788.5 MSP/10–854
No. 503
The Secretary of
State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have your letter of October 8, with enclosures, commenting on the possibility of an increased military assistance program for the Iranian army.2 I concur in the importance of an early decision on this matter.
Recent developments in Iran have resulted in a situation conducive to the attainment of United States objectives in that country. Settlement of the oil issue, following reestablishment of internal security by a strongly pro-Western government, the recent vigorous action to suppress communist activities in Iran and the current resolute attitude of most Iranian leaders vis-à-vis the Soviet Union have created an atmosphere which could not have been foreseen a year ago. The Shah and Government leaders are anxious to improve the effectiveness of Iran’s armed forces. They have stated on several recent occasions that Iran would join in regional defense arrangements, provided it has the forces to make a significant contribution. Additional assistance to the armed forces will offer a means of influencing the Shah and other leaders.
This situation presents us with an opportunity to carry out NSC policies of advancing the Iranian military position and of encouraging Iran to adhere to regional defense arrangements. There have been previous opportunities to assist the Iranians in building up their armed forces. These opportunities were not fully exploited because the objective was then only to maintain internal security in Iran and also because the Iranian political picture was less favorable. We believe that if the present opportunity is seized we can capitalize on the existing favorable situation in Iran and make a significant advance toward bringing Iran into closer cooperation with its neighbors in the free world and changing it from a liability to a positive asset in the Middle Eastern area.
I note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that “a buildup of Iranian military potential would be consistent with the military objectives of the United States in the Middle East.” NSC 5402 likewise [Page 1064] states that we should “provide United States grant military aid for Iran designed to:
- a.
- Improve the ability of the Iranian armed forces to maintain internal security and provide some resistance to external aggression.
- b.
- Enhance the prestige of the monarchy and the morale of the Iranian Government and military services.”
It would seem, therefore, that there is general agreement on the desirability of the further development of the Iranian defense forces for both political and military reasons.
NSC 5402 also provides that we “take into account:
- a.
- The attitude of Iran with regard to this aid and with regard to political, economic and military cooperation with the free world, including Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Iraq.
- b.
- Iran’s ability satisfactorily to absorb military equipment and training, and its willingness at an appropriate time to formalize necessary contracts for military aid and training.”
I think it is clear that military cooperation by Iran with its neighbors can be obtained in the relatively near future provided we are able to assure the Iranian leaders that their military capabilities will be increased to the extent necessary to enable them to make a worthwhile contribution to their own defense and that of the area. Without such assurances I do not believe they will feel willing or able to enter into the kind of arrangements contemplated.
The view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an expanded military aid program for Iran should not be approved until certain regional defense joint planning studies have been completed is fully appreciated. I can, of course, see the advantages of having such plans before deciding upon the allocation of our resources among the countries of the Middle East. As I have pointed out, however, there are strong political and psychological reasons for taking certain basic steps now to begin the development of greater Iranian military strength and thereby to insure Iran’s full cooperation in any eventual defense plans on an area basis.
If, therefore, I am correct in understanding that the Department of Defense considers future Iranian political and military cooperation of value to the security of the United States, I would suggest that your Department consider as a matter of urgency the preparation of an expanded program of military aid for Iran for presentation to the next Congress as part of our military assistance appropriation requests. I think the magnitude of such a program should not be limited by our present estimates of the funds likely to be approved by the Congress but rather solely by our estimates of the [Page 1065] amount needed to achieve the desired result. We should, I think, be prepared to recommend that the Congress seize this opportunity to support a program which will represent a net gain for free world security.
I recognize that in planning such a program the capacity of the Iranian armed forces to absorb equipment must be considered. I hope that through training and other means we can increase this capacity. In conjunction with your Department, the Department of State would be prepared to emphasize to the Iranian authorities that delivery of military equipment must be timed in accordance with the capacity of Iranian forces to utilize it effectively. From the political point of view, the essential is to be able to assure the Iranians that appropriate equipment and facilities will be provided as and when they fulfill their share of the bargain.
It is clear that the development of effective and adequate Iranian armed forces, along with an increased defense capacity will depend not only upon training and military end items but also upon economic and defense support to complement military assistance. Iran does not have the capability financially to support an increased military effort during the next few years while oil revenues are small. Urgently needed and politically essential economic development will consume a major portion of the resources which will be available. We are prepared to recommend and assist in programming additional defense support requirements (which in this instance may involve budgetary support for Iran’s armed forces) in coordination with the FOA. In this connection, we would appreciate the views of your Department as to the kind of defense support which is most urgently needed to complement the military assistance program.
There are as yet no funds allocated for the purpose in FY 1955, but Ambassador Henderson’s military advisors have recommended very strongly that some additional aid be urgently provided in connection with a training program. I am told intensive field training is a primary requisite to the improvement of Iran’s armed forces and that in order to take full advantage of the United States military training teams being assigned to Iran early next year, the Iranian Government should have additional budgetary support funds. These are necessary to acquire training areas and facilities, and to provide for special local needs arising from training activities and which are not provided for under MDAP. Whether such funds can be made available in the current fiscal year should be a matter for consideration between appropriate Officers of the Departments of Defense and State and the Foreign Operations Administration. The views of your Department on the military urgency involved should, of course, weigh heavily in the decision.
[Page 1066]The Department of State does not advocate the adoption of the specific program recommended by our MAAG in Tehran which, in our view, might be regarded simply as an illustrative proposal useful in considering this problem. We would, of course, rely on the judgment of the Defense Department as to the type and extent of a program best designed to expand the Iranian defense capacity.
We do not anticipate serious problems arising from possible reactions of other Middle Eastern countries to an enlarged aid program for Iran. In some of those countries new assistance programs are already being initiated and our policies with regard to aid are clearly justifiable on the basis of ability to absorb, the requirements of Middle East defense, and the relative contributions which various states are prepared to make.
For the foregoing reasons I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would give further consideration to enlarging the military assistance program for Iran and to the type of defense support which should accompany that program.
Sincerely yours,