320/1–1652: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations ( Roosevelt ) to the Department of State

confidential priority

Delga 1059. G: Tunisia—possible SC item. Gadel 708,1 further Delga 1033,2 initial examination Tunisian complaint and covering statement of PriMin purporting qualify Youssef and Badra be heard, these documents suggest Tunisians playing this either for hearing in SC “or any other body”, presumably GA. We understand Tunisians put first emphasis on SC consideration of case because they feel GA presentation Moroccan item3 did not lead to satisfactory results and they have not been advised on or thought through implications request to SC.

Zafrullah stated they had approached him re supporting SC consideration. He determinedly noncommittal. He must ask his govt for instrs, and added he thought it unwise put before SC during French presidency. FYI Greece president in Feb.

1.
Staff sees clear inter-relationship between this move and Moroccan case which can again be brought up in GA at any time. If Tunisian [Page 671] complaint were to be put before GA, which we believe unlikely, it wld be most difficult for US, even if supporting French view it shld not be heard, keep it off agenda. Consistently with considerations recited Gadel 596,4 we feel it wld be wise to urge French not to oppose in headon way any hearing in UN organs.
2.
Basic complaint seems to us very weak, particularly from SC point of view, in that it recites that a dispute exists resulting from treaty of 1881.5 This 70 year old dispute is brought to [surface?] because of French action as indicated by note of 15 Dec. Thus there is no allegation of immediate danger to peace and security. Case cld be more effectively controlled in SC than GA which undoubtedly is reason for Zafrullah’s comment and French wld feel more secure, because of existence their veto. Also, so long as case is before SC, there is question whether GA can go beyond discussion in light art 12, and it can receive more leisurely treatment and all preliminary issues can be carefully examined. US can remain passive in public position until complaint is circulated formally as SC document or informally as of interest to SC members. We see advantages in French pres calling mtg on it rather than have Tunisians shopping with Pak and USSR.
3.

(a) Re adoption agenda, there are many precedents for preliminary examination of complaint without any finding on issue of SC competence. Most recently issue arose in Anglo-Iranian oil case, where Lacoste (France) stated 1 Oct 1951 in voting for placing item on agenda that where views differ on competence there is need for debate that subject. Parodi (France) in Hyderabad case 16 Sept 1948 stated it was preferable place item on agenda, it being understood all subsequent decisions, including competence, were reserved. He took same position Indonesian case 22 Aug 1947 and Berlin case 5 Oct 1 and Berlin case 5 Oct 1948.

(b) Question of right of PriMin or other Cab member to act on behalf Tunisia in absence authorization by Bey can be handled as credentials question under SC rule 14 and Min heard under SC rule 39 simply as person with info on complaint without proceeding under arts 31 and 32.

(c) Question of whether Tunisia is state within meaning art 35 wld probably arise at this stage but from political point of view we would question desirability SC determination based on finding on that fact.

(d) Original complaint suggests either this might be treated as juridical dispute involving interpretation of a treaty or it is clearly in negotiating state and shld be kept so by parties with at most item remaining on list items of which SC seized. Some such formula as this arrived at in unhurried way might avoid case being inflamed as Arab-French critical issue.

4.
Above preliminary analysis suggests desirability our urging Fr [Page 672] not left Position crystallize by strong statements on merits but that SC consideration along above lines wld be effective way keep case under control and not present Arab Nationalists with second rebuff. This wld also have advantage to us of keeping on our traditional line of hearing complaints with open mind as in initial phases Indonesian and Hyderabad cases.
Roosevelt
  1. Jan. 15; not printed. It reported the Department of State had concluded the Tunisians’ chances of obtaining any resolution were dimmer in the Security Council than in the General Assembly, and as a propaganda forum, the Security Council was not much superior to the larger body. (320/1–1552)
  2. Jan. 15; not printed, it transmitted the text of two documents, signed by Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik and dated Jan. 12, left by the Tunisians with Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary General. The first document was a letter to the President of the Security Council, asking him to put before the Security Council the request of the Tunisian Government concerning its dispute with the French Government. The second document was a letter of authorization for Salah Ben Youssef, the Tunisian Minister of Justice, and Mohammed Badra, the Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs, to present the letter in the name of the Tunisian Government, and to speak for it if the case came before the Security Council or any other body of the United Nations. (320/1–1552)
  3. For documentation on this topic, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, p. 135 ff.
  4. Jan. 4; not printed. It reported hope that the French might be persuaded to stop campaigning against consideration of the Moroccan question if it should be reintroduced into the General Assembly. Since the Department of State considered it probable that the item would receive the necessary votes to place it on the agenda, it saw little to be gained by the United States trying to exert influence on other delegates to try to keep it off, especially since there was strong Arab-Asian feeling on the matter. (320/1–452)
  5. This reference is to the Treaty of Bardo, signed in 1881 by the French and the Bey of Tunis, which had governed relations between France and Tunisia since that date.