Office of the Historian

888.2553/12–553: Telegram

No. 394
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State1

secret
niact
London, December 5, 1953—1 p.m.

2444. Limited distribution. Smith from Hoover.

1.
Please pass Byroade Bermuda, in partial response his inquiry this date, London Embtel 2437, December 4,2 which also partially answers Deptel 2954.3
2.
British now tacitly agree some form consortium only practical solution but insist they must go through motions of assessing situation Tehran for themselves and determining extent AIOC participation. HMG estimate probably will not complete this phase until early January.
3.
To expedite progress, HMG and AIOC agree much time saved now by preliminary and hypothetical discussions between AIOC and six other large Middle East offtakers. Fraser has issued invitations accordingly to five American and one British company come London and explore possibilities.4 Draft this invitation seen by me and Jennings will submit copy to Phleger and Department soonest possible. Fraser apparently finds necessary mention me several times as urging this course in absence of his direct assessment in Tehran. I see no harm if will expedite situation. He seemed impressed by my argument he alone possessed initiative now and it was opportunity for great leadership and statesmanship on his part.5
Aldrich
  1. Repeated to Tehran eyes only for Ambassador. Passed by the Department to the Secretary of State in Bermuda as Tosec 24, Dec. 5. (888.2553/12–553)↩
  2. In telegram 2437 Hoover informed the Department that the Foreign Office and the AIOC still wished to assess the prospects themselves to see if the AIOC could return to Iran and, if so, under what conditions. The British claimed this was necessary to satisfy their own public opinion, elements of the British Cabinet, and the directors and stockholders of the AIOC. Hoover also reported that it was his conviction that the Foreign Office and the AIOC could not return in a dominant role, but they were hopeful that the situation was not as bad as Hoover had portrayed it. He also believed that the Foreign Office and the AIOC were now committed to proceeding with the consortium, especially since the AIOC would be able to return only with restricted participation. (601.4188/12–453) The Department passed this telegram to the Secretary of State in Bermuda as Tosec 16, Dec. 5. (601.4188/12–453)↩

  3. On Dec. 4 the Department informed Hoover that it understood that Jersey Standard and possibly other American oil companies had received invitations from Sir William Fraser of AIOC to send representatives to London to discuss the Iranian oil problem; that Socony representatives were going to call at the Department on Dec. 7 to discuss Fraser’s invitation; and that the Department wished Hoover to inform it of what he knew concerning Fraser’s invitation. (Telegram 2954; 888.2553/12–453)

    According to a letter dated Dec. 4 from Austin T. Foster, General Counsel, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, to Phleger, Foster had informed Phleger of Fraser’s invitation, dated Dec. 3, and had set up the meeting to be held on Dec. 7 at the Department. (888.2553/1–453)

    ↩
  4. Not printed. (888.2553/12–453)↩

  5. The Department further informed Hoover on Dec. 5 that S. A. Swensrud of Gulf Oil Company had informed the Department that he and representatives of four other major American oil companies, along with Royal Dutch Shell, had received invitations from Fraser; that Swensrud believed talks could begin in London about Dec. 14; and that Swensrud hoped Hoover would be available in London during the talks. (Telegram 2986; 888.2553/12–453)

    On Dec. 7 Hoover replied that he planned to remain in London during the proposed conference. (Telegram 2457; 888.2553/12–753)

    ↩