Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.2553/10–1852: Telegram

No. 228
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Tehran, October 18, 1952—noon.

1591. Eyes only Byroade.

1. I asked PriMin for appointment this morning to talk with him on personal basis. I told him I had come of my own volition without instructions from Washington. I was taking this action because I believed it my duty to do everything possible to prevent break of relations between Iran and UK, far-reaching consequences of which shld be known to him as well as to myself. I said it my understanding that my govt for several days had been making studies in hope of being able find some suggestion which might serve at last minute to bridge gap between Iran and UK. I had hoped that Iran wld not decide to break relations until US Govt had had opportunity to complete its studies. When I heard his speech on Oct 16² I had at first assumed that nothing more cld be done to prevent rupture. Since, however, step representing actual break had not as yet been taken I decided this morning to make one more effort to forestall development which might do tremendous harm to Iran. I asked PriMin if it wld not be possible for him to delay breaking for several days so that Washington might complete studies which it had undertaken.

2. PriMin replied that he had intended to give note to Middleton this afternoon which wld terminate dipl relations but in view of what I had said he wld postpone doing so for 48 hours. I said it wld be extremely difficult accomplish much over weekend and asked if it was absolutely necessary for him to make break on Monday, Oct 20. PriMin finally agreed that he wld take no action before Wednesday, Oct 22, although failure to do so might cause some embarrassment between him and various colleagues. I told PriMin that things had gone so far that it might not be possible for me to offer him any suggestions at all. Nevertheless, it seemed to me worthwhile postponing taking final step re break if the slightest hope existed. I added that since my visit was of personal character I wld prefer that fact that I had suggested postponement not be made public. PriMin agreed and said that if there shld be any question re purpose my visit he wld state that I had sought from him informally certain clarifications re his radio statement of Oct 16. Emb is giving same answer to press. This answer is not entirely inaccurate since I did discuss several points contained in his speech.

3. In view of above, I hope that Dept and Emb London with Nitze’s help will be able to work out some kind formula which might be presentable both to UK and Iran. I also hope that neither Washington or London will object to this last minute intervention on my part. It was extremely difficult at this distance always to obtain instructions in advance and, therefore, at times I consider that it is in our natl interest to take certain actions without them.³

4. Middleton informed.

Henderson

1. Repeated to London for the Ambassador and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in New York for the Secretary of State. (888.2553/10–1852)
2. On Oct. 16, Mosadeq made a radio address in which he announced that the continuance of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Kingdom was futile in view of the unfriendly attitude adopted by the British Government in its Note of Oct. 14. Mosadeq failed, however, to outline any steps to implement his decision to sever relations.
3. The Department, in telegram 961 to Tehran, Oct. 18, thanked Henderson for his initiative. (888.2553/10–1852)