S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Iran, US Policy Regarding the Present Situation, NSC 117, 136, 136/1”
No. 352
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Director of
the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)1
[Extracts]
Subject:
- Iran
Problem
- A.
- How will the Iranian situation be affected by the recent change of government?
- B.
- What attitude should the United States take toward the Zahedi government?
Discussion
A revolution is in progress in Iran. It has deep-rooted origins in the wave of nationalism sweeping Asia. The old pattern of rule has been irrevocably shattered and any leader must shape his program on the basis of nationalist aspirations.
The replacement of Dr. Mosadeq by General Zahedi is not a reversal of this trend. It is still too early accurately to appraise the [Page 761] stability or character of the Zahedi government. However, his experience as an officer under the ultra-nationalist Shah Reza, his resistance to British and Soviet policies during the war which led to his internment by the British, and his close identification with Mosadeq’s National Front from 1949 to 1952, support assumptions that he will be at least as nationalistic in outlook as was Dr. Mosadeq.
In addition to Zahedi’s personal credo, there are other forces in the Iranian situation which make it most unlikely that General Zahedi will reverse his predecessor’s policies to any major extent. He is reputed to be a realistic man who can recognize a need to cooperate with the West in order to obtain revenue from sales of Iranian oil. If he is indeed realistic he will also recognize that any early indication that he hopes to come to terms with the British on compensation would invite assassination. Prime Minister Razmara was killed the day after he took a decision to force a settlement with the British. Qavam was overthrown primarily because it was popularly believed that he intended to roll back the achievements of Mosadeq’s nationalists. General Zahedi will have to move very carefully to create an atmosphere in which he can move towards cooperation with the West without any appearance of sacrificing objectives which are cherished by the Iranian people as a result of over two years of Mosadeq propaganda and an abiding national belief that the British are responsible for the country’s misery.
. . . . . . .
In summary, there is no case for jubilation that our problems are ended in Iran. On the contrary, the future can be expected to bear remarkable similarity to the recent past.
Conclusions
- A.
- The United States Government should be prepared to move rapidly if requested in making substantial economic aid funds to the Zahedi government in addition to those already contemplated.
- B.
- This additional economic aid should be in the amount of approximately $37 million during the first year and should come from Mutual Security funds available for FY 1954.
- C.
- Zahedi should not be pressed at this time to enter into discussions regarding the oil dispute nor to make anything more than a most innocuous statement which might serve to counter-balance the position taken in President Eisenhower’s letter of June 29.
- D.
- Planning with the British and with major United States oil companies regarding the type of oil settlement which might eventually be made should be commenced at an early date.
- Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Richards.↩