788.13/6–1154: Telegram

No. 475
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State1

secret
priority

2513. 1. I called on Ala, Minister Court, June 10 at his request. He told me Shah had flown in earlier in day from Ramsar where latter was vacationing and would fly back later in afternoon. En route from airfield to Palace Shah had expressed himself as deeply disturbed at continued deterioration prestige government partly as result further additional errors in judgment on part of Prime Minister and tactless way in which Prime Minister was dealing with members Senate and Majlis. Shah had asked Ala to get in touch [Page 1027] with me immediately in order deliver message to effect that both Majlis and Senate becoming so hostile to government Shah feared he could not hold them much longer in line.…

2. I asked what development had led to Shah’s new concern re position Zahedi government. Ala said that criticisms of government because of its alleged corruption had been steadily increasing and public provisions should not be accepted. He asked Ambassador’s opinion. Ambassador replied to effect he had not discussed matter with either British or Iranians and was not aware any such suggestion had been considered. However, he felt Iran Government would understandably want, perhaps within some limitation as to quantity, freedom in making its own decisions re dollar expenditures. This conversion not mentioned to British.

(a)
It had recently released two extremely dangerous nationalists, Razavi and Shayegan, collaborators with Mosadeq, who had returned to their homes in blaze triumphal celebrations in which Tudeh Communists had participated. They already engaging in activities against government. Their release had convinced nationalists and Tudeh that government was weakening. I told Ala I had been informed that Shah responsible for their release. Ala said his understanding was that Shah had insisted that Sadeqi, former Interior Minister under Mosadeq, be released since Sadeqi merely honest, naive professor loyal to Shah who had been misled by Mosadeq. Minister however had taken position that Sadeqi in same category as Razavi and Shayegan and therefore he must release all three;
(b)
Baqai, former deputy and leader so-called Toiler’s Party, had been arrested several days ago in Kerman and interned in south Iran. Following agitation among members Majlis and Senate, government had reversed its decision and released Baqai. As result Baqai’s prestige had grown and that Prime Minister had declined. It was stupid Prime Minister to have arrested Baqai in first place. I told Ala I had heard Baqai was arrested because he was trying to stir up mob violence in Kerman during course election campaign and that he had been released as result intervention Shah. Ala said his information was that although Shah might have told Prime Minister that in his opinion it had been a serious political mistake to arrest Baqai nevertheless Shah had not suggested Baqai’s release;
(c)
In recent appearances before closed session of Senate Zahedi had taken arrogant attitude which had angered even his friends.

3. I told Ala that I thought change of Prime Ministers at present time would be injurious to Iran’s international position; it would raise doubts re Iran’s ability law and order; it would certainly have adverse effect upon oil negotiations. I was convinced that if Shah would adopt firm attitude in dealing with critics of Prime Minister and in giving guidance to Prime Minister present storm would [Page 1028] blow over and government would be able to proceed with important business of oil negotiations.

4. Ala said protracted absence of consortium negotiators had had weakening effect on government. Its enemies were spreading stories that negotiations had broken down and that there no hope government could find solution oil problem. Consequently nationalists and Tudeh elements were triumphantly insisting that Mosadeq had been right after all. Ala asked if I thought there was still chance Zahedi government be able reach agreement with consortium. I replied in affirmative adding I thought consortium negotiators would return Tehran within next ten days.

5. I told Ala I afraid government could do little in present circumstances with meager means at its disposal to check rise in costs of living which were primarily results Mosadeq’s policies. I thought it should, however, explain situation to public. I also thought it should take emergency action to convince public it opposed to corruption.…

6. Ala expressed agreement.… I saw Ala later at dinner. He told me Shah had again decided to continue giving full support to Zahedi and would insist that Prime Minister come out vigorously against corruption.

Shah had agreed it would be good idea for Panahi to be relieved but did not seem enthusiastic at idea Ebtehaj being his successor.

Henderson
  1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London.