772.00/2–1452: Telegram

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State1

secret

111. We think FonOff is indulging in wishful thinking if it believes forced removal present Tunisian Cabinet will make resumption [Page 677] negotiations easier (Paris tel 4950, Feb 12)2 If Chenik is afraid of Bourguiba, his successor likely to be equally afraid. Do not believe any reputable Tunisian natlist wld accept office in opposition to will and policy of Neo-Destour. In any case, negotiations with unreputable Cabinet cld be meaningless so far as ultimate settlement is concerned, and I think anyone who is not acceptable to Neo-Destour must be considered unreputable. We see no signs of split in natlist opinion. On contrary, recent events seem to have increased solidarity of Tunisians. Even moderates like Tahar Benammaf3 (who has ostentatiously visited Bourguiba at Tabask) are lining up with Neo-Destour.

It is possible that change of personalities in Cabinet wld make things easier, from prestige and tactical point of view, but only if change were made by agreement rather than by force, and we feel sure agreement cld be obtained (if at all) only if new members represented substantially same groups and ideas as present ministers.

I devoutly hope French are not thinking of handing Bey an ultimatum on dismissal of Cabinet. If he gave in to overwhelming pressure it wld weaken his own power as moderating influence in Tunisia and wld undoubtedly further exasperate all Arabs against French. If he rejected ultimatum, French wld be forced either to back down or depose him, and I do not think either French or we can afford repercussions of another deposition in Tunisia.

I believe solution present impasse lies along fol lines:

1.
French shld stop fretting about prestige and personalities and recognize that Neo-Destour with Bourguiba at its head is dominant fact of life in Tunisia. Any discussion which attempts eliminate party is eventually going prove futile.
2.
French shld likewise stop being indignant because Tunisian leader “condoned” or even inspired violence. Violence is inherent in situation this kind. Charles de Gaulle, Edgar Faure, Jean de Hauteclocque, not to mention George Washington and Joan of Arc, all advocated and practiced violence in support political aspirations their people.
3.
French shld recognize Tunisian appeal to UN is equally natural and logical reaction of dissatisfied natlists and shld stop insisting on withdrawal of appeal. If de facto negotiations resumed in Tunis, UN [Page 678] case will almost surely collapse. If talks unresumed, other Moslem states will push complaint on Tunisian behalf whether or not Tunisian leaders openly active in matter.
4.
Instead of haggling about conditions under which negotiations case resumed, French shld come forward with concrete proposals. In reality talks have never been suspended; what has happened is that instead of talking about substance they have been talking about procedures and making broad statements of principle. This plays into Tunisian hands, since efforts to change procedure through establishment of mixed command they like give impression of subterfuge, while juridically and propagandawise Tunisians are on their strongest ground when discussion is reduced to questions of principle. On basis of treaties principles of UN Charter and previous French declarations it is almost impossible argue have been offered.
5.
If French wld offer definite concessions not tied to any conditions I think they wld have good chance of breaking, the log jam. Without destroying essential elements of French control, these might include fol:
(a)
Legalization of natlist parties and release of leaders. (Order has been substantially restored, so this need not involve serious loss of face.)
(b)
Through public inquiry into asserted excesses in Cap/Bon and Sahel regions.
(c)
Statement that Tunisian natl sovereignty (not merely Bey’s personal sovereignty) is one and indivisible.
(d)
Statement that eventual relationship between France and Tunisia shld be worked out over period of years by mutual accord (thus jettisoning idea that protectorate must inevitably be permanent) and that in meantime concrete steps toward internal autonomy wld be promptly resumed.
(e)
Tunisians to be appointed in place of present French directors of Reconstruction and Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones. A Tunisian to be appointed as asst SYG. (This wld give Tunisians majority of Cabinet, but that need not be disastrous as long as Resident General retains veto power. French FonOff considered giving Tunisians majority as long ago as summer of 1950.)
(f)
Except for certain highly technical posts reserved to French, Tunisians to have preference for all civil service jobs.
(g)
Discussions to be opened immediately for creation of natl and local rep assemblies, which wld have only limited powers initially, on basis of participation French reps only in economic matters directly affecting their interests, French political interests to be looked after by Resident General as rep French nation.
(h)
Without any statements being made, demands for dismissal of Cabinet, withdrawal UN complaint, prolongation grand Council, and establishment mixed commission wld be abandonded.

Foregoing suggestions wld be revolutionary from current French viewpoint, but I do not believe this situation can really be settled for less.

Jernegan
  1. This telegram was repeated to Paris.
  2. Not printed. Telegram 4621 to Paris, Feb. 6, expressed concern over the Tunisian situation and asked for information on French plans for handling the question in the Security Council. In reply, Paris telegram 4950 reported the Embassy’s impression that the French policy regarding Tunisia was still undecided. One Foreign Ministry official informed the Embassy that there appeared to be only two courses open. One was firmness and force, including removal of the Tunisians in government who wanted such complete concessions that negotiations would no longer be necessary; the other was capitulation to the Nationalist demands, a policy bound to culminate in the eventual loss of all North Africa to France. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.
  3. Presumably this reference is to Tahar Ben Amar, President of the Tunisian Chamber of Agriculture and former President of the Tunisian Section of the Grand Council. Paris telegram 5337, Mar. 5, reported that Maurice Schumann had had a series of discussions with Tahar Ben Amar, and that he was presumably the same man referred to in Tunis telegram 111. Despatch 306 from Tunis, Mar. 11, reported that Ben Amar had been to Paris, and while there had been widely received by French Government officials. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.