Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.2553/9–2952: Telegram

No. 217
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

secret
niact
priority

Washington, September 29, 1952—8:06 p.m.

784. Brit Emb this morning handed us fol three msgs:

A. Text of tel from Fon Sec to HM Chargé d’Affaires in Wash.

“Form of Mussadiq’s reply and manner of its delivery show that, apart from an obvious desire to keep oil dispute going, his main object is to divide US and ourselves. Mussadiq has also distorted and misrepresented joint proposals. He even omits altogether to mention one of our points, namely grant of 10 million dollars from US and does not come seriously to grips with suggestion of negots with AIOC for purchase of oil. His counterproposals are unacceptable.

2. Mussadiq’s accusations against HMG and co must be refuted. We cld not however expect USGov to subscribe to detailed refutation and we therefore think that best course wld be to send Mussadiq short joint reply bringing him back firmly to earlier joint proposals, and for HMG alone to reply in detail to Mussadiq’s allegations. You may so inform State Dept.

3. In these circumstances PriMin and I have agreed on terms of possible joint reply and text of msg to Mr. Truman. Pls convey these to him.”

b. Text of msg from Churchill to Pres:

“You will no doubt have already seen lengthy msg which Mussadiq sent me in reply to our joint tel. Anthony and I have prepared draft answer for ur consideration. Evidently his hope is to avoid our joint approach. It seems for this very reason all more important that we shld continue together. Britain has suffered by Persian depredations losses which I am told may amount to 60 millions pounds Sterling a yr across dollar exchange. We cannot I am sure go further at this critical time in our struggle for solvency than proposals which you agreed were fair and just. It seems also to me, if I may say so, that it wld be hard prospect for Amer taxpayer to have to bribe Persians (and how many others?) not to become Commies. Once this process started it might go on long time in lot of places. Naturally I have thought great deal about danger of Tudeh revolution and Sov infiltration or aggression. I may of course be wrong but as I at present see it I do not feel that it will happen that way in near future. Anyhow it seems far more likely that Mussadiq will come to reasonable terms on being confronted with continued Truman–Churchill accord. I earnestly hope therefore that we can send him msg from us both on lines of this draft.”

C. Text of draft joint reply to Mussadiq:

“We are disappointed to see from ur msg that our joint proposals shld have been misunderstood in so many ways. Ur fears that proposals fail to recognise Persia’s nationalisation of oil industry, or seek to reinstate 1933 Concession, or think to impose monopoly purchase of oil, have no foundation.

All three of us are agreed that question of compensation shld be decided by Internatl Court. UK and US Govts think that Court shld be free to consider matter in all its aspects. To contend that only those aspects favourable to Persian claims shld be considered wld prejudice decision of Court. We cld not accept this attitude and we urge Persian Govt to reexamine our proposals which are reasonable and fair, and, if accepted, wld bring immediate substantial benefit to Persian people.”

Acheson

1. Repeated to London. Drafted and signed by Byroade.