Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.2553/6–553

No. 330
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Washington, June 5, 1953.

Subject:

• Letter from Dr. Mosadeq to President Eisenhower

There is attached a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Mosadeq to President Eisenhower which was delivered to the President on June 5, 1953 by Ambassador Henderson.²

In handing this letter to the Ambassador for delivery to the President, Dr. Mosadeq said that it would be most unfortunate were the existence of the letter to become known.

The following are the principal points in the letter:

1. A recitation of the difficulties experienced by Iran, allegedly as a result of British attitudes and activities.

2. An expression of grave concern over the probable consequences of a further deterioration of the financial and economic situation in Iran, which deterioration can be reversed only by (a) the removal of obstacles to the sale of oil or (b) increased economic aid from the United States.

3. An urgent appeal to the U.S. for increased aid “if the American Government is not able to effect a removal” of the obstacles to the sale of Iranian oil.³

1. Drafted by Richards.
2. For text of Mosadeq’s letter, May 28, see Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1953, p. 74. Eisenhower’s reply, delivered to Mosadeq on July 3, followed the line of policy agreed on at the June 19 meeting; for text, see ibid. See also Document 332.
3. A handwritten note by Byroade on the source text reads: “Sec: We will give you a draft reply as soon as possible.” According to a memorandum of a conversation held in the Department of State on June 19, among Matthews, Bowie, Waugh, Schaetzel, Raynor, Jernegan, Richards, Stutesman, and Ambassador Henderson, it was decided that a reply should be drafted for the President to send to Mosadeq that would politely refuse his request for immediate increased economic aid but would not burn any bridges in case, at a later date, the United States might wish to make budgetary and economic aid available to an Iranian Government. (888.2553/6–1953)