Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

641.88/11–1953: Telegram

No. 388
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Tehran, November 19, 1953—noon.

1140. Noforn. Department for Secretary, and Byroade.

1. I am fully in sympathy with need for early resumption Iranian-British diplomatic relations, and on basis Department’s expressed attitude have been pressing this matter upon Shah, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other leading Iranian officials. However, I can foresee certain serious difficulties which could affect adversely all we have been attempting to do in recent months, if firm. Note commitments are not made by United States and United Kingdom Governments to each other before formal relations resumed between United Kingdom and Iran. Nature such commitments I will elaborate below.

2. There is perennial Iranian fear that resumption diplomatic relations with United Kingdom will signify revival alleged United Kingdom interference in internal affairs to detriment Iranian interests on oil question. Many Iranians equally fear that they will be depriving themselves of strongest card in negotiating with United Kingdom, since they feel that United Kingdom actually more interested in reestablishing relations than in reaching oil solution. Such persons envisage that resumption of relations may be followed by variant of previous British policy, namely to wait until economic pressures could bring Iran to agree to type oil arrangement United Kingdom preferred, at same time endeavoring manipulate political arrangements most favorable that objective.

3. British attitude toward Zahedi government seems to us here somewhat unclear. We aware of assurances given this summer regarding fullest cooperation in event successor to Mosadeq should take office. However, we have remarked since that time certain attitude of reserve and wait and see taken by ranking British officials, United Kingdom stiffening in general field of oil proposals, and continued strong criticism Zahedi regime by Iranians long known as strongly pro-British. Our estimate of Iranian situation and prospects for 1954 being submitted in Embassy telegram 1141, November 19.² Therein we consider Zahedi regime, with its fundamental goodwill toward West, appears have best chance of any potential government to meet grave issues at this time facing Iran, including oil. If Zahedi government against its political judgment bows to British insistence for resumption relations without anything to show that progress has been made in oil dispute, it will only be as result efforts this Embassy on basis United States Government’s views on this question. Zahedi government hence will consider United States has strong moral responsibility to see that thereafter United Kingdom take no internal steps to undermine this government in its negotiations regarding oil, or in its very existence.

4. In light attitudes many Iranians and situation as it appears to Embassy, I believe it extremely important UK have full grasp of implications US role in Iran in behalf entire free world, including UK, and of extent to which US risking its prestige and influence while in that role. It seems to us that UK on its side should be in position to give for definite period of time concrete assurances to US Government that it will not countenance and will disapprove any efforts here which could be interpreted as unilateral UK objective to undermine and replace Zahedi government. We are of opinion such a period could extend during course of oil negotiations and for at least limited time following successful signature and Majlis ratification of an oil agreement.

5. It vital to common objectives US and UK in Iran that there be no possibility of misunderstanding on basic issues following resumption UK-Iranian relations. There no doubt Iranians, from whatever motivation, will do all possible to sow suspicion between US and UK following that event. Interest of both our countries could suffer disastrous reverses if such activities even partially effective. Shah himself if he considers for one moment there some divergence between US and UK approaches to Iranian problems during this crucial period will not hesitate join in game. Shah’s support is keystone any actions on part Zahedi government to cope with serious problems such as Majlis elections and oil negotiations and eventual Majlis ratification of oil agreement. Hence, common Anglo-American attitudes toward Shah without slightest deviation and full mutual confidence, justified by behavior not only between two governments but also between their representatives in Iran, are essential to maintenance of Shah’s support for and to prospect success of Zahedi regime.³

Henderson

1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London for the Ambassador.
2. Infra.

3. On Nov. 21 the Department responded that it greatly appreciated Henderson sending this cable, as it would help the Department to prepare for the impending Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. (Telegram 1225; 641.88/11–1953)

   The Embassy in London replied on Nov. 25 that it agreed entirely with Henderson’s views as expressed in telegram 1140. (Telegram 2257; 641.88/11–2553)