discretion nature and level of your approaches to Fr Govt but we feel you shld raise this at once and keep it constantly before the Fr Govt. UKUN is recommending Brit Govt make similar representations to Fr Govt.
- This telegram was drafted by Bonbright (EUR) and Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson and cleared by Jernegan (NEA). Bonbright signed for the Secretary. It was repeated to Tunis, Tangier, and Rabat.↩
- July 18; not printed. It informed the Department of State that the Asian-African group was likely to put Tunisia on the Seventh General Assembly agenda and that the entire Latin American group would support the action. (772.00/7–1852)↩
- Tunis telegram 28, July 28, reported the Tunisian Prime Minister had issued a statement stating that the Bey alone had the right to make the final decision on the French reform program. (772.00/7–2852) Tunis telegram 31, July 29, reported on a meeting held the previous day by the Resident General and the Tunisian Prime Minister with the Bey. The Bey’s position was reported as ambiguous; he said he could not seal the decrees in final form for 6 weeks or 2 months, as his advisers had to study them. (772.00/7–2952)↩