772.00/2–1552: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State1

secret

5031. Tunis tel 111 to Dept Feb 14, rptd Paris 902 Have read reftel with great interest and, while agreeing that certain of suggestions therein may appear revolutionary from current French viewpoint, believe that French must move generally along certain of these lines if they intend move from present precarious impasse involving control by large display of force and work out permanent and friendly relationship with Tunisians.

Present preoccupation of French Govt with many pressing problems appears to have prevented top members from giving fullest study to resolving; Tunisian crisis on other than provisional basis. Realization that whatever policy they take in Tunisia is bound to have repercussions in Morocco and Algeria probably plays large part in French decisions and apparent slowness in resolving crisis may be due to weighing thoroughly all sides of problem before taking steps affecting conditions of their control of all North Africa.

We believe that any formal offer of assistance by US at this time wld be unwelcome. French are aware of our sympathetic interest in their dilemma and grateful for our support in having kept Morocco and Tunisia off agenda Sixth GA3 They know US favors accelerated development of self-govt in both Tunisia and Morocco and has welcomed French statements looking to that end. French are also aware general trend of public opinion in US critical of French policy in North Africa, They are also cognizant of their role in maintaining security northern shores of Mediterranean within framework of Western defense, and our interests in their continuing that area.

We believe that best approach wld be to discuss with FonOff informally on working level certain of Jernegan’s suggestions as factors in situation, making clear this being done in spirit of friendship and concern for problem which is now of international interest.

Our comments on Jernegan’s suggestions will follow.4

Bonsal
  1. This telegram was repeated to Tunis.
  2. Supra.
  3. For documentation on this topic, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, pp. 135 ff.
  4. Telegram 5070 from Paris, Feb. 18, was a more detailed evaluation of the Embassy’s response to the proposals in Tunis telegram 111. It commented that the Embassy believed the French Government was beginning to realize the majority of Tunisians supported Neo-Destour’s nationalist aspirations, but the habit of trying to divide and rule would die slowly. It also reported the Embassy had informally let the French know it was convinced resumption of negotiations would result in an end to the Tunisian case in the United Nations. (772.00/2–1852)