888.2553/7–751
No. 36
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Secretary of State1
top secret
[Washington,] July 7,
1951.
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Freeman Matthews—G
- Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA
- Sir Oliver Franks—British
Ambassador
The British Ambassador called, at his request, and presented the attached
memorandum from Mr. Morrison
dated July 7, 1951, which was in response to conversations between
myself and the British Ambassador on the 4th of July relative to the
President’s proposal to send out a personal representative to Iran to
discuss the oil question.2
After reading the memorandum I advised that I felt the U.S. Government
could and should support the recommendation of the International Court
of Justice as requested by Mr. Morrison.3 I did, however, feel that it might still be
desirable for the President to
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send out a personal representative whose going might be linked to the
findings of the Court and who might facilitate a working out of a modus vivendi either in the way prescribed by the
Court or in some variation of the Court recommendation which might be
acceptable to both governments. I then sketched out some of my thoughts
in this matter (which were subsequently incorporated in the President’s
reply to Dr. Mosadeq4) for the benefit of the
Ambassador.
The British Ambassador stated that he was sure that London would
appreciate United States support of the ICJ recommendation and might not oppose the President’s
sending out a representative if linked to the Court’s decision in the
way that I had suggested. He stated, however, that he would like to go
back to London on this point and hoped to advise me by noon the day
following as to London’s reaction.
(The British Ambassador did, on the day following, advise the Secretary
that London acquiesced in the proposed reply by the President to Prime
Minister Mosadeq’s message, even
though it was indicated that Mr. Morrison still had the same reservations with respect to
the President sending out a personal representative.)
[Attachment]
Foreign Secretary Morrison to Secretary of State
Acheson
top secret
[London, July 7, 1951?]
H.M. Ambassador has reported to me your conversation with him on the
4th July about Persia, and your suggestion that President Truman might appoint a personal
representative to discuss a settlement of the dispute with the
Persians and us, to see whether any road to a solution could be
found.
Let me say at once that I fully share your concern at the course of
events which may develop from the present deadlock and that I
greatly appreciate your wish to make some positive contribution
towards a satisfactory solution. The concern which you feel, and the
suggestion you have put forward, encourages me to give you a very
frank reply.
Since I became Foreign Secretary you and I have been able to settle a
number of difficult issues between us. In several of these a
settlement has been reached by our going a considerable way to
accept the American view. In dealing with this question of Persian
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oil, where we find
ourselves in grave difficulties, we need your wholehearted support.
I have greatly valued the help you have already given and I am most
grateful to you for your present suggestion, which I appreciate is
made with the sincere desire of reaching a settlement. But the
suggestion which you made to Sir Oliver
Franks of the lines which a settlement might follow
seems in substance to differ little from the offer already made to
the Persian Government by the Company during the visit of their
delegation to Tehran. This offer, which accepted the Persian thesis
of nationalization, was rejected out of hand, and since then the
Persian Government have refused to consider anything but the full
implementation of their nationalisation laws.
There is, however, a more important thought in my mind in considering
your main proposal. I must tell you that one of our main
difficulties in dealing with this intractable problem has arisen
from a belief persistently held by many Persians that there is a
difference of opinion between the Americans and the British over the
oil question and that America in order to prevent Persia being lost
to Russia, will be ready to help Persia out of any difficulties
which she may encounter as a result of the oil dispute. Influential
and friendly Persians themselves have told us this, and stressed
that it is an important factor in encouraging Dr. Mossadegh’s present intransigence.
An approach by a representative of the President as you suggest
would, I fear, merely encourage Dr. Mossadegh in this belief. The danger of this would
be all the greater since the decision given by the Hague Court,
which has introduced a new and most important factor in the
situation. The Court has recommended that nothing should be done to
hinder the continuation of the Company’s operations as carried on
before the 1st May, and that these operations should be carried on
under the Company’s management as constituted before that date. It
has recommended the setting up of a Board of Supervision to ensure
that the Company’s operations are carried on in accordance with the
Court’s recommendations. We have declared our full acceptance of
these recommendations. It is now up to the Persian Government to do
the same and put an end to the unwarranted interference by the
temporary Board in the Company’s operations, which are now
threatening to bring the operations to an end.5 I feel
most strongly that what is wanted from you now is not an offer to
mediate, but a firm and categorical statement that it is up to
Persia to accept and follow the recommendations of the Hague Court.
Such a statement, making it clear once and for all that the United
States of America
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can give
no sympathy or help for a country which flouts a decision of the
world’s highest legal authority, would be of the utmost value at the
present critical juncture.
