Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

788.5 MSP/2–1954: Telegram

No. 427
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

top secret

Washington, February 19, 1954—3:15 p.m.

1751. A. New NSC policy on Iran states:

(1) US grant military aid is designed to

• “(a) improve ability Iranian armed forces maintain internal security and provide some resistance to external aggression, and
• “(b) enhance prestige of monarchy and morale Iranian Government and military services.”

(2) Amount and rate of such military aid to Iran should take into account

• “(a) attitude of Iran with regard to this aid and with regard to political, economic and military cooperation with free world including Turkey, Pakistan and possibly Iraq, and
• “(b) Iran’s ability satisfactorily to absorb military equipment and training and its willingness at an appropriate time to formalize necessary contracts for military aid and training.”

(3) In addition, NSC policy states Iran should be encouraged “to enter into military cooperation with its neighbors as feasible, and to participate in any regional defense arrangement which may be developed for the Middle East.”²

B. You are authorized use substance foregoing in answer Shah’s inquiry as to future Iranian forces. You may find it convenient approach Shah shortly after issuance Turk-Pak communiqué³ and announcement US intention provide military aid Pakistan this context. (We anticipate making announcement military aid to Pakistan about February 25⁴ and you should approach Shah re subject this tel immediately thereafter, see Deptel 1722⁵ for background information.) Referring these developments, you may wish point out that delay in reply Shah’s query due extended study Iranian security problem as part of general security problem of area and relationship American military aid thereto. While Department considers you in best position decide manner presentation revised US views on Iran to Shah, you may wish consider following approach:

(1) US view at highest level is that Iranian armed forces should develop some capabilities beyond those strictly required for internal security. UK concurs in this view.

(2) Although funds limited and inadequate meet urgent needs throughout world, US prepared grant Iran certain additional military assistance scope of which should be described in terms of end-items and training (recommendations from you and McClure will be basis for decision as to what buildup including armament, equipment and training seems feasible and desirable).

(3) However, believe that continued acquisition of heavy armament and equipment cannot within foreseeable future enable Iran alone to withstand outside aggression. We inclined believe only really feasible means for Iran to counter outside aggression or forward security interests is through joining hands with neighboring countries in coordinating defenses of area.

C. FYI only, it was recently decided to earmark an additional $19 million to existing military aid program for Iran. Of this amount $5 million was taken for “morale” needs now being provided. Remaining $14 million tentatively scheduled to be programmed for purposes set forth in B(2) above. The additional funds will permit some expansion, but on scale substantially less than has been recommended. Except for small amount to be provided for continuing maintenance of existing program, foregoing represents entirety of funds presently contemplated for Iranian military assistance program. Whether or not further funds for expansion might ultimately be approved or requested from Congress would most probably depend upon:

(1) absorption of aid rendered and valid and justifiable new planning under new NSC policy,

(2) priority of new proposals for Iran against all other calls for US assistance around world,

(3) degree of attainment of stability by Iranian Government including resolution of important internal problems,

(4) development in area defense arrangements plus demonstrated Iranian ability effectively to progress in developing military capability to participate effectively in regional defenses.

D. We fully realize it presently premature press for Iranian agreement join area defense arrangements, but in conversation with Shah you should make it apparent US interest in regional defense arrangements will influence decision regarding future military aid beyond program presently contemplated for Iran.

E. With reference A (2) (b) above, would appreciate your comments regarding possibility use aid funds encourage Iranian Government “formalize necessary contracts for military aid and training.”

F. Regarding B (1) above, British doubt that really effective Iranian forces could be developed, but believe nevertheless that in addition to internal security forces Iran should develop small highly mobile commando-type units for delaying harassing operations in northwest.

Pertinent points foregoing communicated to British Embassy Washington.⁶

Smith

1. Drafted by Ben F. Dixon, NEA, and Richards. Signed by Byroade after being cleared with Robert B. Black, Fretchling, and Colonel Gordon of the Department of Defense.
2. These quotations are from NSC 5402, Document 403.
3. For text of the Turkey–Pakistan communiqué of Feb. 19, see Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 327.
4. For text of President Eisenhower’s statement of Feb. 25, see ibid., Mar. 15, 1954, p. 401.
5. Not printed. (782.5/2–1354)
6. On Feb. 20 the Department instructed the Embassy in Tehran to withhold action on approaching the Shah until the Department sent further instructions. The British desired additional time to consider the matter further. (Telegram 1761; 788.5/220–54)