772.00/3–152: Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Department of State 1

secret

5288. Deptel 4982, Feb 22 (rptd Tunis 50).2 In series informal conversations with Puaux, director Protectorate Division FonOff, we have submitted suggestions Tunis tel 111, as modified by Dept’s comments in reftel, as possible line of action French might take in solving Tunisian problem. Puaux appreciated spirit in which our views presented, and understanding US interest in finding solution satisfactory to both French and Tunisians. General impression gained is that French while conceding that certain reforms are necessary are still clinging to idea that forceful approach only one suited to Arab mentality and yielding too much to Tunisians this juncture wld be fatal not only in Tunisia but in rest North Africa.

Puaux said that FonOff recognized need for prompt resumption negotiations in order to stave off discussion Tunisian question in SC but rather despairingly admitted that instability of govt which has since fallen wld inevitably delay obligatory Cabinet decision.3

Fol are briefly summarized Puaux’s reactions, to lettered paras under para 5 Tunis tel 111.

a.
French cld not legalize nationalist parties at time when latter are directly responsible for stirring up trouble, nor cld they release nationalist leaders until law and order completely restored. Puaux felt that both might be accomplished once negotiations undertaken and modus vivendi established.
b.
Puaux stated that inquiries already conducted or being conducted by military and other regarding alleged atrocities Cap Bon and Sahel all that cld be done now. He said it wld be better to keep Parliament’s nose out of this.
c.
Puaux gave long discourse on how necessary it was to maintain sovereignty of ruler in Arab countries, where scanty notions of democracy and general illiteracy of people made it advisable to maintain existing auth of throne and protect inhabitants from unbridled, unethical and corrupt demagoguery of nationalist leaders. He pointed to Farouk as saving grace in Egyptian politics and considers that Tunisia wld best be served by maintenance of sovereignty in person of Bey.
d.
Puaux confirmed most French Govt has never declared permanency of protectorate and referred to public statements of Foreign Minister promising self govt. No denial was made that internal autonomy was feasible under terms of Bardo treaty.
e.
Puaux seemed lukewarm to replacement of French directors public service by Tunisians without preliminary consideration by mixed commission and appeared opposed to suggestion of appointment Tunisian as asst SYG without offering any reasons.
f.
This was only item to which Puaux agreed remarking, however, that replacement of French by Tunisians must necessarily be gradual process to allow for retirement of French civil servants who cld not be peremptorily dismissed after serving years in administration.
g.
Puaux was noncommittal on subject creation national assembly and considered this a question to be worked out by mixed commission. He said formula for replacing General Council was under study.
h.
Puaux readily perceived advantage of no statement being made but let it be understood that apart from prolongation Grand Council three other points formed part of French conditions at moment. He insisted that there are elements in Tunisia quite ready to negotiate moderate evolutionary program which wld be difficult if not impossible of achievement with extreme nationalists who he still tries to convince himself do not represent thinking of majority of people.
Bruce
  1. This telegram was repeated to Tunis.
  2. Ante, p. 680.
  3. This reference is to the government of Prime Minister Edgar Faure. Antoine Pinay became the new French Prime Minister on Mar. 6. For additional documentation on this topic, see volume vi .