888.2553/10–352: Telegram
No. 219
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Iran1
priority
niact
820. Eyes only Henderson and Gifford. Brit Emb today informed Dept that Eden considered it extremely important that we maintain position of solidarity set forth in joint US–UK proposals to Mosadeq, and stated that Mr. Churchill was deeply disappointed to learn from President’s msg that he did not wish to join in reply to Mosadeq’s counter-proposals. Mr. Eden hoped nevertheless that we might agree on joint reply to be signed by him and me on behalf of Mr. Churchill and President. In line with this suggestion Brit agreed to accept draft of our proposed msg to Mosadeq but with certain minor changes.
This afternoon Brit Emb made available to Dept preliminary draft of proposed Brit refutation to points in Mosadeq’s counter-proposals and later Brit Amb called to discuss both msgs with me.
Brit Amb was informed that President in his reply to Churchill said “I can understand too your belief you must answer accusations made against Brit action in Iran. So I think that if this Govt replies at all it shld do so separately”. The Brit proposal went directly contrary to this by proposing that we both make joint or identic replies and that Brit wld then fol by another msg which in fact seemed to us unnecessarily provocative. This meant we wld be associated with this second msg. Brit Amb then inquired whether, in event Brit preferred make reply similar or identical with ours and were willing drop any further and separate msg, we wld be willing proceed with our suggested reply to Mosadeq.
We made it clear to Brit Amb that we had not through President’s msg, nor were we now, attempting exercise pressure on them to influence form their reply. We were concerned with protecting ourselves against association with their second msg which might limit effectiveness of anything we might do in future.
After consultation with President, I informed Brit Amb that you wld be instructed to deliver fol msg to Mosadeq providing (1) Middleton receives instructions to submit similar parallel msg (we wld not object to deletion by Brit in their msg of words “there are [Page 483] doubtless other equitable methods” although we must retain this in our msg. We wld indeed prefer that they paraphrase our msg although we do not insist on this), and (2) providing Middleton receives instructions to assure you that Brit will not deliver any other reply in any form. Otherwise you are not to deliver any msg to Mosadeq and shld await further instructions. In this event Middleton is of course free to deliver any msg he may receive.
Our msg fols.
Msg to Mosadeq from Acheson to be delivered only if foregoing conditions are met:
“I have been in touch with the Pres since he recd your msg of Sept 24, 1952, and, since he is away from the Capital at this time, he has authorized me to acknowledge your ltr. He is disappointed to learn from it that you have found unacceptable the proposals which were put forward on Aug 30, 1952.
It had been our understanding that the Iran Govt’s position was that negot for settlement of the oil dispute must take into account: (a) the fact of nationalization, (b) the complete independence of Iran in the operation of its oil industry, and (c) the freedom of Iran to sell its oil on other than a monopoly basis.
It was and is our sincere belief that the proposals which were put forward on Aug 30 met these points. These proposals clearly recognized the fact of nationalization and did not seek to revive the 1933 Concession, or any concession. Foreign management of the industry was not put forward as a condition, or even suggested. There was no intent to propose a monopoly of the purchase of Iran oil.
As regards claim for compensation by the Co and the counter claims by Iran, we suggested a method of settlement of all claims by impartial adjudication. There are doubtless other equitable methods. In regard to the question of the price to be paid for Iran oil, we suggested that this shld be worked out between purchaser and seller rather than by Govts.
Regardless of the acceptability of the proposals of Aug 30, it is a matter of regret to us that their meaning shld have been misunderstood. We have tried to correct this because of the real importance which attaches to our words being understood by you as they were meant by us. Acheson”.
If Mosadeq gripes about a parallel reply you may point out to him tactfully that in light of his “counter proposals” the net situation might have been considerably worse and urge him to apply himself to constructive nature of msg which leaves door open to further efforts by all concerned.2
- Repeated to London. Drafted by Richards; cleared with Secretary Acheson, Under Secretary Bruce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs James C.H. Bonbright, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Linder; and approved by Jernegan.↩
- On Oct. 4 the Department informed Ambassador Henderson that Foreign Secretary Eden had agreed to the delivery to Mosadeq of short parallel messages, and that there would not be a further British reply to Mosadeq’s note. Therefore, Henderson was authorized to deliver the note to Mosadeq contained in telegram 820, after concerting action with Middleton. (Telegram 825; 888.2553/10–452)↩