772.00/3–652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

secret priority

5246. Paris for Bruce from Secy. Pls see Schuman earliest opportunity and inform him Tunisian situation continues give us serious concern; that we are particularly disturbed lest reference of question to SC (which will come to a head next week) further exacerbate situation and increase tension to great detriment current efforts resume Franco-Tunisian negots and achieve satisfactory settlement. You may assure Schuman of our desire be helpful but point out difficulties our position in absence any public assurances re French willingness meet minimum and reasonable demands Tunisian Govt re resumption negots. In order to do so we must be able take position that (1) direct French-Tunisian negots offer best possibility satisfactory resolution problem and (2) that such negots will be resumed shortly and do in fact promise eventual satisfaction legitimate Tunisian aspirations. In present circumstances we do not have necessary assurances to support this position. In short, we convinced that any possibility of avoiding formal proposal for admission of item to agenda or if that fails of [Page 686] avoiding extensive consideration in SC depends on Fr assurance that some measures will be taken soonest to help satisfy more urgent demands of Tunisians.

Therefore, though we obviously aware Schuman now acting in caretaker capacity only,2 we believe some immed action by him essential. We wld strongly urge statement by him in next two or three days to effect Fr are determined renew bilateral talks on basis specific proposals for reforms and intend press forward with negots with firm resolve make every effort conclude with Bey’s Govt arrangements for orderly progress toward development autonomy in accord existing treaties and sincere desire both Govts.

We do not concur with Fr view as reported in para 1 Embtel 52883 that force is any but short-term solution to problem and cannot be satisfactory policy so far as we can see. It has not proved notably successful in past.

Naturally we agree that Fr themselves are most intimately acquainted with details of problem and in best position to say what can be done re urgent Tunisian demands, and we hope they have come forth with something viable in program which Hauteclocque recently presented to Quai d’Orsay.

In this connection you shld tell Schuman we feel we shld be informed now re details of this program. If it envisages substantive improvements and if the parties involved are about to resume negots, the Fr position vis-à-vis the SC wld be greatly strengthened. If on the other hand, newest project is basically window dressing Fr shld be told this simply is not good enough and will in no way solve problem. Fr must realize necessity for acting now in imaginative way in Tunisia.

We continue to feel such measures as legalization nationalist parties, replacement of Fr functionaries regardless their retirement problem, appt Tunisian Asst Sec Gen as highly desirable now. Study of longer term questions such as creation of purely Tunisian legislative body perhaps with Fr participation on some council dealing with economic questions only and ultimate form of Protectorate itself shld also not be further neglected. Finally we concur Emb’s view that it is delusion on part Quai d’Orsay if they still believe nationalists represent only insignificant minority of Tunisians.

With foregoing in mind explain frankly difficulty we are now facing in UN on this question. Reiterate we desire assist Fr in this field but [Page 687] are hindered from so doing by Fr refusal face facts. State we expect something concrete emerge from present Hauteclocque plan that will permit resumption bilateral talks and that we regard this approach as by far most satisfactory. However, stress again that time has arrived when vague promises will not be sufficient solve either immed UN or basic Tunisian problem.

Finally you may inform Schuman that our position is as follows: (1) Our primary interest is settlement of Tunisian problem with minimum disturbing of stability of area. (2) We will seek postponement of consideration of Tunisian item in SC at least until Fr governmental situation is cleared up.

Acheson
  1. This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared in substance with the Secretary of State, NEA, and the offices of Matthews (G), Hickerson (UNA), Ferguson (S/P), and Tate (L). Bonbright (EUR) signed for the Secretary. The telegram was repeated to Tunis.
  2. Paris telegram 5426, Mar. 8, reported that Robert Schuman, who had been the Foreign Minister in the Faure Cabinet, would hold the same position in the new Pinay Cabinet. (751.13/3–852)
  3. Mar. 1; not printed. The first paragraph reported the Embassy had informally given the Foreign Office the suggestions made in Tunis telegram 111, Feb. 14, p. 676, as modified by Department of State comments in telegram 4982 to Paris, Feb. 22, p. 680. The Embassy had the impression the French, while conceding certain reforms were necessary, still clung to the idea that a “forceful approach” was the only one suitable to the Tunisian situation and felt that for France to yield too much would be fatal to them elsewhere in North Africa. (772.00/3–152)